893.00/11232: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
887. Your 339, September 30, 3 p.m.
1. Upon receipt of the Department’s telegram I repeated it to Hankow and Nanking for confidential comment as the Department requested. I also repeated it to the Admiral. Following based upon comments which I have received.
2. As to instigation. Lockhart says:
“The real instigators are not definitely known but there is reason to believe attacks are a part of campaign of the several communist or bandit armies in this district, aided and abetted by enemies of Chiang Kai-shek, to cause trouble for the Nanking Government. There are those who believe that the responsibility rests with Northern militarists who desire to make as much trouble as possible in the rear of the Nanking army and thereby draw troops away from the front and also to prevent despatch of further troops northward which two purposes have been served. This theory is somewhat sustained by repeated efforts of political agitators to create trouble at Hankow for past two months. Such a widespread and thorough organization [Page 194] lends color to the theory that shrewd political agents associated with the Northern allies may possibly have instigated the campaign which has not been difficult to execute because of the willingness of ex-soldiers and professional bandits to enlist in the cause. Since the firing is directed at all vessels including those under Chinese flag, it would not be correct to term it antiforeign in character. It is unquestionably being done by groups of armed men identified with the several communist or bandit armies which have been operating in this district for several months.”
Admiral McVay states that
“Various detached forces and bands engaged occupying and looting towns in several localities and in firing on vessels along the Yangtze River cannot all be definitely characterized, but no matter whether they are called or call themselves Communists, bandits or robbers, result is same as they are against recognized Chinese Government and regularly organized Chinese military forces. Chinese and foreign individuals and interests suffer and there are numerous cases where towns have been looted and burned, inhabitants murdered or held as hostages for ransom and Chinese women taken.”
[Paraphrase.] In a conversation I had with Admiral Sir Arthur Waistell, British Commander in Chief, China Station, he informed me that British ships on the Yangtze River were having a difficult time between Wusueh and Hankow and west of Hankow in the Shasi neighborhood. The Admiral said that the banks of the river had been occupied by bands using the communist insignia, and they were firing boldly at all ships passing up or down the river; that the Chinese population had been compelled to flee; that navigation aids marking the river channel, such as beacons and lights, had all been either destroyed or moved; and that evidently it was the intention of these people entirely to interrupt river traffic. The Admiral supposed it was their purpose to destroy commerce on the river in order to embarrass the National Government at Nanking and to embroil it with the foreign powers. [End paraphrase.]
3. Sole firing is done by armed Chinese forces occupying river banks between Wusueh and Hwanghsihkang between Kiukiang and Hankow and above Hankow in the neighborhood of Shasi. These bands are part of organized armed forces under various leaders which would then terrorize [have been terrorizing?] the provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi and Hupeh during the past 7 months. They are made up of ex-soldiers and of radically inclined forces that accompanied the Nationalist advance on Hankow in 1926, to leave with Chang Fahkwei in 1927, plus local bandits, and are added to from time to time as various armies are defeated, demobilized or mutiny because of lack of pay. These groups use communistic slogans and insignia which has given rise to term applied to them by Chinese as well as foreigners. They renew their supplies of ammunition by seizing [Page 195] arms in towns or cities captured, or by purchase from Government unpaid troops.
4. Objectives. As to objectives I have partly covered this in paragraph 2. To summarize views expressed to me, objective would appear to be embarrassment of Nationalist Government at Nanking by interrupting traffic on the river and embarrassment of the Government by several foreign powers. To this may be added irresponsibility and pure deviltry of men possessing arms who have nothing to lose by their activities.
5. [Paraphrase.] I consider it would not be wise to address the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs upon this subject, since it is my feeling, and Admiral McVay is in agreement with me on this point, that a communication of this sort would only bring a reply to suggest that American vessels be completely withdrawn from the Yangtze. It is the view of the Legation, with which, I believe, both Consul Adams and Consul General Lockhart agree, that the Chinese Government will attempt to take steps for the suppression of this activity should peace prevail as a result of the present intervention by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and should the Government be able to withdraw armies for the purpose from the Lunghai Railway area. The Government will be obliged to take some steps in order to prevent the movement from completely paralyzing trade in the Yangtze Valley and thereby curtailing much-needed revenues. However, the Government will be handicapped by the greater mobility of the bandit groups and by the probable unwillingness of the soldiers to engage further in warfare. [End paraphrase.]
6. Lockhart makes following suggestion:
“An appreciable reduction in the number of engagements between American naval vessels and the armed forces being made could probably be effected by a considerable reduction in the movement of such vessels from one position to another. The frequent passage of naval vessels between Hankow and Kiukiang and Hankow and Ichang invariably subjects these vessels to fire and they quite naturally do not wish to be attacked and not return the fire. Except in cases of necessity which may certainly be expected to arise occasionally, naval vessels, pending a clearing up by the Chinese authorities of a bandit-infested area along the river, might well remain in the large ports where the possibility of such attacks is reduced to a minimum. The movement of naval vessels is of course of necessity for the protection of American lives and property, for the morale of the officers and men and for repairs but I do feel that the movements could be appreciably reduced and thereby remove some of the opportunities for engagements with armed forces ashore. I favor station ships for the principal ports of the Yangtze so far as that policy is feasible from naval point of view.”
7. [Paraphrase.] I feel there is considerable virtue in the suggestion by Lockhart, but I hope the Department may be careful in [Page 196] whatever use it makes of the suggestion, or in whatever discussion it has with the Navy Department, so that Lockhart may be protected from any criticism or implication. [End paraphrase.]
8. All nationals, British, French, Italian, Japanese, American and Chinese, are suffering from the same menace. Bandit groups are attacking all without discrimination. I cannot see how our naval vessels can act otherwise than they have acted. It is significant that there has been no reaction on the part of Chinese, either north or south, against activities of foreign naval vessels. This may be due to the fact that in the south they believe attacks are instigated by Northerners (see Lockhart’s suggestion in paragraph 2), and unwillingness of North to admit connection with outrages. Unless we are to permit river to be closed completely to traffic by American naval and merchant ships, firing by American naval vessels will have to continue as long as attacks are kept up.
- Telegram in ten sections.↩