893.00/11079: Telegram

The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

694. Your 264, August 6, 6 [2] p.m.

1. Following from Hankow:

“August 11, 4 p.m. My estimate of the Hankow situation is as follows:

While definite and reliable information concerning Communists’ movements and plans is, as may well be understood, difficult and almost impossible to obtain, it has been stated that there are numerous Communists within the city and they are undoubtedly in communication with groups operating outside. It does not seem probable that such groups within the city are well armed. Past experience—Yochow, Changsha, et cetera—would indicate that an interior communist uprising will not occur unless outside communist aid can be availed of at once.

Communists outside the city are on practically all sides in small groups at varying distances from Wuhan. Their military strength is small unless they can arrange for joint operations in connection with some of the so-called Red armies mentioned in the Consulate General’s despatch No. 1000 [1004?] of June 30th.80

[Page 167]

The forces which operated against Changsha are believed to now be in Liuyang and the vicinity of Pingsiang. There is evidence to believe that the Reds operating in central China have a plan of operation which contemplates the capture of Wuhan or a part of it. It does not seem that they can operate against Hankow within a short time although indirect information, from Japanese sources indicates that the Japanese anticipate trouble in this area before August 16th.

There is in the present situation no substantial guaranty of security. I have reason to believe that remnants of Hu Tsung-tu’s Hupeh troops (possibly 4,000) still exist in western Hupeh. I think many Hankow Chinese would welcome their entry to the city. They would not have to be Communists however and would probably not unite with the Communist troops although they might ally themselves with the Northern Coalition if occasion offered. They are not active now.

I view with concern the garrisoning of Ichang and Shasi with Szechuan troops as there exists in it the danger of Liu Hsiang’s influence in Szechuan being weakened with the possibility that his military rivals may cause trouble in Szechuan. Liu Hsiang is understood now to be confronted with a shortage of revenues.

Although crops are reported good on rivers of central China, in many sections they are being harvested by Communists who allow the farmers only 10 percent thereof. There is no stability in the interior of the central provinces and many persons predict that Changsha will be retaken by the Reds. However the war situation may go, the financial difficulties of the governing Chinese are bound to be great soon and the release of soldiers from the fronts at the cessation of hostilities seems fraught with dire possibilities. It would seem that as far as the Yangtze Valley and a large part of the territory within the consular district are concerned, the present outlook for the fall and winter is distinctly unfavorable. Local situation is as follows:

(1)
Wuhan garrison can be estimated at maximum of 10,000.
(2)
General Ho Ying-chin has been ill, possibly from overwork.
(3)
Numerous military conferences have been held recently.
(4)
Forty Chinese have been executed during past week. Many of the forty beheadings have been staged on the streets of the former concessions and bodies allowed to remain several hours before removal.
(5)
The police in Hankow have been disarmed either to give their rifles to soldiers or because of a fear that they might turn over to Communists or Northerners.
(6)
It is rumored that troops in Wuhan have not been paid for several months, which I doubt, but their reliability may be questionable.
(7)
The Kinhan line is frequently being broken by bandits despite military’s efforts to keep it open. In view of Legation’s July 30, 5 p.m., this may be a precaution to insure safe retreat although there are no local indications of reverses on the Kinhan line.
(8)
On August 8, Admiral Craven and I made an extensive tour of the native city of Hankow where conditions seemed practically normal. We saw in all about 50 soldiers, several of whom were doing picket duty at waterworks.
(9)
Chinese business, while dull, seems otherwise normal.
(10)
Plans for the concentration of American citizens residing in Wuhan have been elaborated on in conjunction with Admiral Craven. [Page 168] I believe all Americans could be assembled at protected concentration points in a few hours.
(11)
Japanese and French are prepared to defend their concessions. British are prepared to defend large portion of their concession at Chungkung,81 which will afford protection to National City Bank which has 12 short tons of silver in its vaults. Japanese defense plan includes Standard Oil Company number 1 installation. Americans in 3 defense areas mentioned will assemble there instead of American Consulate if time and conditions will not permit them to reach Consulate.
(12)
British intention to defend former concession may be due to fear that British business cannot well withstand another evacuation and its possible attendant looting and destruction with the consequent substitution of claims for actual values.

Copy to Admiral Craven, Nanking, Shanghai.”

2. Legation’s July 30, 5 p.m., to Hankow, referred to, is to the effect that Marshal Feng had wired Yen’s diplomatic representative in Peking that since Generals Yuen Wei-chun and Hu Tsung-an had gone over to the Kuominchun, Feng expected at that time to occupy Hankow without fighting within 10 days.

Johnson
  1. Telegram in six sections.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Presumably former British Concession in Hankow.