Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1930, Volume I

500.A15a3/804: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

London, March 29, 1930—6 p.m.
[Received 7:44 p.m.¹⁰]

177. Your telegram No. 271, March 28.

1. An analysis and summary of the various forms of political pacts which in one form or another have been given support in respect to this Conference will help you best to understand the past week’s events and to secure future coordination.

(a) Ambassador Houghton on his return from London brought to my attention almost a year ago the British desire for consultative arrangements with us as a precaution against a clash between our Navies when the British Fleet was serving as an ancillary to the League of Nations and might thus interfere with our trade. This danger is well known; it has been the subject of frequent discussion and the attention of British statesmen has been preoccupied by it. The purpose of such a consultative arrangement would be to obviate friction between the United States outside the League and a Europe organized under the League. Particularly as the British Navy will be supported by the navies of the other members of the League, it is important for us to know what course will be pursued by it in case of an impending emergency. Eventually such consultations are certain to take place; it would, however, appear of great advantage to all parties if they should occur prior to the creation of an irrevocable situation fixed by the League Council’s vote. It appears to me that a consultative pact of this kind is the only one having a direct connection with this Conference’s problems, for the British have been embarrassed by the absence of such consultation in fulfilling their obligations under the League of Nations and the Locarno Agreement toward the French and therefore French security is impaired in the opinion of the French.

(b) At the time of the Russo-Chinese crisis last summer, Claudel, acting for Briand, suggested to me that, in order to provide machinery to meet such a situation, there be added to the Kellogg Pact a consultative clause based on the Four-Power Pacific Treaty. While I have always felt that a clause of this kind offered many difficulties to the Kellogg Pact and have had a preference for other machinery which I have had in mind, nevertheless I expressed myself as being ready to discuss the proposition.

(c) The French in their note to the British on December 20, on the subject of the Naval Conference, brought up their demand for an agreement as to mutual assistance. They suggested different forms which such assistance might take, for example, the amplification and clarification of the Locarno Agreements now existing and a Mediterranean Pact. Because of this demand and its temporary refusal by the British, as I have stated before, it was impossible for the United States to consider any political pact, even solely for consultation, as a substitute for the French demand, for fear that it would lead in the future to misunderstandings as to the scope of American obligations.

(d) Apparently the situation was further complicated and all distinction between these fundamentally different forms of political pacts was confused when the Foreign Policy Association and French propaganda entered into the discussion and it was taken up by the American press.

(e) My press conference of March 11 was prompted by this confusion of legitimate consultation with implied obligations. In that conference I made it clear that our objection was not to consultative pacts in themselves, but to the circumstances which surrounded the broaching of the question. In my many conferences with Mac-Donald I also made this plain, as well as to Tardieu and Briand; see my telegram No. 156, March 23, 9 p.m.

2. MacDonald’s position on this matter, as stated in my telegram No. 156, has gradually shown a decided cleavage from that of his Foreign Office. Since he retained personal control over the negotiations and was decidedly in opposition to the granting of the French demand, those who thought otherwise could never discuss the question of a change in this attitude.

3. Upon receipt of advices from Tyrrell on the evening of March 21, as I reported in No. 152, March 22, MacDonald apparently thought it impossible to bring about an agreement between the five powers. I think such a feeling on his part was justified, in view of Tyrrell’s advices and MacDonald’s own views with respect to the French. On Saturday, March 22, there was a strong effort made, apparently by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, to further, even on new lines, a five-power agreement. Apparently Henderson sympathizes with their view. That the Conference was on the brink of a precipice, with the consequent disastrous result to the whole European peace situation which would follow failure on such issues, was recognized by all parties. Consequently all parties attempted to canvass entire situation prior to a break which would be final. A meeting at one o’clock on Saturday, the 22d, was held by our own delegation, at which time the situation was discussed from all angles. Craigie told me last Saturday that Massigli’s view of the situation was that it was not so hopeless as Tyrrell’s report indicated. Therefore, we sent you our No. 156, on Sunday, March 23, containing our complete summary of the situation.

4. I sought the conference with Alexander, Henderson, and Mac-Donald on Monday morning, March 24, as reported to you in my telegram No. 161, March 25, because it had become clear to us that there were decidedly different points of view in the British delegation as to the proper course to pursue with respect to France and because we were unwilling to have any possibility of misunderstanding with us prevent the saving of the situation. This was the first real opportunity we had had to discuss with the Prime Minister and Henderson the question which seemed to be holding up the Conference. Obviously the question which the French regarded as fundamental was what was the true British position with respect to the clauses in the Covenant of the League of Nations providing for mutual assistance. The British had been a party to these clauses for more than a decade, but the apprehensions of the French had been aroused by Mac-Donald’s attitude. Especially did his radio speech on “entangling alliances” disturb them.

5. French diplomatic and journalistic methods throughout the Conference have apparently irritated MacDonald, whose great patience, tact, and industry have characterized his conduct of the negotiations. We have felt, as we viewed the general peace problem of Europe, that Henderson’s view toward France was the sounder one. I believe I am accurate in saying that the spirit of that portion of the Rapidan statement of October 9 which follows: “the part of each of our Governments in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active cooperation with its European neighbors; but each of our Governments will direct its thoughts and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world” is being adhered to by the Foreign Office and Henderson.

6. The importance of my statement made on March 24th to the British, which merely repeated what I had already said to Tardieu, Briand, and MacDonald (emphasized, however, by the impending crisis), was that it gave Henderson his first opportunity to urge upon MacDonald a reconsideration of the British position toward the French; and MacDonald had evidently been won over to Henderson’s view by Tuesday morning, as the latter then was given authority by the Prime Minister to telephone to Briand at Paris that they would discuss the subject of mutual security with the French. The French themselves had, at the same time, evidently experienced the beneficial effect of the threatened failure of the Conference and the invitation to return to London was accepted by Briand. In the French afternoon papers of Tuesday incorrect and sensational accounts of the changes in the situation were already appearing; and the necessity of our midnight statement was occasioned by these incorrect accounts reaching London that same evening.

7. You can see from the foregoing the rapid course of events which the impending failure of the Conference produced and during which an opportunity for the British to change their position was furnished by our statement. I need not tell the President how much I regret that my statement, contained in my telegram No. 156, failed to reach him before he had given out his press statement on Tuesday. It was sent at 9 p.m. on Sunday, and there had been inserted sections (7) and (8) expressly to warn you that the matter of a consultative pact might come up, although we were surprised with the rapidity with which matters moved. I appreciate the fine sporting spirit of the President toward us in the face of the extreme difficulty into which he had been put. Please tell him so.

8. I will discuss with the delegation promptly your suggestion, in your telegram No. 271, for a consultative clause, and you will be kept advised of any changes in the negotiations.

Stimson

10. Telegram in six sections.