Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1930, Volume I

500.A15a3/803a: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

Washington, March 28, 1930—4 p.m.

271. I think you should understand the President’s position regarding a consultative pact and I, therefore, submit the following for your own personal information. From the very beginning, his attitude, as you know, has been against inclusion of any political undertaking as a part of disarmament agreement. Both of us were of the opinion that the Kellogg Pact was the political basis for reduction of arms at the present.

At the time this situation began to loom up as a result of peace society and French propaganda, we observed from your telegrams Nos. 126, 128, 136, and 152^3a a continuous refusal to agree to any consultative pact or any other political pact with the exception of consultation provisions with respect to a naval program in the treaty growing out of the Conference and of the general purport of the Washington Armament Treaty. We had no intimation that there was any possible change until we received your No. 156;^3b then your No. 161,^3c regarding the offer you had made to the British, was received before we were able to reply to your No. 156.

At his press conference the same day but before the receipt of your Nos. 156 and 161, the President made a strong statement to the newspapers, not for quotation, to the effect that such a pact would be of no purpose or effect on reduction of tonnage, relying of course on your previous statements. He has continuously advised Senators, newspaper editors, and other persons who have been agitating this question that no political action could be taken by this Government. He is much pressed, therefore, on the inconsistency of the present situation. He does not intend to embarrass the negotiations, however, by explanations or other statements but he is of the opinion that any form of political pact would very likely strengthen the opposition of big navy people by including others.

We are of the opinion that this situation leads to some important considerations.

• First, there should be strict limitation of our commitments within the spirit of the President’s Armistice Day speech.⁴
• Second, a political pact should be a separate treaty from the naval treaty as was the case of the Pacific treaties, so that if the political pact should not receive confirmation it would not put the disarmament program in danger; and at some appropriate time our colleagues in the Conference could be informed that it would be impossible for us to guarantee ratification and that two treaties must not be contingent upon each other.
• Third, we should be fully advised as to any new departure in the negotiations even though it would mean delay, so we could have time to reflect on it before you indicate your position.

This is merely an explanation of the difficulties which confront us here and the things that should be safeguarded against, and the President does not wish you to think that this is in the nature of criticism.

The President and I suggest that you consider a repetition of the two vital clauses of the Kellogg Pact, instead of the formula in your No. 167^4a and then continue as follows:⁵

“In accordance with the spirit of this undertaking the signatories declare that in event of controversy among them they will advise with one another fully and frankly to the end that they may discover pacific means of settlement (it being the clear understanding that so far as it concerns the United States ‘pacific means’ shall exclude from discussion any military or other coercive action.)”

The foregoing formula does not necessarily represent our final opinion.

It is suggested further that the Bryan treaties⁶ be considered by you as to the possibility of rendering them binding upon all parties.

Cotton

1. Ante, pp. 55, 57, 62, 72.
2. Ante, p. 75.
3. Ante, p. 79.
4. Delivered on November 11, 1929; Congressional Record, vol. 72, pt. 1, p. 505.
5. Ante, p. 87.
5. Quotation not paraphrased.
6. For the Bryan treaties for the advancement of general peace, see Foreign Relations, 1914, index, p. 1130; ibid., 1915, index, p. 1328; and ibid., 1916, index, p. 1007.