Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1930, Volume I

500.A15a3/788a: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)

[Paraphrase]

Washington, March 26, 1930—6 p.m.

265. After reading your yesterday’s press statement and after conference with the President, I send you the following:

It is our wish to call the following points to your attention with respect to the whole question of a consultative pact:

1. If the provisions of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty¹ are applied to a setting which is European, even though a reservation is made against military action, they become an entanglement of the first order in European affairs, this being particularly true of paragraph 2 of the Pacific Pact. The two settings present this essential difference: With respect to Europe, if included in the present treaty, it would apply to every European political disturbance which might affect any one of the five parties; with respect to the Pacific Pact, we have possessions in the East and the Pact refers solely to those possessions.

2. The supplementary agreement of December 13, 1921 [February 6, 1922²], by delimiting action further under those provisions, which cannot be included in the present treaty, modified the Pacific Pact.

3. To repeat the text of the Pacific Treaty as a part of the text of the present proposed treaty would be to incur, therefore, the greatest possible dangers. We would be drawn into questions into which we could not go if the pact were so drawn as to be confined to Europe; and if such a pact were not confined to Europe, other powers would be drawn into questions affecting the Western Hemisphere, and this we cannot allow.

4. To us it would appear that the provisions of any such pact would necessarily have to be strictly limited to an agreement of mutual frank communication with the purpose of finding means for peaceful settling of any dispute apt to occasion war between those signing, and that such interchanges should be confined wholly to the ascertainment of peaceable methods and should leave out specifically all consideration of military or other sanctions, that no signatory shall be obliged to take part in such interchanges dealing with problems in which they say they have no concern, and it should contain an affirmation that it is this country’s policy not to become involved in controversies with respect to Europe.

5. There are certain implications which some will draw if some of the Pacific Pact terms were included in this treaty. It would be interpreted as a declaration of the purpose to dominate the world by five naval powers. It is true that even the adoption of the above modified form if it employed the word “consultation” would be interpreted in all probability as leaving the implication of conference and it should not be “consultation” but rather “communication.”

6. It appears to us important that, as early as possible and prior to further discussion as to a consultative pact, your Conference ascertain whether or not France will be satisfied enough with the sanctions which Great Britain is willing to offer to reduce her terms to an approved level before you discuss the terms of any arrangement which they may ask of you. As any arrangement which might be made by you would have to be so diluted as not to be particularly valuable, it would seem improbable that any consultative arrangement would be asked of you. We think the above course best because the whole matter in public discussion on this side has assumed undue importance.

7. It is our desire, in any event, to be consulted and informed as to the form in which you propose to put your commitments before you have discussion as to their terms.

Cotton

1. Signed December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 33.
2. ibid., p. 46.