500.A15a3/777: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State
156. The following is our survey of the situation.
(1) Negotiations as to the relative size of their fleets have been conducted by the French and the Italians and by the French and the British. On some of these negotiations, particularly those between the British and the French, we have sat in at the request of both sides. I have conferred many times with MacDonald, Briand, and Tardieu, in addition to which Morrow has kept in constant touch with Aubert and Massigli. The French, in coming to the Conference, we believe desired it to succeed; however, from the first they have insisted upon a mutual assistance security pact in which Britain would participate. France would have substantially reduced her figures, we think, had she gotten such a pact. Whether under Britain’s two-power European standard such reduction would have been enough to meet the figures in the agreement we have had with Great [Page 76] Britain we cannot say, because negotiations between Great Britain and France have not gotten that far. We have never been asked directly by France to give her a consultative pact; and we are certain, on information we have gotten, that even had such a pact been offered she would not have, on that basis alone, reduced her figures.
(2) A pivotal point in preventing an agreement between the British and the French has been the unwillingness of MacDonald to satisfy the French on the subject of European security. In his former administration, you will remember, the protocol idea, so-called, with the purpose of strengthening the League of Nations sanctions even to military protection against an aggressor, was partly his doing. The subsequent Conservative Government repudiated this tentative arrangement for the protocol. Chamberlain substituted Locarno for this protocol idea. The French assert, in this regard, that the hope was held out to them by the British that the League would be strengthened not by a sweeping agreement for sanctions but by a series of regional pacts, the parties to which would be those countries having a vital interest in the particular regions to be protected.
Ten months ago when MacDonald entered office there was under way in England a decided reaction against that country entering into any further sanctions through which they might become involved in a continental struggle. With the coming of our negotiations, the French demand for security through a Mediterranean Pact, which was suggested by them in their December note, was refused by MacDonald, who has not since forsaken that position. Two weeks ago French disquiet was added to by his public statement in opposition to entangling alliances. The French claim that they cannot understand this change from Britain’s former attitude toward them. It would now be difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the MacDonald Government to reverse itself completely in this position, as there seems to be an increasing volume of public opinion in Britain in support of MacDonald’s attitude toward keeping free from further entanglement in continental affairs. Not all members of his own Cabinet, however, have heartily supported this position. Henderson, who was at Geneva for seven weeks negotiating the protocol in 1924, feels, and has always felt, that Britain, provided she could get in return definite naval reduction from France, should add to or at least reaffirm definitely her European obligations. He criticizes France on the ground that she does not offer great enough reduction of armament in return and not because she asks for more security. In brief, he feels that France never gave sufficient consideration in return for the Locarno Agreement, although he feels it was all right for Britain to join this agreement and even the protocol idea. The permanent officials of the British Foreign Office, who realize that [Page 77] they must continue to have France as their nearest neighbor, seem to share Henderson’s feeling. Tyrrell, who is now in Paris and who has much weight with the permanent officials, we have been told, shares this view.
(3) The British effort, in place of the security pact, has principally been to endeavor to secure from Italy for France a reduction corresponding to or greater than that which she asks of France in order to force the latter’s figures down. We have from time to time been invited to sit in on these negotiations by both sides as friendly impartial counselors, but have taken no part, though we have been present. No substantial success has come from these negotiations. France and Italy, both of whom have been very stubborn in their demands for parity in the one case or superiority in the other in naval strength, have toward the end shown some willingness to set aside their theoretical positions and instead to stand upon reservations thereof with the aim of adopting a modus vivendi. Willingness to make concessions with regard to over-age tonnage has been asserted by both, but as the matter stands neither has made any concessions in building programs or under-age tonnage.
British opinion considers France’s submarine and perhaps her cruiser program a serious menace, though we do not believe she is consciously building against Great Britain. A series of unpleasant incidents, which have occurred recently, have been the basis of suspicion and fear of France and Italy toward each other. I have no evidence of any danger to peace between the countries which is specific and imminent.
(4) The outcome of the interview between Tardieu and MacDonald last Sunday, which was unfortunate, has complicated the situation during the past week. Apparently MacDonald gave the French some ground for their belief that he has appealed to Mussolini through the Ambassador to get more definite figures. It was apparently through a French source that the possibility of British influence at Rome leaked out to the press. Both the Italians and MacDonald were greatly irritated. A dispute on fact arose between the French and English as a result. There had already existed a distrust between MacDonald and Tardieu, which has been added to temporarily at least by this incident. The incident has also brought forth a strong statement from the Fascist Council giving unqualified support to insistence upon parity by Grandi. Of course we had no representative at the meeting at Chequers, and I did not know of any action which was being taken in Rome by MacDonald. I had, however, solely for his information, apprised Garrett of the situation.96
[Page 78](5) Since day before yesterday when I sent my No. 152, MacDonald and I have not talked; but on Sunday Craigie told me that Massigli has tried to soften the position taken by the French as reported by Tyrrell from Paris and claims that that report is exaggerated; that there is no intention by Tardieu and Briand to end negotiations, but that the latter will be back Tuesday.
(6) It will be seen from the foregoing that two fundamental controversies exist, the first between the British and the French and the second between the French and the Italians. We can properly take no leading part in either. The parties to the controversies must themselves work out their problem with such friendly help as we can give. A mistaken idea as to the fundamental nature of the controversies is the basis, we think, for the idea of the American press that by some simple act or statement we could bring about their solution.
(7) The following is our position with reference to a consultative pact:
I have made clear to Briand and Tardieu that a consultative pact is not inherently objectionable to us, as we have already joined many of them, of which the Washington Disarmament Treaty was one. I told them that there was little doubt that a consultative provision with respect to matters of naval program in a treaty growing out of the Conference would be favored by us. I have made clear that our objection was to a pact which, because of the circumstances under which it would be given, would be considered as a quid pro quo for French reduction in naval armament; that we objected to any pact which might be the basis of a future demand for military assistance. Tardieu and Briand have both told me that they fully appreciated that no pact could be given by us which was subject to any construction of an implied promise of military assistance. We have been assured by the French that what they wanted and must have as a condition precedent to reduction of their program was a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain, or at least that Britain’s existing obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations be amplified or clarified. They consider this especially important, because they believe that Britain apparently wishes to back away from the European commitments which she already has made. A reason or plausible excuse is thus afforded France for getting a navy of some kind with the possibility facing them of confronting a European situation with Great Britain neutral. French public opinion, from the best sources we have, is solidly behind Tardieu and Briand. What the French are asking of Great Britain is understandable if we consider the continental agreements of the past decade, though we have no sympathy with their action. Our belief is that France is seeking [Page 79] to force participation in European sanctions by Britain through a French naval program very alarming to public opinion in England. This is particularly true with reference to France’s submarine program. Due to this the future of European politics gives us serious anxiety.
(8) Should Great Britain and France resume negotiations it is possible that a situation might arise in which it would be safe and appropriate to make a promise of some consultation. This is for your consideration. It might be of moment to both France and Great Britain if they had an assurance that we could be consulted when an emergency arose with respect to our method of exerting our peaceful influence toward maintaining the world’s peace, in case Britain upon consideration, should try to reach an agreement with France based upon some security pact, or amplification or interpretation of their covenants under the League as a quid pro quo for the reduction of the French Navy. The matter has been discussed by the delegation and we feel that a consultative arrangement of this sort would have to be safeguarded (1) by a separate security pact between France and Great Britain, and (2) by specific clauses which would clearly and expressly deny any promise of military assistance. The Rapidan joint statement of October 997 has been studied in this connection as a guide for a statement setting forth in their relation to Europe the different functions of Britain and America.
(9) With respect to our future action, we hope to confer with MacDonald on Monday. Confirmation of my views as to the effect of France’s position, as stated in my No. 152, has been gotten as a result of a conference Saturday with our delegation.
A new and favorable factor in the situation may be introduced as a result of cables from Tokyo which indicate a probable approval of our agreement.
- Telegram in six sections.↩
- John W. Garrett, American Ambassador in Italy.↩
- See press release issued by the White House, October 10, 1929, Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. iii, p. 33.↩