500.A15a3/744: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
126. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. I took Morrow with me on Saturday morning and had a conference with Henderson. Henderson and Briand, I had learned, were about to meet and I wished Henderson to know clearly the American position in opposition to the consultative pact. A definite and clear statement of this was made to him. This precaution was a fortunate one, as it developed that he felt quite differently from MacDonald and such a pact had even been drafted by him.
That afternoon I had tea at Stanmore with Briand and Léger, with Morrow present, and had a long talk with them. I then told them that I had reached the conclusion that any blending of a successful naval treaty and the Kellogg Pact now would be disastrous to both; that I was a friend of both. I gave them a full and careful explanation of my position on the modification of the Kellogg Pact, filling in fully the background since last summer when the subject was first broached; and my reasons for the conclusion which I had reached. I told him why the papers in America relied on by him did not represent real public opinion on the subject and explained fully to him the situation as to that public opinion. The interview, which was long and friendly, terminated in his telling me that the matter was ended so far as he was concerned and that he fully understood my position.
Briand and Massigli had a long conference at Chequers on Sunday with Henderson and the Prime Minister, as I was told by the Prime Minister today. He had overruled Henderson, so he told me, on the subject of a consultative pact. The interview with Briand, he said, had been long and friendly, and any idea which Briand had had of a guarantee of military assistance was ended. The Prime Minister hoped that through some other formula an agreement with the French could still be worked out. He is thinking of inserting a preamble in the proposed naval treaty which would recite and reaffirm the Kellogg Pact as to the renunciation of war. The following sentence from the joint statement made at Rapidan75 might possibly serve as the basis for such a preamble:76
“After full consideration our Governments resolve to accept the peace pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge.”
Negotiations between the French and the British were resumed today, with Morrow, Robinson and myself present. This session later merged into a session of a subcommittee, which lasted all day and will continue tomorrow, for the purpose of analyzing the British-French figures. Morrow was present.
Morrow and I believe that a purely consultative pact would not help in reducing France’s figures, unless the French people would falsely conceive such a pact to imply that we would give military assistance against an aggressor, and it seems to us that what France really wants is a security pact of mutual military assistance against an aggressor. We are convinced, in other words, that American newspapers such as the Baltimore Sun, the World, and the New York Times, which have been attacking the President for not favoring a purely consultative pact, are wrong in their belief that France would be satisfied with such a pact.
Reed, aided by me, has been carrying on negotiations with the Japanese contemporaneously with the foregoing negotiations. The negotiations with the Japanese are very tedious, as the Japanese, evidently in an endeavor to satisfy internal dissensions in their delegation, are bringing to us recurrent propositions which they know we will refuse; however, we believe we are slowly reaching a point of agreement with them which will be satisfactory.
The Italians remain noncooperative.
The reference to the Rapidan joint statement which the Prime Minister made last night in his broadcast was suggested to him by me in order that pressure on the President might be relieved by giving evidence that the Prime Minister did not expect America to cooperate in affairs in Europe.
- Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. iii, p. 33.↩
- Quoted sentence not paraphrased.↩