500.A15a3/741: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Castle) to the Acting Secretary of State
39. To be repeated to Reed in London.71 I am grateful for your message, which was clear and interesting. I have been told by Shidehara that, with regard to your conversations, he had just received a personal message from Matsudaira. The figures were exactly those sent by you. This seemed extremely generous, I said, and if accepted by the delegations it surely was a basis for agreement. The several points were discussed and I made it very plain that the suggested revision of the capital ship program depended absolutely upon agreement on auxiliaries. He said, in regard to large cruisers, that since we were definitely allowed eighteen such an arrangement was a denial of the 10–7 ratio demanded by Japan. I told him that it seemed to leave the question open for the next Conference, and the fact that the requested ratio was more than maintained could be [Page 50] established in public opinion prior to that time by the Japanese Government. If our last three cruisers could be postponed until 1935, he said that agreement would be simple, that then another cruiser might also be asked for by Japan. My answer was that Great Britain would certainly have something to say in this regard and that American public opinion was of equal importance with Japanese; that if these demands which seemed excessive were insisted upon by Japan very bad feeling in America would certainly be caused, something far more to be feared than an extra cruiser or two; also that he was mistaken in saying that eighteen cruisers was what we wanted, for actually our minimum had been twenty-one, and furthermore in reducing to eighteen we had made a great sacrifice, and that the only compromise could not certainly be limited to ourselves. Shidehara is, I believe, personally willing to accept American suggestions in regard to the cruiser question but fears the opposition of the Navy. The telegram has been shown to no Navy men by him.
The submarine question Shidehara considered the most difficult and asked the reason for our great opposition to submarines. Our belief, I said, was that submarines were bound to be used in the way they had been used by the Germans. Denying that Japan would ever so use them, he stated that they were wanted by the Japanese Navy only for coast defense, that ratio was not a matter of concern inasmuch as Japan could never be attacked by American submarines, but that a certain number for coast defense was estimated as necessary. Japan, he said, not only would be ready to sign the Washington submarine treaty but, since France would not agree that submarines could not even be used for visit and search of merchant vessels, would gladly sign a new treaty with the United States alone. The London arrangement, I pointed out, involved more than Japan and the United States, and France would be encouraged in its demands by the large submarine tonnage for Japan. We were not discussing ratio, I pointed out, but only whether Japanese submarines should be scrapped down to 52,000 tons when they reached 13 years of age. The United States was offering to scrap at once a large part of its submarine fleet.
He heartily concurred when I told him that it would be a tragedy if the Conference should be disrupted by Japanese insistence on 70 percent. There was a clear understanding that our talk was as informal as yours and Matsudaira’s. The suggestion made as to the submarine treaty was the only new one. Any discussion of fortifications was avoided because anything in the nature of a threat is not only ineffective but dangerous when dealing with the Japanese … [Page 51] In addition, looking at it from the broader aspect, nothing would be more certainly disastrous to peace in the Pacific regions than the construction of further fortifications. Only as a last resort could this be justified.