500.A15a3/733: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State
107. Department’s No. 163, March 3, 9 a.m.58a Please transmit the following to Castle from Reed as the delegation’s No. 27:59
The present situation in its bearing upon Japan is substantially as follows. The American naval proposal60 and the subsequent Japanese proposal,61 both made early in February, are the only formal proposals which have been submitted. There has been no recession on the part of either delegation from the positions outlined [Page 44] in these proposals, which you have received and which have also been published.
In the effort to devise suggestions to get around the deadlock, I have held frequent and informal meetings with Matsudaira. It has been suggested, but the suggestion has not yet been approved by either delegation, that the construction of our eighteen 8-inch-gun ships should be so planned that the last three should be laid down in the years 1933, 1934, and 1935, respectively. By this procedure Japan would be assured that we shall not have actually in service more than fifteen ships to her twelve when the next Conference will convene. We have worked out this schedule in connection with the general naval study of the possibilities of completing the construction called for under the proposals now being discussed between the Japanese, the British and our delegation. This suggestion is not inconsistent with the Japanese position and appears to preserve the American position. There seems to be no substantial dispute in regard to cruisers carrying 6-inch guns, as the Japanese demands are not in excess of what we are prepared to allow. They ask 105,000 tons in destroyers as against 150,000 tons for the British and Americans. Ninety thousand for Japan is our maximum. In view of the great preponderance in destroyers which we now have this appears fair.
The British apparently acquiesce in the suggestion concerning submarines which has been made to the effect that Britain and America should scrap down to 60,000 while all submarines becoming 13 years old between now and 1936 should be scrapped by Japan, thus giving the Japanese on that date 52,000 tons. The Japanese appear willing to accept the proposal on capital ships which was outlined in our original proposition for immediate scrapping and a construction holiday, it being understood that no new battleships to match the Rodney would be built by America or Japan. The fact that unless an agreement is reached on auxiliaries there can be no battleship holiday has been impressed upon them. Unless we can get a comprehensive treaty now, the Washington schedule must be adhered to as our delegation and the Washington administration will not yield at this point nor do I believe the British will do so. This fact should be strongly impressed on the Tokyo authorities.
A minimum of new construction outlay by Japan and the least possible scrapping of ships, which she now has, are called for by the suggestions now under consideration. Japan would be given by these suggestions in the two classes, which are its principal concern, 72 percent in 8-inch cruisers and 87 percent in submarines in actual commissioned tonnage at the time of the 1935 Conference. Naturally, however, at the completion of construction then under way if no change were made in the 1935 Conference Japan would be at approximately 60 percent in 8-inch-gun tonnage. If the Japanese insist on a flat 70 percent it can lead only to a disruption of the Conference and will necessarily arouse alarm in America and the demand that the treaty forbidding fortification of Manila be terminated. Our argument to the Japanese here is that our generous offer to scrap capital ships and half our destroyer fleet clearly shows our pacific intentions. It developed last night in conversation with the British that they are willing to go as far as, but no further than, the suggestions which have been made, especially with regard to the [Page 45] building of two additional 8-inch cruisers of 8,800 tons each by the Japanese. This proposal would clearly be cause for great alarm to Australia and New Zealand. It has been our effort to impress upon the Japanese that a large part of our cruiser, destroyer, and submarine fleet must remain in the Atlantic and at Hawaii and Panama. The Japanese would be given a clear supremacy over us in the Western Pacific by the suggestions we are now discussing. It is realized, I believe, by Ambassador Matsudaira that we have gone as far as it is possible to go in these suggestions and that even for this it will be difficult to get the unanimous approval of our delegation. Possibly Japan’s naval officials think they can secure better terms by holding out, but you will be absolutely correct in assuring Tokyo officials that this is not the case, should the question be broached.