835.01/8: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

129. The Department is already aware of the fact that the revolution has resulted in favorable advance of exchange and an offer of a [Page 383] loan double the amount asked by the Provisional Government; there are, however, other indications of immediate return of confidence; i. e., trade is resuming liabilities eliminated during the past years, commercial houses are making contributions to organizations previously refused in 1930, and in all probability the Supreme Court will manifest its adhesion to the Provisional Government within a few days.

The report of the embarkation of Irigoyen on an Argentine warship today is correct.

This afternoon the Spanish Ambassador called to inform me that he had received authorization to recognize the Provisional Government; that both he and the Italian Ambassador were desirous of proceeding at once but were disposed to wait if there were any likelihood of the United States taking similar action. I have learned confidentially that Uruguay is also ready to extend recognition. Yesterday the British Ambassador called to inquire about our attitude toward recognition, and I learned that he too had recommended it to his Government.

With reference to the Department’s 100, September 11, 1 p.m., it would aid me to know whether the suggestion of American-British cooperation in matters of recognition originated with the British. It appears to me that England as the traditional friend of Argentina gains by keeping the United States from obtaining marked advantage in being first to extend recognition while her own nonrecognition loses her nothing as long as the United States is also withholding recognition. On the other hand, by simultaneous recognition the United States loses an advantage which becomes a British gain.

The United States, as the most feared and envied nation, has an opportunity to assist Argentina at a moment when moral support would be particularly appreciated, and would unquestionably benefit our position here. American business interests desire recognition in order to hasten recuperative business.

While I am not unmindful of Pan American interests, the situation created by the Bolivian revolution2 and Peruvian revolution, or the possibility that a too prompt American recognition might be interpreted as of predatory intent, my handling of the delicate situation here would be strengthened were I to be informed what considerations are weighing against recognition.

Bliss
  1. See “Revolution in Bolivia,” pp. 415 ff.