Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1930, Volume I

500.A15a3/731: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

London, March 3, 1930—6 p.m.
[Received March 3—5:36 p.m.⁵³]

103. For the President and the Acting Secretary of State. Your telegram No. 154, February 28, 5 p.m. The possibility of making any treaty may ultimately depend upon the question of political security and it may well become pivotal. I am sending this estimate of the situation on to you so that you may be fully prepared in case the necessity for quick decisions occurs. The French, we hear, will return to London next Thursday and the events will then undoubtedly move quickly. This is merely to prepare you for all eventualities and in laying the possibility of last measures before you, I do not mean to paint too dark a picture.

The French, at their last meeting before Tardieu left, demanded ten new and two old, 8-inch cruisers. MacDonald was not willing to concede any old ones and only seven new ones, which was one more than the British Admiralty advised. They had not reached the difficulties regarding the submarine program. Thus far no argument has made any impression upon the Italians, who are unyielding in their insistence upon parity with France. If Great Britain would offer them some kind of security in the Mediterranean, they could make concessions, they have privately indicated to us. The public anxiety and feeling against France suddenly aroused here by her demands is the serious factor in the situation and I am of the opinion that if France persists in her program MacDonald may find himself eventually unable to carry through even a three-power treaty on the basis of our present tentative agreement with a clause similar to article 21 of the Washington Treaty. MacDonald has stated that if necessary he is in favor of such a three-power treaty but it is possible, I believe, that in the last event public opinion may compel him either to demand a much higher building program than that now agreed upon between us or to remain entirely free. The following is the situation as to security proposals: The British originally declined to give a guaranty pact for the Mediterranean. Informally the British suggested a consultative Mediterranean Pact, but the French were of the opinion that it added nothing to the Covenant of the League of Nations. An alternative form of agreement along the lines of the Locarno Covenant⁵⁴ has been informally submitted by the French, and this alternative form of agreement is still under discussion between France and Great Britain. I have informed both Great Britain and France that, whether consultative or guaranty, America would not join in such a pact.

Briand has suggested on two occasions that eventually he would wish to discuss with me an amendment to the Kellogg Pact, a matter which had been broached last summer in conversations between Claudel and me.^54a I told him that I should be glad to talk the whole matter over with him after these naval negotiations have ended. It is my surmise, though Briand has said nothing, that they will propose something in the nature of a quid pro quo for reductions in naval armament in the shape of an amendment to the Kellogg Pact. These are reasons why France might readily believe such a proposition on her part reasonable: (1) Because the need of additional machinery in the pact was brought up by me last summer, although what I had in mind was an investigative rather than a consultative clause; and (2) because the same suggestion for a consultative clause such as Briand now has in mind was made by Chief Justice Hughes last April.⁵⁵

As you know, it is suggested by your cable that the proposal is being urged by the French indirectly through the press and otherwise. Our information is that the Locarno proposal is still under discussion and this proposal is much more according to France’s wish. The danger to the naval treaty in the Senate, should any political agreement be presented as a condition, is recognized.

It does not seem to me, however, that the Kellogg Pact suggestion is inherently objectionable and if France should bring it forward its presentation to the Senate would almost necessarily have to be at a different time and as a different matter from the naval treaty, since much time for its negotiation with the other signatories would be required. I think, therefore, it should be given most careful consideration before rejection, should the point be reached where it offered the only solution to a complete failure of the Conference. The relations of the French with us make it easily possible to bring forward any such proposition directly and they should not be forced to use propaganda, and I am quite in harmony with the President’s refusal to give attention to attempts made indirectly to get from him a pronouncement on the subject.

If the question of security arises when the French return, I plan, first, to encourage the making by the Mediterranean powers of a satisfactory pact among themselves; and, second, to urge the consultative features of article 21 of the Washington Treaty upon the French. These would probably have to be introduced into any new treaty in order to assure them of consultation with America as to naval problems which may in the future arise. The British will not consent to a three-power treaty if none of these steps are sufficient to save the treaty from failure. May I have the President’s views as to how far a Conference resolution calling upon all the signatories of the Kellogg Pact for a consultative amendment to that pact can be supported by us? I append, in order that a full background of the matter may be before the President, a draft of the proposed treaty drawn up by us but which has been withheld awaiting a favorable opportunity to bring it forth at a time when final differences may be bridged by it. It has been shown to both MacDonald and Tardieu, but they have not been given copies. They are inclined to favor it. The consultative feature of article III has already been approved by the Senate, having been copied exactly from article 21 of the Washington Treaty. Here follows the present draft:⁵⁶

• “Article I. The contracting powers recognize the sovereign right of each power to determine for itself the amount and kind of naval armament necessary for its defense. They also recognize that in order to prevent competition in armaments and the international suspicion inseparable therefrom it is essential that each power in exercising its right should endeavor to adopt such a program of naval armament as will not alarm the other powers or be regarded by any of them as a menace, and such as to effect reduction of its naval armament to the lowest point consistent with national safety.
• Article II. The programs of naval armament for the period ending December 31, 1936, herein below set forth have been adopted in accordance with the principles stated above. They are not intended to define the relative maritime interests of the several contracting powers.
  • Program of the United States of America:
  • Program of the British Empire:
  • Program of France:
  • Program of Italy:
  • Program of Japan:
• Article III. The contracting powers agree not to exceed the programs herein set forth during the period ending December 31, 1936; provided, however, that if during the term of the present treaty the requirements of the national security of any contracting power in respect of naval defense are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the contracting powers will, at the request of such power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.
• Article IV. If at such conference a mutual agreement of the five contracting powers is not reached as to the amendment of the provisions of this treaty, then the power which has requested such conference may give six months’ notice to the other contracting powers of its intention to alter its program and will inform the other powers of the exact nature of such alterations. Upon the expiration of said six months said power shall be free to alter its program accordingly. Upon receipt of such notice each of the other contracting powers, absolves itself from the obligations of this treaty and in such case may alter its program as it may determine for itself.”

Stimson

53. Telegram in five sections.
54. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, signed at Locarno on October 16, 1925, by Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, p. 289.
55. See “Informal Suggestions for Further Implementing the Treaty for the Renunciation of War,” Foreign Relations, 1929, vol. i, pp. 59 ff.
55. Speech delivered by Charles Evans Hughes, President of the American Society of International Law, at the twenty-third annual meeting of the Society, Washington, April 24, 1929.
56. Quoted draft treaty not paraphrased.