500.A15/1139: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 26—10:20 a.m.]
39. I am sending in my telegram No. 40, November 26, 1 p.m.,85 some texts drawn up by the special subcommittee dealing with chapter V of the convention relating to the Permanent Disarmament Commission and to the general procedure with respect to complaints, derogations, and revision.86 These texts will now be submitted to the Plenary Commission.87
In this subcommittee there was at first a decided tendency toward giving the Permanent Disarmament Commission judicial or quasi-judicial powers to enable it to determine when and if the convention had been violated and what action should be taken by high contracting parties in the case of a violation by a contracting party.
- (b)
- [sic] Acts of another contracting party not in violation of the treaty but of a nature to give concern.
- (c)
- Similar acts of a nonsignatory state estimate, [sic]
There was a further tendency toward linking it closely with League machinery and the obligations under the Covenant. This situation became so involved that we took occasion to make a statement of our position along the following lines:
That we had envisaged a Permanent Disarmament Commission designed to receive, collect, and disseminate information, to follow in a broad way the progress of disarmament, and to make preliminary studies for future disarmament conferences. When, however, it came to giving the Commission actual powers as indicated in the preceding paragraph we felt bound in frankness to say that we could not follow their lead.
[Page 198]That we recognized in logic the distinction between the various classes of violations referred to above but felt that the remedy should be the same for all and should follow in broad lines the escape clause we had proposed.
That it was not always easy to find a formula that would meet the preoccupations of both League members and non-League members and if the subcommittee did not see its way to following along the path we outlined we suggest that the League members frame the provisions which would satisfy them. The non-League members could then consider to what degree and with what modifications they could adhere to the system proposed.
A considerable modification of views became apparent in the course of subsequent debate evidently due on the one hand to a growing realization of the impracticability of other alternative drafts, and on the other hand to the growing desire to have us included in the system from the beginning and as will be seen from the text our views appear to have been met in regard to most, at least, of the essentials.
In general the text outside of our particular amendment is more detailed and specific than we would have preferred. Indeed from the start it became evident that, opposed to the Anglo-Saxon desire for a brief and simple text which would permit the logical growth of the Permanent Commission through experience, was the rather general desire to foresee every contingency and specify in detail and with rigidity a rigid and binding procedure. In view of the fact that this desire for rigidity was based on apprehension as to the future, the acceptance of broader and simpler views seems to us to constitute a very material concession even though it be in the direction of common sense.
Studying the text it would seem that the only article of doubtful acceptability is article ZB dealing with the report to be made by the Commission upon receipt of complaints. We made it clear that we wished to give this article further study. We incline however to the belief that as finally phrased (it having been twice attenuated to meet our special preoccupation) it should present no difficulties particularly as the text remains subject to further modification at the Conference itself.
The Department will note two or three minor alterations made by the committee in our escape clause, notably that the Permanent Disarmament Commission should be notified of any temporary suspension of the convention together with the reasons therefor at the same time as the other high contracting parties.
The provisions of article OA concerning the status of members of the Commission seem somewhat open to criticism. These represent a compromise between the views held by the French and the British delegations. In view of the divergences of views on this point, this [Page 199] will undoubtedly be reopened at the Conference and meanwhile would not appear of sufficient importance to us to warrant a strong stand as there could in no event be an obligation on the part of the United States to accept membership on the Permanent Disarmament Commission if it did not so desire.
These articles will come up for discussion before the full Commission this afternoon or tomorrow and will probably be somewhat modified in text, although there is no reason to foresee that they will not be accepted for their broad outline.
We should greatly appreciate it if the Department would permit us to express general approval of the texts outlined, bearing in mind that this is a draft only open to modification and indeed complete review at the final conference. The delegates of the major powers have made very substantial modification of their thesis to meet our views and have shown an earnest desire and [sic] to meet our difficulties. It would have a happy effect if we could express appreciation at the third reading as well as a readiness to take this text as the basis of our discussions at the General Disarmament Conference.