500.A15/1075a
The Secretary of State to the American Delegates to the Preparatory Commission (Gibson and Wilson)77
Sirs: I am directed by the President to inform you of his desire that you represent this Government at the forthcoming continuation of the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. You will be assisted by the following advisers:
- Mr. Jay Pierrepont Moffat,
First Secretary of the American Legation, Berne. - Mr. Pierre de L. Boal,
Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs. - Lieutenant-Colonel George V. Strong, U. S. A.
- Captain William W. Smyth, U. S. N.
- Commander Thomas C. Kinkaid, U. S. N.
and by the following technical assistants:
- Major Robert Le G. Walsh, U. S. A.
Assistant Military Attaché, American Embassy, Paris. - Lieutenant Commander George D. Murray, U. S. N.
Assistant Naval Attaché, American Embassy, London.
In view of the progress made at previous meetings and especially in regard to naval questions at the London Naval Conference,78 it is hoped that the forthcoming meeting may dispose of the questions still remaining on the agenda and result in the elaboration of a final draft in which all the countries represented on the Preparatory Commission can concur. The President is heartily desirous of seeing the work of the Preparatory Commission brought to an early and successful conclusion in order that the general problem of the reduction of armaments may pass from the theoretical to the practical phase. While it is not expected that problems of major importance to the United States will be brought forward in this session, you will, nevertheless, have constantly as your goal the furtherance of [Page 188] effective general disarmament, and it is desired that you lose no opportunity to contribute to this end.
Regarding naval problems, you will be guided in general by the findings of the First Committee of the London Conference79 which were transmitted to the Secretary General of the League of Nations by the President of that Conference. It may be found necessary to modify the terms in so far as they apply to nations possessing smaller navies. The United States is not disposed to maintain an attitude so rigid as to prevent the inclusion of those foreign navies within the framework of limitation and reduction, and it may be necessary therefore to make such minor adjustments for their benefit as you deem advisable. It is well understood, however, that no such modifications would affect the treaty already existing between the principal naval powers.
Among the questions which will come up for discussion is Chapter II, Section III, Article AD, “Air Armaments.”80 This would be examined in connection with Article ZD.81 This Government could not agree to any draft which contained a reference to civil aviation as an arm of war or as one of the factors on which the calculation of armed forces is based. Indeed it appears that Article AD would serve merely as a justification for large figures in this field. Furthermore, it would seem that such a statement would have no proper place in the text of an international treaty. Nevertheless, we recognize that to many other States this matter is of paramount importance and if such States feel that they desire to attach to the draft a resolution embodying their own views and not that of all members of the Preparatory Commission, the American Delegation need take no exception thereto.
The discussion of Chapter III will bring up the question of budgetary limitation of military expenditures. This Government is of the decided opinion that the acceptance by the United States of any form of direct budgetary limitation is impracticable and on this point the Delegation must stand firm. When defining the Delegation’s position in this matter, it should be clearly stressed that the fullest publicity is given by this Government not only on expenditure, but also on numbers, weights, and units of matériel.
The question of a standard account may be discussed. This Government feels that the labor involved in changing the budgetary methods of fifty-odd states would prove very difficult in practice and hardly calculated to produce proportionate results. So far as this [Page 189] Government is concerned, full and detailed information is given, which could be embodied in any form of presentation or comparison.
Chapter V, Section I, Organization. It is understood that fresh plans in this connection will be introduced by the French and British Delegations. This Government is, of course, willing to enter into international cooperation for the fullest exchange of information and for such elucidation of fact as may be contributory to the cause of peace. The American Government is pleased to note that the present tendency of the Preparatory Commission is to move rather in the direction of “information and inquiry” than of “supervision and control” and abandon any form of control in the usually accepted English sense. It is noted with satisfaction that the draft agenda states that in examining this question the Commission will have to take into account the special situation of the United States, which is not a member of the League of Nations. While this Government would, of course, be unable to accept provisions for reference of such matters to the Council of the League of Nations, it would find no difficulty in accepting reference to a body set up by the Treaty which, in addition to a representative of the United States, might contain representatives of those countries represented on the Council.
10–Chapter V, Section III, will bring up the question of derogations, or methods of being freed from the obligations of the Treaty in cases of emergency. It is the belief of this Government that the obligations of such a Treaty will be more readily accepted by the various Powers if they feel that in case of genuine need they will not be bound. It is believed by this Government that the States will more voluntarily assume and more scrupulously observe obligations as to armament if they are free in cases of emergency to take adequate measures to protect themselves. We also believe that the states will go much further in the drastic reduction of armament if they are not bound by too long and too rigid terms. This Government is therefore in favor of including a broad escape clause which will merely specify that the nation which believes its security threatened shall, after a public statement of the reasons for this belief, be freed from its obligations, which would leave the decision and responsibility for the invocation of the clause solely to the Signatory Power concerned. In this connection, it may be possible to induce those states bordering on Russia to withdraw their reservation in view of the fact that they may adopt measures for their protection any time occasion demands. Furthermore, the argument for the necessity of including a clause justifying the consideration of the state of civil aviation of neighboring countries, loses a large portion of its value if every state is free to denounce the terms of the Treaty when it feels its security menaced.
[Page 190]In connection with the preparation of a report of the Preparatory Commission to the Council of the League of Nations, it is noted that this report will contain recommendations as to the date of the first General Disarmament Conference. It would seem sufficient for the American Delegation to state that this Government hopes for early and effective progress and will be prepared to participate at any date which the Powers are able to agree on as the most efficacious.
I have [etc.]
- Hugh S. Gibson, Ambassador in Belgium, and Hugh R. Wilson, Minister in Switzerland.↩
- See pp. 1 ff.↩
- See Department of State Conference Series No. 6, Proceedings of the London Naval Conference of 1930, pp. 123 ff.↩
- For text of the draft convention, see League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series X, Annex 1 (C. P. D. 211), pp. 423, 440.↩
- Ibid., p. 458.↩