500.A15a3/1230: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Garrett) to the Secretary of State
107. From Gibson. At Grandi’s request Garrett and I called on him at 5 o’clock this afternoon. He stated that although he wished to tell us something of how our suggestion impressed the Italian Government, he felt somewhat embarrassed in stating anything definite. He said that he had still felt rather optimistic when he had last seen us, because he believed that my conversation in Paris had at least prompted steps to be taken by the French for reopening conversations. (See my telegram No. 101, October 30, 7 p.m.)
Grandi went on to state that since that time the French Ambassador has made him feel extremely pessimistic by a further call on Friday evening. Beaumarchais stated that the French Government was glad to hear that Grandi was prepared to continue conversations on the naval question, and that if the Italian Government would as a precedent condition abandon the idea of parity, the French Government was ready to acquiesce.
[Page 169]In reply Grandi stated that, although they were prepared to make substantial concessions as to substance, they could not agree to abandon their principle previous to discussion. Beaumarchais said that in that case all he could do was to refer the matter back to the French Government.
He went on to say that information from several sources indicated that the building of two or three 15,000-ton capital ships was being contemplated by France, who were assuming that Italy could be depended upon not to duplicate their construction inasmuch as this was outside the auxiliary classes. He felt that they would almost inevitably have to duplicate French construction in this class on account of the popular outcry to the effect that their cruiser units would be outclassed by even one of these ships. He indicated by inference that, without reaching such a high figure as 15,000 tons—he mentioned 12,000—the French might construct something to deal with the German Ersatz Preussen. He added that, in dealing with this question by means of statements which paradoxically announce a program of capital ship construction that would have to be duplicated by Italy, he feared that it might result in an increase in French and Italian naval armaments instead of a decrease and that careful consideration must be given to this matter.
Grandi then brought up the subject of the reports coming from Paris and London intimating that France was making ready to come to terms with the parties to the three-power treaty and to complete a four-power agreement. Grandi stated that these reports had caused considerable resentment in Italy as it was felt that purpose of the move was to make Italy appear to be responsible for any future difficulties. When the Italian Ambassador in London had inquired at the Foreign Office regarding the basis of the report, Craigie had told him that “there was nothing official yet” on this subject, that it was nevertheless quite possible, and that he felt it might be rather a good thing as it would tend to force Italy to come to agreement of some sort.
Grandi said that he had been bewildered, when our suggestion was under consideration, by the move of the French Government in insisting, as a preliminary to discussion, that Italy surrender her parity principle, as well as by the somewhat ominous allusion to a four-power pact. If he were obliged to give his real thoughts, he told us, he would have to be rather disagreeable as regards other people. We could see plainly that the present French attitude bewilders him.
Grandi stated that instructions have been given to the Italian experts on the Preparatory Commission to maintain the offers which Rosso has already made and to examine any other proposals which may be made in a friendly way. Rosso, who was present, interrupted [Page 170] at this point. Since he himself was the one who was going to handle the problem at Geneva, he wished to clarify what he considered to be Grandi’s views. His statement was that they would maintain his proposals and would examine any others, and that they were quite prepared to examine, through the method we had suggested, whether a solution could be found—a statement from which Grandi did not dissent.
Perfect understanding of our helpful attitude in this problem was expressed by Grandi, who stated, however, that we would understand that, his position with the Grand Council being difficult, he would have to be prudent in view of French intransigence.
Rosso, after we had left Grandi’s room, asked us to remain so that the situation might be still further clarified. Rosso said that, while he had hoped Grandi would be more outspoken as to his real attitude, he did not hesitate to elaborate it in his own words since it was so definite. He stated that if a direct agreement could be reached with France making possible the completion of the five-power agreement by continuing the conversations after reaching Geneva, this would be preferred as a better arrangement by Italy. In reply to my statement that we would much prefer that the five-power treaty be completed and that our suggestion has been made in the event that this was impossible, he stated that they quite understood this, but that if in Geneva it became obvious that agreement could not be reached by direct negotiations, the Italian Government desired that our method of unilateral declarations be adopted. At my request Rosso repeated this part of the conversation in the same words to Garrett, who had not heard it.
This afternoon I talked with the head of the Italian delegation at Geneva, General de Marinis, and as a result of this conversation and conversation with Grandi and Rosso, Garrett and I are convinced that the Italians sincerely desire an agreement and that if they can avoid the appearance of a diplomatic defeat and thus allow Grandi to defend the agreement before the Grand Council, they are willing to make substantial sacrifices. No good effect, we are convinced, would result from any maneuvers to force them into foregoing the principle of parity or, by leaving them out of a four-power agreement, to make them appear responsible.
It is clear that, apart from what Grandi has said as to their reluctance to begin a building program, they have every interest in reaching an agreement and consequently avoiding heavy naval expenditure, in view of the fact that the financial situation here is becoming acute. Nevertheless the possibility that something might be put over on them clearly worries them, and if no attempt is made to meet them they may feel that they must duplicate the French program.
[Page 171]The French might be inclined to make exacting terms, we fear, if the foregoing were communicated to them.
We do not think, in any event, that anything can be done here to deal with this phase of the problem. You may, however, wish to use some moderating influence on France either directly or through the British, making clear to the latter that if the Italians were allowed to infer that they were being maneuvered into an awkward position by the Franco-British negotiations (telegram No. 342, from Paris, October 27, 10 p.m.) which have been reported in the press, it would have an unfortunate effect.
- Telegram in four sections.↩