500.A15a3/1214: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Armour) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

344. From Gibson. On account of the possibility that subsequent discussions may bring up details of my interview with Tardieu, I think it advisable to send you herewith, as a supplement to my telegram No. 341, October 27, the following full summary of my remarks to him, in the form of a free translation from the French:

“Inasmuch as I was going to Paris, the Secretary of State thought it desirable that I call on you and give you the substance of what he told M. Claudel on October 16, and also that I make use of the few days before the opening of the next meeting of the Disarmament Conference to call on Signor Grandi in order to give him the substance of Mr. Stimson’s conversation on the same day with the Italian Ambassador.

My message being rather long, I venture to begin by stating that it will lead up to a suggestion as to how a solution might be found of the Franco-Italian naval difficulty.

It is our conviction that there is a necessity for completing at its next meeting the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. If this session ends without completing its labors, we feel this completion will be indefinitely retarded, and a situation fraught with unpleasant possibilities will arise. It is my understanding that this view is shared by the French Government.

There seems to be no insuperable obstacle in dealing with the questions on the agenda, the naval question excepted. The Secretary of State, however, is worried by the thought that if the Preparatory [Page 157] Commission should meet without a prior solution of their naval controversy having been found by France and Italy, a distinct danger that the situation will be embittered as regards this and other problems will exist. The efforts largely under French guidance for finding a solution of the general disarmament problem have been followed with great interest by the United States Government, and Mr. Stimson’s friendly feelings prompted him to express his uneasiness at the present situation to M. Claudel.

French concern for security in any move toward disarmament is fully understood by the American Government. As you will remember, we recognized, in the course of the work of the Preparatory Commission, that the French thesis concerning land armaments resulted from this concern for security, and we have therefore deferred to the French conception in this matter even to the extent of giving up our insistence upon the necessity for limiting trained reserves—a concession which subjected our Government in the United States to severe criticism. I remind you of this merely to emphasize our genuine desire to meet the French conception of security and to fall in with this point of view as far as it is practically possible.

Considering this attitude of the American Government—which has been proven in practical form—I am convinced you will not take amiss a frank statement of our views on the naval phase of the disarmament problem as it bears upon the security of France. To us it seems clear that if it were possible to remove the French-Italian question from the field of discussion, security would inevitably be enhanced by the resulting confidence and good will.

If, however, there is continued the present insistence on the principles of parity on the one hand, and of superiority on the other, there is danger that security will tend to become diminished as a result of increasingly bitter discussions. We are convinced for this reason that, if the present misunderstanding with Italy should lead France to a rapid and complete execution of her 1924 program, the result would not be increased security but exactly the opposite due to the repercussions in other countries which would probably follow.

It is necessary to bear in mind another consideration: Should the 1924 program be put into rapid execution, it is apparent that the British Government, when a certain point is reached, would invoke article 21 of the London Treaty, thus upsetting the existing threepower agreement. Naval competition between the three signatory powers has been eliminated by this agreement; any event which upsets the agreement would certainly give rise to misgivings among the peoples of these three countries. It was my desire to draw attention to this merely as a fact which is evident.

I should like to express another thought as regards this controversy. In analyzing the problems between your two countries, it has seemed to us that these problems are far from insoluble, and that by a single step of real leadership it would be easily possible materially to improve relations between France and Italy. There would appear to be little hope of an agreement if negotiations are to be continued on the present basis, according to such information as we have regarding the progress of these discussions. The Italian insistence on naval parity cannot be reconciled with French insistence on naval superiority. It seems to us, however, that as a practical matter this immediate [Page 158] difficulty could be put to one side by a gesture of real political leadership by means of a unilateral declaration by both countries, postponing, until 1936, the question of principle and announcing, for the intervening period, restricted programs of construction. These declarations would of course be entirely unilateral and spontaneous as regards their public effect. As a practical matter, however, it would be necessary to coordinate them between France and Italy beforehand, and to make sure that the declarations really meet the situation as far as concerns Great Britain.

I am under the impression that the French delegation made this suggestion informally during the London Conference and it is our belief that at this time this offers the one practical way toward a solution. You will recall that a similar idea has already proved very useful as regards the slowing up of this year’s building programs; and we believe that if this French idea could be adopted, both countries could easily leave out of consideration, for the next five years, the parity problem. What is more, a gesture of this sort would produce an atmosphere of harmony which would increase the possibility of later on reaching the more lasting agreement.

In the event that the French Government could see its way to declaring that, in the absence of unforeseen factors, it proposed to hold up until 1936 its 1924 building program as regards auxiliary vessels, it may be hoped that Italy would respond with similar declarations thus assuring France the maintenance of the present difference in the two fleets in favor of France for the duration of the London Treaty, with the added advantage of good feeling between France and Italy. Such a declaration would make it easy for Italy to adopt a similar program in view of the fact that they also have maintained that it is their wish to avoid building and that, if given some help in the face of their own public opinion, they would gladly give up building. As you have no controversy with Italy concerning the building of capital ships within the Washington Treaty tonnage, the real problem is definitely restricted, thus leaving only new construction in auxiliary craft. Nor would replacements presumably be affected. What we propose, briefly, is that on the subject of parity there should be neither a diplomatic victory nor a diplomatic defeat, but that both countries should expressly reserve their position on this question until 1936, if they desire to do so, and that their declarations should be limited to a statement of their intentions during the period up to the expiration of the London Naval Treaty.

What I am saying to you bears especially on the French phase of the problem, naturally; but I am leaving for Rome in order to state the case to Grandi after my conversation with you. I have instructions to urge Italy to give up the idea of a diplomatic victory at this time, and to postpone the question of parity in order to facilitate any measure you may feel justified in taking in order to reach a solution of this difficulty.

I would like to say only one more thing: This is the first time in history that there has been a long, patient, and scientific effort to prepare the basis for a limitation and reduction of the armaments of all nations. The United States also recognizes that French initiative has been largely instrumental in bringing about this effort, and that a large role in the work has been played by the French delegations at [Page 159] Geneva. The moment has now arrived when we can hope that what has been done may be practically applied. There will inevitably result a deep general discouragement and disillusionment if the enterprise collapses at this point, and a definite setback to the whole cause of disarmament would ensue. If, on the other hand, this dangerous problem can be set aside by a new evidence of French leadership, a new impulse will be given to a movement toward security just as much as to the movement toward disarmament. For this reason, the President and the Secretary of State, persuaded of the great importance of this problem, have regarded it as a friendly duty to send me to call on you in order to submit this suggested solution and to ask you to give your careful and friendly consideration to our proposal.”

You will recognize that this message is a somewhat attenuated version of your own, rendered necessary by the irritation in which I found the Prime Minister. I did not fail, nevertheless, to drive home points in subsequent conversation when I saw that he no longer was in an antagonistic attitude.

Armour