500.A15a3/1150a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes)
258. This afternoon the Secretary saw the Japanese Ambassador, and at the same time Marriner and Gibson45 talked with Campbell, Counselor of the British Embassy, as the Ambassador is ill.
The purpose of these conversations with Debuchi and Campbell was to explain that as the French are now on the verge of publishing their building program for 1931, it would seem desirable that the three powers who have ratified the London Naval Treaty46 should [Page 138] make representations for the purpose of preserving the levels set down in that treaty from any disturbance arising from a failure on the part of France and Italy to come to some agreement.
In addition to imminence of publishing the French program for 1931, an action which would tend to aggravate the situation, it is felt to be important that France and Italy shall not come to the session of the Preparatory Commission set for November 6 in Geneva and there embark upon naval discussions calculated to complicate the situation still further.
Campbell is cabling to his Government the details of the conversation, the point of which is that the three powers should make the suggestion to France and Italy through all available channels that they abandon efforts to win diplomatic victories, each over the other, with respect to naval parity and defer that issue until 1936, in the meantime issuing unilateral declarations setting forth their respective naval programs. The terms of these declarations, naturally, would have to be worked out together beforehand, and they would constitute, presumably, a retarding or postponement of their building programs in such a way as not to risk bringing into play article 21 of the Naval Treaty.
The Secretary will emphasize to the French and Italian Ambassadors that their mutual attitude on naval armaments will not increase security; in particular, that a heavy increase over present establishments on the part of France which would necessitate any change in the London Treaty levels, would tend to alienate sympathy not only in Great Britain but in the United States as well, and presumably in Japan. The Government of the United States does not desire to be alone in its efforts as it feels that maximum influence can be exercised on France and Italy only after each realizes that the question is one which is of genuine world interest, not of interest to any one country alone.
The foregoing is for your information and your guidance should the matter be broached to you in London.