817.00/6376: Telegram
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Hanna) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 24—11:35 a.m.]
200. Department’s telegram No. 106, July 22, 11 a.m.,21 third paragraph; and my 193, July 17, 4 p.m.
The present strength of the marines in Nicaragua is 144 officers and 2422 enlisted, of the aviation detachment 12 officers and 196 enlisted, and of the Navy 21 officers and 91 enlisted.
Order has not been restored in Nicaragua. Extensive regions in the north are dominated by lawless elements and the resumption therein of peaceful pursuits is impossible. Incursions by these outlaws [Page 578] upon neighboring productive centers ordinarily peaceful still occur. The raid into the Matagalpa coffee region some weeks ago is an example. As recently as July 5th there was an engagement in which 16 bandits were killed. The British Chargé d’Affaires here has consulted me frequently of late concerning adequate protection for his nationals.
Few, if any, informed people here, so far as I know, think the situation much, if any, better than it was a year ago. Even the most optimistic consider the situation bad. A reduction in the forces operating against outlaws under existing conditions might have disastrous results. I believe the danger too great to justify such reduction. If by chance the outlaws are discouraged and desirous of returning to peaceful pursuits this is the time for more active operations against them, and not an occasion to encourage the zone leaders and other influences interested in instigating disorder, as would be the case if the marines are reduced.
It should not be overlooked that the elements opposed to the Moncada administration would be glad to see the marines withdrawn. They seek to discredit that administration, and a continuance of disorder in Nicaragua is to their liking. They play upon the discontented element. The reduction of the marines would be used by them to stimulate a recrudescence of disorder.
The reduction of marines on active field work would be immediately felt in the disturbed region especially as the force of guardia now in those regions cannot be materially increased. I believe as do many here that the influence of Sandino is greater now than it was just prior to his leaving Nicaragua. His propaganda is being published by a part of the press here and one paper recently referred to him as a Nicaraguan patriot. His name has a distinct appeal. It remains to be seen if this is but a temporary condition.
I have not overlooked the stabilizing effect of the engineer battalion when it reaches Nicaragua but it can have little direct influence on the state of disorder in the north. Neither have I overlooked the desirability of reducing the marine force if that were at all practicable, and I regret that I cannot recommend a reduction. Instead I am strongly of the opinion that this is the moment to initiate a more vigorous campaign than ever before against the outlaws with every available man of the combined marine and guardia forces and I recommend that orders to that effect be issued. I believe if this is done in conjunction with measures now under consideration which would extend amnesty and work to those outlaws who are ready to return to peaceful pursuits a condition of public order may be speedily reestablished such that a reduction of the marines at the beginning of next year may be hoped for.
- Not printed.↩