500.A15/864

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Memorandum

The instructions to the British delegate on the Preparatory Committee for the Disarmament Conference which meets at Geneva on April 15th have lately been under review by His Majesty’s Government.

In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government it seems generally to be felt that it will be impossible at this stage to make progress with the problems of naval disarmament and, indeed, it appears to His Majesty’s Government unlikely that discussions in full committee at Geneva, or even in a special naval sub-committee, would be fruitful of results until the ground has been prepared by previous consultation through diplomatic channels, particularly between the United States Government and themselves.

In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government propose at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee at Geneva to take the line that the difficulty of proceeding with the naval problem is no reason for doing nothing with regard to disarmament on land and in the air. Bound by the Washington Treaty the principal naval Powers have already accepted a very large measure of limitation and even reduction of naval armaments. On the other hand no agreement [Page 79] has yet been reached in the matter of armies or air forces and as it is most desirable that progress should be made in these spheres His Majesty’s Government have given to their delegate instructions designed to enable him to cooperate in the most helpful manner possible. Nevertheless they fear that the possibility of no agreement being reached along the present lines of discussion must be contemplated.

His Majesty’s Government have therefore been considering whether, in the event of a breakdown, any more promising compromise could be proposed.

The Committee have for two years past been trying to elaborate a convention which would in practice amount only to an agreement by the signatory Powers not to exceed certain maximum limits which would be fixed by each for themselves. This is not a very ambitious scheme. In fact, each signatory Power would only bind itself under this projected convention not to exceed a certain maximum program for a given period. Even so, however, the Preparatory Committee has been unable to agree on the headings or framework of the proposed programs. Discussion, largely theoretical, continues but no real progress is being made toward the actual limitation of armaments. In these circumstances if it becomes clear that along the present lines no real progress can be made, His Majesty’s Government contemplate proposing that rather than do nothing, and since the Committee appear to be unable to agree on the exact form in which programs should be presented, each Government should be asked to submit a program in its own form in the hope that these several programs may eventually be assembled and embodied in a convention binding the signatories not to exceed them. The programs envisaged should cover a period of years.

As the United States Government are aware the French and other Continental Governments attach great importance to their theory that the naval, land and air arms must be treated alike. In these circumstances were His Majesty’s Government to put forward the proposal above indicated they might be asked whether they would be willing to apply the same plan to navies as well as to armies and air forces. For their part His Majesty’s Government would be willing to do so and are disposed to believe that such a procedure if applied to naval armaments might after friendly discussion between His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government assist to a solution of the difficulties hitherto separating the United States Government and themselves and might render possible of realisation some, if not all, of the results which the naval powers have been seeking to obtain. Before issuing final instructions to their representative, however, His Majesty’s Government desire to assure themselves that the United States Government agree with them that it [Page 80] would be unwise to resume the discussion of naval issues on the old lines until there has been an opportunity for further confidential discussion between the two Governments. His Majesty’s Government have not interpreted Mr. Houghton’s note of September 28th, 1928,18 as implying that the United States Government would be indisposed towards such confidential discussions and they consequently hope that the United States Government will agree with them that it is desirable that the naval debate at Geneva should for the present be adjourned. If the United States Government do in fact agree with His Majesty’s Government on this point His Majesty’s Government would be glad to know whether, in the event of a failure to reach agreement at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva with regard to armies and air forces and in the event of the British delegate being consequently obliged to suggest procedure by programs in order to avoid a complete breakdown, and in the subsequent event of his being asked whether he would agree to the adoption of a similar procedure with regard to navies, the United States Government would see any objection.

His Majesty’s Government are anxious to avoid giving any impression that they despair of the success of the Preparatory Committee on present lines and to avoid prejudicing its chances in any way. The proposal outlined above would only be made if the discussion on present lines definitely fails. In that event, the British delegate would explain his proposals to the members of the Committee before they disperse and beg them to obtain the views of their Governments thereon at the earliest opportunity. But for the moment His Majesty’s Government wish only to obtain confidentially the view of the United States Government as a preliminary step and they trust that the United States will regard this communication as entirely confidential lest as above indicated the impression should be given that His Majesty’s Government despair of the success of the Preparatory Committee on present lines and thereby prejudice its chances.

  1. See telegram No. 329, September 25, 1928, 3 p.m., to the Chargé in France, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 282.