Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

500.A15/863a

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium ( Gibson )

Washington , March 23, 1929.

Sir: The President has instructed me to inform you of his desire that you continue to act as Chairman of the American Delegation at the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which is to meet at Geneva on April 15, 1929.

The President has directed that the following persons be designated to assist you at this conference:

• Advisers:
  • From the Department of State:
    The Honorable Hugh R. Wilson;
  • From the War Department:
    Major John N. Greely;
  • From the Navy Department:
    Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones;
• Technical Assistants:
  • Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Esquire,
  • Commander Harold C. Train, U. S. N.

On the basis of information which has reached the Department, it is assumed that before undertaking a second reading of the draft convention, the Commission will discuss certain general proposals, among them

(1) Report on the Work of the Security Committee.

(2) The proposal of the Russian Soviet Government for a progressive reduction of armaments.

(3) The proposal made by the German Delegation regarding publicity in connection with armaments.

1. Report on the Work of the Arbitration and Security Committee. While this Government has considered from the beginning that this was a purely European question and therefore did not feel warranted in accepting membership on the Committee on Arbitration and Security, it is not anticipated that the Committee will have a definite report ready for approval, but that the discussion will be confined to certain phases upon which agreement has not as yet been reached. In this event, there will presumably be no occasion for seeking an expression of the views of this Government. Should the Committee, however, have a report ready, the attitude of the American Government on the general subject of security has been very clearly developed in connection with the conclusion of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War,¹⁰ in the statements of its attitude on the arbitration treaties and more recently in the attitude of the American Delegation at the Havana Conference¹¹ and the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration.¹² On the basis of the documents which have been furnished to you, you will be enabled to point out, should occasion arise, that the United States has demonstrated its eagerness to contribute to general security by the development of the resources of arbitration, inquiry and conciliation not only in the Western Hemisphere, the region in which it is primarily interested, but likewise, throughout the world, by its solemn undertaking not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. The United States cannot, however, join in any pact for Security containing any obligation to enforce the treaty either by economic or military sanctions; in fact, beyond what we have done in treaties already concluded, we cannot become a party to any security pact.

2. The Proposal of the Russian Soviet Government of March 23, 1928, providing for a reduction, within two years, of all land, naval, and air armaments by an amount ranging from one-half to one-fourth their present strength. This proposal has been carefully examined by this Government, which, however, has not been able to escape the conclusion that it is essentially impracticable as a basis for further discussion. In many respects, it remains as objectionable as the earlier proposal of the Soviet delegation looking toward the complete abolition of all military establishments, and the criticisms voiced at the Fifth Session of the Commission with regard to this latter scheme are to a large extent applicable to the present proposal. In particular, this proposal takes into consideration no other factor than the scale of the present military establishments. The discussions at past sessions of the Commission have clearly shown that it is impossible to base a practical solution of the disarmament question on such abstract mathematical formulas applied indiscriminately to all categories of armaments, land, sea, and air, as are contained in the second Russian proposal. They take no account of the varying needs of individual countries as regards national security, depending on such factors as geographical position, area, population and resources. In this connection, it may be noted that the League Covenant provides that the League Council, in formulating plans for a reduction of armaments, shall take account of the “geographical situation and circumstances of each state.”

The completely impractical nature of the proposal would, in the opinion of this Government, justify setting it aside in order not to waste the time of the Commission in fruitless discussion; it has been reported to the Department that there may be a proposal to divide the Russian scheme into various parts to be treated as amendments to the pertinent sections of the draft convention with the idea that it be discussed in proper order during the second reading. It would seem that this would be an even more wasteful procedure than a general discussion resulting in the elimination of the Russian Proposal as a whole, as it would afford the Russian Delegates an opportunity in connection with each paragraph of the draft convention for a general restatement of their views on all subjects and for publicity and propaganda. Of the three courses suggested as possible, the wisest would seem to be for a certain number of Delegations to state briefly the obvious objections to the Russian Proposal as a whole and then to call for a vote eliminating it as a matter of discussion. A less desirable alternative would be to agree to a general discussion of the Soviet Proposal with the understanding that the Committee would, after hearing what was to be said for and against it, vote upon it as a whole.

3. The Proposal made by the German Delegation, on March 15, 1928, regarding Publicity in connection with Armaments. This proposal would not seem to require any fresh instructions from the Department. Our position as favoring the fullest measure of publicity in regard to all measures of budgetary expenditure, military forces and materiel in stock has been fully set forth before the Preparatory Commission, and there would seem to be no occasion for your intervening in the debate further than to restate our position if you deem this desirable. It is not believed that the Commission would be warranted in devoting a great deal of time to the discussion of this proposal, which has been taken up in part by the Special Commission for the Preparation of a Draft Convention on the Manufacture of Arms and in part under the proposals for the control of budgetary expenditure.

Second Reading of the Draft Convention. If the Commission reaches a second reading of the draft Convention, it is assumed that it will take up at first a limited number of questions which were definitely reserved for consideration at the second reading, namely:

(a) Poison Gas,

(b) Limitation of Budgetary Expenditure,

(c) War Materiel in Stock,

(d) Land Effectives, including Trained Reserves,

(e) Limitation of Naval Armaments.

(a) Poison Gas. The American Government was a pioneer in the effort toward the abolition of the use of poison gas and concluded a treaty with Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan on February 6, 1922,¹³ for this purpose. Although the United States has ratified this treaty, it has not yet entered into effect due to the failure of other Powers to ratify. It will furthermore be recalled that the American Delegation at the Arms Traffic Conference in 1925 took the initiative in the conclusion of a protocol for the abolition of the use in war of asphyxiating gas, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.¹⁴ The protocol was signed by thirty-eight nations, including the United States, but has, up to the present time, only been ratified or acceded to by Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Italy, Liberia, Russia and Venezuela. It is the earnest hope of this Government that further ratifications of both of these conventions will bring them into effect at the earliest possible date.

(b) Limitation of Budgetary Expenditure. This Government has seen no reason to modify its view that there is no useful purpose to be served by the conclusion of measures for budgetary limitation and that the cost of building or maintaining armament or armies varies so in each country, due to differences in exchange rates, prices of materiel and labor costs, that it could not possibly serve as a logical basis for limitation. These views have been fully set before the Commission and you will probably not find it necessary to enter into the debate further than to restate our previous position that such limitation is neither practical nor possible.

(c) War Matériel in Stock. This Government feels that agreements for the limitation of armaments would not be really complete without provisions for publicity regarding war materiel in stock. This view was set forth in the Preparatory Commission and its Technical Subcommittees in the most definite form and is a matter of record. On first reading, it was considered proper for the American representatives to state our views in this matter and to make an earnest endeavor to persuade other delegates to adopt these views. When, however, we come to second reading, it must be remembered that agreement can be reached only by a considerable measure of mutual concession. This imposes upon each participating government the obligation carefully to examine the whole field covered by the draft Convention and to make the fullest measure of concession possible upon points which are not of vital interest to it. The Department has scrutinized the draft Convention with a view to finding what concessions it can make without sacrificing fundamental American interests, and it is felt that while we should certainly prefer to have strict measures of publicity for materiel in stock, this is, after all, a matter of secondary importance and one on which we can, with some reluctance, defer to the wishes of other governments in the hope that this concession will awaken a responsive effort to meet our views in regard to those questions which we consider of primary American importance. You are therefore authorized when, in your judgment, it becomes desirable, clearly to restate the American position on this subject and to state that in the desire to promote general agreement our views will not be allowed to constitute an insurmountable obstacle as regards this particular question.

(d) Land Effectives including Trained Reserves. The American Government is convinced that the question of trained reserves is of fundamental importance in connection with any general scheme for the limitation of armaments and that no general agreement can be thoroughly accurate and effective which fails to take account of such forces which, in many instances, comprise the major portion of the military strength of a nation. It will be remembered that this Government has maintained this point of view in agreement with certain other Governments since the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission. However, we have felt that we should discriminate between those questions which were of vital importance, and those of theoretical value to the United States. We have felt throughout that it was improbable that any agreement could be reached which would call for any reduction of the land forces of the United States. In these questions we are disposed, as a practical matter, to defer to the views of those countries whose land forces constitute their chief military interest, again in the hope that this will cause them in like manner to defer to us as regards those questions which are of primary importance to us. If it becomes apparent to you that by making a concession on this question we can contribute to an ultimate agreement, you are authorized clearly to restate our reasons for believing in the limitation of trained reserves and for supporting that view in the Preparatory Commission, and also in stating our reasons for abandoning our insistence in the hope of facilitating agreement. You may consider it advisable to take this occasion for intimating that we trust that our concessions in regard to land armaments will prompt others to display a similar spirit in making concessions on naval questions.

In accordance with your previous instructions, you should naturally refuse to countenance for the United States any measure or methods of supervision and control in connection with carrying out any of the provisions of the draft Convention.

(e) The Naval Question. It is the task of the Preparatory Commission to agree upon a method of naval limitation, consideration of quantitative proposals being reserved for a final conference; it is therefore unnecessary at this time to furnish you with precise figures as to tonnages, percentages, ratios, or other definite criteria which would be acceptable to this Government.

In previous discussions the American Government has been disposed to examine in the most friendly spirit any proposed methods for effecting the limitation of naval armaments. Nevertheless, it has found no reason for modifying its view that the simplest, fairest and most practical method is that of limitation by tonnage by categories,—a method which has been given practical and satisfactory application in the Washington Treaty.¹⁵ While it is realized that this does not constitute an exact and scientific gauge of strategic strength, we have nevertheless felt that it did constitute a method which has the advantages of simplicity and of affording to each Power the freedom to utilize its tonnage according to its special needs.

The United States has supported its thesis throughout the first reading, but in view of the disparity of views presented and the unacceptability of this thesis unmodified, this Government has sought, in the various methods presented, for some solution which might offer the possibility of compromise and general acceptance. During the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission the French Delegation brought forward a method which was an attempt to combine the total tonnage with tonnage by categories, by the assignment of a total tonnage to each nation and the division, for the duration of any agreement to be signed, of this total tonnage into five categories of ships by specific tonnages. The proposal was subsequently modified so as to provide that the percentage allocated to any given category might be increased by a certain percentage to be agreed upon, such increase to be transferred from any other category or categories not already fixed by existing treaty (battleships and aircraft carriers).

In the hope of facilitating agreement as to naval armaments, this Government is disposed to accept in principle this method of effecting limitation. It is, of course, the understanding of this Government that this involves an agreement upon the method alone and not upon any proposed quantitative tonnage or, as the matter is now understood, on the percentages to be transferred from one category to another. All quantitative proposals of any kind should properly be reserved for discussion by an eventual conference.

This Government is disposed to give full and friendly consideration to any supplementary methods of limitation which may be calculated to make the application of the French thesis acceptable to other Powers and if such a course appears desirable when the time comes for considering the application of that thesis, this Government will be prepared to give consideration to the method of equivalent tonnage values. In order to arrive at the basis of comparison in the case of categories in which there are marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might be desirable in arriving at an equivalent tonnage to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as displacement, age and calibre of guns. This method of comparison has been given careful consideration and this Government will be in a position to discuss the subject whenever it becomes of practical interest.

Aside from the very material concession which you have been authorized to make on land armament, this Government feels that in accepting the French thesis in regard to naval armaments it is giving unmistakable evidence of its anxiety to contribute, by all possible means, to the early achievement of general agreement. It is hoped that by the removal of obstacles in regard to land armaments the question is simplified in the sense that further discussions will be limited to those Powers directly and vitally interested in this phase of the disarmament problem, and it is hoped that unhampered by opposition from this Government they may find it possible to agree among themselves. As regards naval armaments, which are recognized as being of vital concern to this country, we have given further proof of our earnest desire to contribute to the solution of the problem by material concessions, in the hope of simplifying the issues involved and promoting the possibility of general agreement on naval matters. In the event that there is any attempt on the part of other delegates to inject into the debates a discussion of the specific problems involved in our naval relations with other countries, you will, of course, find it desirable to point out that this is a subject entirely without the scope of the Preparatory Commission.

This Government realizes, of course, that the discussions of the Preparatory Commission are merely for the purpose of agreeing on methods to be recommended to a General Conference for the limitation of armament; nevertheless, it is desirable that you bear in mind the following considerations as to our general position regarding the limitation of naval armament:

This Government believes that there can be no complete and effective limitation of armament unless all classes of war vessels, including cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, are limited, and would not agree to any method which would result in leaving any class of war vessels unrestricted. In its reply of September 28, 1928, to communications from the British and French Governments concerning an understanding reached between them as to a basis of naval limitation, this Government pointed out that this understanding applied to only one type of cruiser and one type of submarine and would leave totally unlimited a large class of effective fighting units.¹⁶ Our note also called attention to the position we took at the Geneva Naval Conference and the fact that we there made a proposition for real limitation.

If the proposition, suggested by the French at the last Session of the Commission and subsequently modified, should be adopted as a basis of limitation, it will be impossible ever to make an agreement with Great Britain unless that Government very materially modifies its demands. However, rather than to insist on a plan of fixing exact tonnages for each category, it may be advisable to agree to the French plan, which, of course, we would be willing to see accepted at a final Conference, provided that the tonnages in each class should be sufficiently low to mean a real naval reduction and provided the percentages of variation from the tonnage of each of the categories should be satisfactory. Again it appears probable that the British Government will insist on two classes of cruisers and possibly of submarines. In that event, it would seem impossible to work out, to the satisfaction of the United States, the French plan of permitting the transfer from the tonnage of one category to that of another.

It should be borne in mind that in the event a final conference is called this Government feels that the principal emphasis must be placed on reduction rather than mere limitation of armaments. In all the conferences in which this Government has participated, it has consistently advocated the lowest levels of armament that could be arrived at on a relative basis.

Ever since the Three-Power Conference in Geneva,¹⁷ this Government has felt more and more impressed with the fact that the only real contribution we could make lay in the direction of an actual drastic cut rather than the mere placing of a limit beyond which we agreed not to go. This could hardly be considered an achievement in the cause of disarmament, but merely the sanctioning of existing armaments or even a tacit encouragement to build up to still higher levels.

Moreover, it is the belief of this Government that the levels of naval armament are almost entirely a relative matter between the principal naval Powers, since the whole world, aside from the Washington Treaty Powers, does not contain sufficient cruiser tonnage to endanger any one of them. Therefore, the great burden of taxation entailed by the building and maintenance of unnecessarily large naval establishments seems wholly unjustifiable and this Government would be willing to take any steps necessary to arrive at a low level agreed upon by the remaining Powers and feels that in doing so it is meeting the ardent desire for disarmament manifested by the very meeting in which we are taking part.

Unless we can find some method of agreeing upon a genuine reduction in existing establishments, we can see no useful purpose to be served by concluding an agreement which would countenance extensive building.

This Government, in accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, is obligated to call a conference during the year 1931 to consider what changes, if any, may be necessary in that Treaty, and furthermore has already expressed its willingness to call that conference as early as January in that year. Naturally this conference will only affect the five Naval Powers signatory to the Washington Treaty and will not touch on land armament. However, in view of the fact that Great Britain, although bound by the provisions of the Washington Treaty, and thus unable to effect any changes before 1931, has frequently asserted its willingness to reduce the size and extend the life of battleships, and has maintained that great saving might be effected thereby (a view not shared by this Government), it seems that if the subject is raised you should state that the American Government will be prepared in 1931 to discuss the subject of the reduction in size and armament and the extension of life of battleships and aircraft carriers.

I am [etc.]

Frank B. Kellogg

10. Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
11. See ibid., pp. 527 ff.
12. See ibid., pp. 621 ff.
13. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 267.
14. Ibid., 1925, vol. i, p. 89.
15. Treaty for the limitation of naval armament, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247.
16. See telegram No. 329, September 25, 1928, 3 p.m., to the Chargé in France, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 282.
17. See ibid., 1927, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.