500.A15a3/322: Telegram
The Ambassador in Belgium (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:43 p.m.]
84. Tyrrell and Massigli83 came to see me while I was in Paris on my way back to Brussels.
Massigli told me that his Government was very much concerned over the forthcoming Conference since it felt that, as soon as we had come to an agreement with the British, we had disregarded our understanding that a general exchange of views would take place, and had called the London Conference without considering the convenience of the French. Massigli stated that the French Government is of the opinion that: (1) The United States has reached a definite quantitative agreement with the British, and France will be face to face with the alternative of being blamed for failure of the Conference [Page 271] or of accepting the place assigned to her in the agreement; (2) America will withdraw from the Preparatory Commission and all efforts of the League of Nations towards disarmament as soon as a naval agreement has been secured. Massigli added that this belief came from official sources and his Government believed in its accuracy.
My obvious reply was that it is contrary to our methods to arrive at agreements against one country with another and that any idea of an attempt on our part to maneuver the French into an embarrassing position could be dismissed. We had, I told him, no hard and fast understanding with the British, but had merely had discussions and come to an agreement contingent on its acceptance by the other powers; he himself had insisted at Geneva that this method was an essential preliminary to any general negotiations.
Massigli then informed me that they had been unable to begin their conversations with the Italian Government and that the Cabinet crisis had temporarily delayed matters, although it was his hope that the discussions might soon begin. He said, however, that the Anglo-American difficulties were not as hard to solve as were those between France and Italy, inasmuch as the latter was worked up to a high degree of nationalistic feeling and was insistent on parity with France, while France was just as determined that Italy should not be granted parity. France’s position, he explained, was based on the fact that the Italian forces were concentrated in the Mediterranean, while the French Navy was spread all over the world; ship for ship parity would amount to giving the Italians manifest superiority. I found him very pessimistic as to the possibility of a reasonable solution considering the temper existing in both France and Italy. He says that in any event they cannot hope to be ready for the Conference at the time it has been called for.
Massigli stated finally, with some show of vigor, that France was determined that the London Conference should make no final decisions, and that the French would not yield on this point inasmuch as their policy was founded on the theory of interdependence of armaments; insistence on this point was largely due to the conviction that the United States, possibly in the company of Great Britain, would withdraw from further disarmament efforts after achieving a naval agreement, unless all categories of armaments were dealt with together; all hope of general disarmament would be useless if this were to happen. I brought out the point that the French position could not be prejudiced by anything contained in the agreement which might be reached at the Conference since what was desired was an agreement which would be supplementary to the Washington Treaty and coterminous with it and which would result in restraining building until 1936; a more comprehensive agreement [Page 272] which might be reached by a General Disarmament Conference would thereby be facilitated. In my opinion the French Government might be reassured on this basis.
Tyrrell later came to see me and stated that he was worried over the French feeling about the Naval Conference. His outline of French feeling in various circles was similar to that which Massigli had described to me; he added that there could be no doubt that the French really thought a definite Anglo-American agreement had been reached, including, presumably, an understanding as to the forces to be allotted to France. The Franco-Italian situation, he said, was very difficult and, if left to themselves, he did not think they would be able to find a solution; in his opinion, the only hope lay in tactful mediation, a mediation which only the United States could supply since France had no confidence in the disinterestedness of the British. Finally, he stated that he had done all in his power to reassure the French concerning the nature of our understanding and our intentions toward them, but he felt that it would undoubtedly have much more effect if we were to approach them along the same lines.
How much of the state of mind now obtaining in France has resulted from inaccurate information and how much from general nervousness I cannot say, but I believe that, for your information, I should report these conversations.
Wilson84 is sailing home this week and is fully informed as to my conversations with Tyrrell and Massigli. I have consulted with Armour85 before sending this telegram and have sent a copy to the London Embassy.
- Sir William G. Tyrrell, British Ambassador in France; René Massigli, Chief of the League of Nations section of the French Foreign Office, and French representative on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.↩
- Edwin C. Wilson, First Secretary of the Embassy in France.↩
- Norman Armour, Counselor of the Embassy in France.↩