500.A15a3/176
President Hoover to the Secretary of State63
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have been giving a great deal of thought over the week end to the Prime Minister’s latest dispatches.
I am, of course, glad to discuss with him on his visit the gap between our two cruiser proposals, but I suggest later on a method of closing it before Mr. MacDonald’s visit. I dislike the idea that Mr. MacDonald’s visit might become one of negotiation or split on such a question as this for our whole great program might in public mind degenerate into a huckster’s quibble; nor does it seem to me that we should fail after Mr. MacDonald’s visit to call the conference because of such a gap. The purpose of the conference is to find methods for surmounting difficulties that we cannot solve otherwise.
The position as I see it, on the two proposals as to cruisers, is that the British with 339,000 tons would have a superiority of some 24,000 tons over the American 315,000 tons, a superiority to the British equal to, say, 4 medium sized modern cruisers, as against the American Navy having the advantage of two inches in gun calibre on 60,000 tons, or 30% of its fleet. It is true that part of the British cruisers will be less modern than ours, yet our Omaha class is in turn less modern than other important British classes. I am, therefore, convinced that we have gone as far as we can go on this line. We have on our side a great burden indeed to prove to our people that we have parity in the two programs when the American Navy will be 24,000 tons and 16 ships less than the British Navy even if it be compensated by larger gun calibre and an average more modern fleet—that is by the yardstick.
I am willing to try to carry this burden through but I do not believe if Mr. MacDonald understood the difficulties of our situation he would insist upon enlarging this margin by 15,000 tons and decreasing the compensation in gun calibre. Our situation is necessarily different from his because, having arrived in a position in which his own political colleagues have agreed to support him, he [Page 241] can carry through Parliament. We, on the other hand, have to persuade an independent branch of the Government to vote with us by a two-thirds majority. I am, however, very anxious to find a way around this difficulty by mutual concession especially as the twenty-one large cruisers on our part may affect the program for the other powers.
It seems to me that the emphasis which the Prime Minister properly lays upon the importance of a second conference in 1935 to again reduce the world’s naval arms, suggests a new line of thought and presents a basis to reorient our whole discussions and proposals.
Under the cruiser programs which we have been discussing the British will between now and the conference of 1935 lay down 91,000 tons in new 6-inch cruisers. We must lay down 145,000 tons further. This is in addition to the ships which we now have in construction. In other words, we shall between us have imposed upon ourselves, say 236,000 tons of new warships at an expense of, say $1,500 a ton, a total expenditure of over $350,000,000, some part of which at least would be much better invested in works contributing to real human welfare. And then after we have done all this, the whole purpose of the proposed 1935 conference and the aspirations we have with regard to it, would be that after we have built up all this tonnage and expended all this money, we shall then try to find a method by which we shall scrap it, or some large part of it. And in any event we shall then determine that some of it was not necessary.
It seems to me that there is the most profound outlook for peace today that we have had at any time in the last half century, more especially if we succeed in our conference of January next, yet in effect we are plunging along building more ships at fabulous expense only with the hope and aspiration that at the end of a period so short as 6 years we shall be able to sink a considerable part of them.
In the same line of thought it occurs to me that the dangers of war during the next six or ten years for either of our countries in any direction are inconceivably less than they have been at any period since the Great War. But I find on examination that the British Empire has apparently, during the past few years, been able to preserve peace and provide for its naval defense with a very much smaller cruiser fleet than that now contemplated.
The figures given to me indicate that the British cruiser strength actually in commission in 1922 was 285,000 tons; that it decreased to 244,000 in 1925 and that after allowing for recent disposal of three old ships it comprises only 300,000 tons actually in commission today. Yet we are proposing at this moment that the British fleet should be increased to 339,000 tons. Again in the American fleet I find that we had in commission a total cruiser tonnage of 161,000 in 1922, 153,000 [Page 242] in 1925, and that we have today a tonnage of 100,000 tons afloat—and we are likewise proposing to increase this to 315,000 tons by 1936. In the same breath we are promising the world that at that date we shall use our best endeavors to sink a considerable portion of these fleets. All this is illogical and is the simple negation of our own aspirations and I believe also of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.
This discussion between our governments has been in progress now for about three months. There has been time for public opinion to react on all sides, and there is the most extraordinary unanimity and prayer throughout both countries and the whole world that we shall succeed in actually reducing naval strength, not that we shall increase it.
The major discordant note we have is the criticism in the United States over the published statements of proposed cruiser programs—that it is not a program of reduction but a program of expansion. We are faced with the practical fact, however, that to abolish competition and to get any program accepted, we must reach what will not only be parity but what will carry to our people a conviction of parity.
In view of all this situation I am anxious that before Mr. MacDonald arrives he shall have opportunity to find whether or not it will be possible for him to reduce the proposed tonnage of the British fleet from 339,000 tons to at least 300,000 tons. I would be glad to join with him in so bold a move. On such a gross tonnage we could in turn reduce our program by 39,000 tons, thus solving the question of reduction of our 8-inch cruisers from 21 to 18, and allowing us to make a further cut of one proposed new 6-inch 7,000 ton cruiser.
I know that upon turning to his charts, Mr. MacDonald will find that with his proposed replacement program of 14 new ships, this could not be accomplished. If, on the other hand, after scrapping the Hawkins class, he limited his replacements so as to provide the laying down of one cruiser per annum, or a total of six replacements, he would keep constant employment in his yards and he could perhaps worry along with his policing of the British Empire by extending the life of some of his older ships for a few years and we would thus each of us arrive at 1936 with at least 39,000 tons less of new ships to deal with. Such a program could apparently be worked out to about fifty ships. I may mention that we have four cruisers now in service that are over 25 years old and one 30 years old that do most effective police duty in various parts of the world. Even a reduction of 39,000 tons in our cruiser programs seems small in the face of all our public backing in this situation, and I should like to see it down another 50,000, but I do not wish to seem impractical.
I would call your attention to the fact that if our present agreement is proposed to be binding only to 1936, if at that time the reduction [Page 243] of the British fleet to 300,000 tons proved too severe, it could be corrected then.
There are some other phases of the problem which seem, to me also of the utmost importance and could quite well be taken up on Mr. MacDonald’s arrival here with view to making an announcement after his visit of an accord much more powerful from a world point of view. At various times in these discussions we have referred to the maximum destroyer strength of somewhere about 150,000 tons for each country. If we could agree on this figure, it would in itself mark a great tonnage reduction on both sides, although we would each require some construction for replacement. Likewise on submarines, if we could agree on some maximum tonnage for each country, at say 75,000 or even 50,000 tons, it would be helpful to have such a figure declared to the world as a part of our accord.
Another still more important phase of the whole discussion that I think we should bring in, and which I would appreciate Mr. MacDonald’s having in mind, is whether or not as a part of this preliminary accord we could not settle the proportion of replacements of battleships we should propose to the January conference that are to be undertaken prior to 1936.
By reference to the Washington Arms Treaty I find that we each of us are presumed to lay down cruisers C and D in 1931, E and F in 1932, G in 1933, H and I in 1934, and K and L in 1935. As these ships are 35,000 tons each, this amounts to each country laying down ten ships, or 350,000 tons which will represent a commitment to an expenditure to our two countries of over $1,000,000,000.
I recognize the Prime Minister’s feeling that he must keep some continuous construction going in his navy yards, but it would seem to me this could be accomplished if we laid down a maximum of one ship each 18 months which would reduce the number laid down from ten to four on each side. The net effect of all this would simply be that we should maintain in service our present ships for a longer time than we contemplate in the Treaty, which would give opportunity in our second conference of 1935 to reconsider whether or not we should scrap these older ships and thus reduce the capital ships in the world. It would seem to me a most effective and comforting statement if we could arrive at some such proposal as this during Mr. MacDonald’s visit and could announce it as part of the conclusions at which we have arrived.
Obviously proportionately the same reduction would need be accepted by the other signatories to the Washington agreement and they should be glad to have such an opportunity.
I shall look forward to the Prime Minister’s visit as an opportunity for most distinguished accomplishment.
Yours faithfully,
- Text telegraphed to the Ambassador in Great Britain as Department’s telegram No. 250, September 17, 8 p.m., for communication to the British Prime Minister.↩