793.003/92
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Johnson)
The Japanese Ambassador called upon me this morning and handed to me the attached carbon copy of an Aide Memoire, the original of which he had just handed to the Secretary.59 He said he had told the Secretary that he would come and discuss its details [Page 447] with me. He desired to say to me first that his Government was delighted to know that we were prepared to discuss questions concerning China with Japan as well as with the other powers. He referred with satisfaction to the fact that since his arrival in Washington, the Secretary had already discussed with him two important questions concerning China; the first, the question of the raising of the legations to the status of embassies; the second, with regard to treaty revision, and he hoped that the Secretary would continue to call him in and discuss such matters from time to time as his Government especially prized this evidence of confidence. He said that the attached Aide Memoire contained two important points which he desired to emphasize orally. The first was the fact that the Chinese Government had adopted a policy of insisting on repudiating unilaterally the treaty between China and Japan. He said that Japan could never assent to this method of treatment; that they could never assent to China’s insistence upon her rights under her own interpretation of the treaty terms thus to repudiate the treaty. He said he hoped that we would understand the difficulties arising in Japanese relations with China as long as China took this point of view.
The Ambassador said, however, that provided China retreated from this unreasonable attitude, Japan was quite prepared to enter upon serious discussions regarding treaty revision and to go as far as anyone in meeting the aspirations of China; that they were prepared to recognize tariff autonomy; that they were prepared to discuss consular jurisdiction, although this was a very delicate policy and one which waited upon China’s cleaning up of her own house, to use his phraseology.
The Ambassador said there was a third point upon which Japan desired to negotiate with China, and that was inland water navigation. He said that doubtless on account of my long acquaintance with China I would understand this question as being important to Japan. I told him I quite understood its importance as I knew that practically the whole fabric of foreign inland water navigation in China, American, British and Japanese, was based on the terms of the Japanese Treaty of 1896. The Ambassador said he was very anxious to know whether we would have any objection to Japan insisting upon freedom of navigation of Chinese inland waters and reminded me that it was his understanding that a very large proportion of American commerce in China was handled by Chinese coastwise vessels and the small launches and river boats flying the Japanese flag and navigating the inland waters of China. He said he thought with this large interest involved that America would not be opposed to Japan negotiating this on a basis of reciprocity. In [Page 448] fact he wondered whether we ourselves would not be ready to negotiate on such a basis. I told the Ambassador that I was not authorized to make any statement with regard to this matter, although personally I felt that the United States could have no objection to any position which the Japanese Government for its part might wish to adopt in this matter. However, I could not see how we could negotiate with the Chinese in such a matter on the basis of reciprocity as we would not permit foreign vessels to navigate the inland waters of the United States, at least so was my understanding, and it would be out of the question for us to take up and consider seriously such a matter. The Ambassador said that nevertheless he hoped we would not object to Japan negotiating along this line.
The second important point in the Aide Memoire, the Ambassador said, was to be found in the next to the last paragraph where the Japanese Government mentioned the tendency of the Chinese to insist upon attaining their objects while neglecting the fulfillment of the promises which they have on various occasions given. The Ambassador said that his Government placed great importance upon the hope that the nations should concert themselves while lending assistance to China for the realization of her aspirations in insisting on the other hand that China should not entirely disregard actual conditions within her own territories and commitments made to other powers.
I said to the Ambassador that I realized the importance of this matter. I said that personally, and entirely off the record, I would like to say with regard to China’s promises in the past that I was of the opinion that frequently China had made promises under duress or in the hope of obtaining some benefit thereby, promises which the Chinese people and the Chinese officials who made the promises never intended to fulfill. As an instance of this type of promise I recited somewhat the history of the question of likin, pointing out that although China had on various occasions promised to abolish likin, it was known to everyone that there was no established feeling of opposition to likin current among the Chinese and that therefore it was almost impossible for the Chinese to fulfill any promise to give up this matter.
The Ambassador said that he would understand from what I said that I would be opposed to any concerted action on the part of the powers against China and I said that I would like to qualify that statement a little, that I felt there were certain things upon which the powers could agree to take action alike. At least we could take concerted action in constructive measures, or in the line of moderation, but unfortunately in the past the powers had only considered it necessary to concert themselves when one or more of them were in [Page 449] the position of the defensive and it seemed to me that that fact reduced our action to one of mutual interest in our defense but individual interest in all other matters. I was sometimes doubtful as to the benefits when action was limited in this way. I reminded him however that in saying these things I was speaking entirely from my own personal viewpoint and must not be understood as necessarily expressing myself as giving the views of this government.
The Ambassador concluded by asking whether the British had made any further reply on this subject or whether the French had made any reply and I told him we had nothing further from the British nor had we anything further from the French. He said he felt that if the Secretary or myself could find an opportunity to make some frank comment officially either orally or in writing, upon the Japanese Government’s statement of their position, they would be very happy. I told him I would discuss the matter with the Secretary and see if I could not arrange it.
Before leaving, the Japanese Ambassador once more referred to statements in the press about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He pointed out that it was utterly impossible that this should happen and felt certain that everyone understood this now. He spoke rather bitterly of an editorial in the Star one or two nights ago which stated that the United States had taken the lead in recognizing the Nationalist Government; that this lead had been followed now by the British and that the Japanese were left alone of all the nations adopting an intransigent attitude towards the Chinese.
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