Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1928, Volume II

793.942/19: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan ( Neville ) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo , July 25, 1928—9 p.m.
[Received July 25—6:30 p.m.]

90. Department’s 82, July 24, 6 p.m. The recent change in the position of Vice Minister together with the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is also Prime Minister has made it difficult the last few days to keep closely in touch with the foreign policy. Some days ago the chief of the Asia Bureau was asked if the Japanese Government cared to make any statement in regard to the conditions in Manchuria and the Japanese attitude in regard to the attempt at abrogation of the Japanese commercial treaty with China. He stated that Baron Tanaka was preparing a statement which he would give to the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States. He did orally at 4 o’clock this afternoon.

1. In regard to the treaty of 1896 Baron Tanaka said that for some months the Japanese Government had been negotiating at Peking for a revision of the treaty in accordance with its terms. Recent events in China had rendered these negotiations fruitless and the Japanese therefore considered, in accordance with article 26, that the treaty was to continue in force for another 10 years; this position they intended to adhere to and they would not admit that a unilateral denunciation was of any value in terminating the treaty. The consul general at Shanghai had been instructed to inform the Nationalist authorities in this sense and the Japanese were prepared in case of necessity to take such measures as were necessary to safeguard their interests. In reply to a question, the Prime Minister said that as yet of course no definite steps were contemplated and that what action might be taken would be dictated by circumstances and in any event the Japanese would not adopt concrete measures without notifying the other interested powers. He said he had invited us to the Foreign Office to explain the Japanese position and he hoped that other powers would see their way clear to support the Japanese in their contention; that treaty rights and interests in China were not to be completely disregarded at the wish of only one party to the compact. He said that Japan was ready and had been ready at all times to carry out the promises entered into in concert with other powers at Washington in 1922;²² that she was still ready and had no wish to be hard upon the Chinese people or to take advantage, if such a thing were possible, of the disturbed conditions in that country; he felt strongly however and he knew that he had the public opinion of the country behind him in his insistence that treaty revision could be discussed only between responsible people. He could not admit that the Nanking regime had proved itself capable of administering a government in China or of affording adequate protection of life and property. He asked careful consideration of the history of the present Nationalist movement. While in Canton it had been completely in the hands of the future communist wing, at Hankow its actions were extremely high-handed, and the Nanking incident was of recent occurrence; it is true that at Peking and further north the Nationalists had shown a more moderate attitude but he felt sure that he was safe in saying that this regime had hardly proved itself in a position to inspire confidence; this was altogether apart from the question which he felt was of prime importance—the necessity of insisting upon the sanctity of treaties.

2. A few days ago Chang Hsueh-liang invited the Japanese consul general at Mukden to call upon him stating that he was in mourning for his father and could not himself go out. Baron Tanaka said that at this interview Chang asked the consul general what he thought would be the best policy to pursue in view of his father’s death and unsettled state of affairs in China proper. The Japanese consul general seems to have told him, speaking purely in his personal capacity, that it was not desirable to permit too sudden a change to occur in the political situation in Manchuria and that it perhaps would be advisable to await developments in China proper before accepting the national regime. Apparently he pointed out that the status of affairs in China proper was very unsettled and that it was not quite certain who was in control and Chang might well find himself allied to one faction or another to no purpose and perhaps to his own detriment if he took too precipitate a course. Baron Tanaka said that while this statement was made by the Japanese consul general on his own responsibility, the Prime Minister thought it was very good advice (I understand, although the Prime Minister did not say so, that the consul general in Mukden had been previously advised of the general attitude of the Japanese Government toward Manchuria). Baron Tanaka then stated that it would be extremely unfortunate if the chaotic conditions which prevail in other parts of China should extend to Manchuria. He did not mean to make any special claim for Japanese rights and interests against those of any other powers in that region, but the Japanese interests there are enormous and the livelihood and well being of thousands of people depend upon the smooth working of the economic machinery (I presume this means the South Manchuria Railway) and the Japanese are convinced that no benefit to anybody could accrue if the Manchurian authorities take precipitate action in tying up with factions in other parts of China when perhaps by waiting until the situation further develops the Three Eastern Provinces could be included in a general arrangement for China without any local political upheaval at all. He added that the action of the Nationalists in denouncing the Japanese treaty of 1896 could not be other than disquieting and he did not see what the people of Manchuria had to hope in the way of political betterment from action which would only arouse antagonism on the part of the foreigners without accomplishing any practical good. In reply to a question he admitted that there was opposition to Chang in Manchuria. He said that this was due to the ill-advised action of Chang Tso-lin in attempting to spread his influence over [beyond?] Manchuria. Many of the inhabitants of the Three Eastern Provinces had been opposed to this from the beginning and Chang Tso-lin had been repeatedly urged to remain in Mukden. He had not done this and of course his family have lost prestige and it might be quite a while before it was regained. This condition he regarded however as a local one in Manchuria and in no way concerned with the Nationalist movement in China proper.

3. In conclusion the Prime Minister said that he wished to assure us all that Japan was extremely desirous of acting in these matters in concert with the other powers; that this country had no intention or desire to increase its responsibilities in China or to take action for any purpose other than that of affording protection to the lives and property of Japanese subjects in China; and that before taking any concrete action whatever Japan would inform the interested powers.

Copy to Peking.

Neville

22. Refers to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington. Nov. 12, 1921–Feb. 6, 1922; see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.