893.00/10075
The Ambassador in Japan ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 12.]
Sir: I have the honor to state, with reference to my telegram No. 63 of May 17th, 7 p.m., that on May 17th, I received a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting me to call on him that afternoon, as he wished to hand to the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, a statement on the situation in North China. As I had an engagement which could not be broken, I instructed the first secretary to call in my stead.
Baron Tanaka began by saying that he wished fully to explain to the representatives of the Powers principally interested in China, the steps which the Japanese Government intended to take with respect to the situation now developing in North China. He described the disposition of the opposing forces about Peking, and said that, owing to the topography of the country west of Peking, the fighting there would develop very slowly, and that the Mukden general staff was confident that the Mukden forces could hold off the combined armies of Generals Yen Shi-shan and Feng Yu Hsiang in the region south of Peking. He added, however, that the 70,000 troops under General Chang Tsung Chang, now collected near Tientsin, were completely demoralized and could be considered worthless as a military unit. Baron Tanaka did not believe that they would be able to stand against the advancing troops of General Feng Yu Hsiang.
Baron Tanaka did not believe that the Chinese soldiers would indulge in Peking and Tientsin in the excesses that they were guilty of at Tsinan, but that the Japanese Government was prepared fully to carry out its obligations respecting any joint measures which might be taken by the Powers to protect their nationals in and near Peking and Tientsin. He said that there were now five companies of Japanese troops at Tientsin which would be increased to thirteen companies as soon as the detachment recently sent to Tsinan returned to Tientsin, but that if the situation made any further increase advisable, the Japanese Government were ready to send to Peking another reinforcement. Replying to a question put to him by the British Chargé d’Affaires, Baron Tanaka said that the latter would be sent from the Division now en route to Tsingtao, and that, if the circumstances made it necessary, one or two vessels now proceeding to Tsingtao would be instructed to proceed to Tientsin.
[Page 230]Baron Tanaka said that the Japanese Government were deeply concerned by the effect which the impending hostilities near Peking would have on conditions in Manchuria; that the Japanese Government intended to make Manchuria a safe field for the commercial activities of persons of all nationalities; that there were one million Koreans living in Manchuria, and that the Japanese Government could not view with indifference the prevalence of disorder in the regions contiguous to their colony, Chosen. With these circumstances in mind, the Japanese Government had instructed their Minister at Peking and Consul General at Shanghai to present an identic note to Chang Tso-lin and the Nationalist Government, respectively, on Friday, the 18th, at 2 p.m., until which time he asked that the text of the note be kept secret. Baron Tanaka added that this note was intended to serve warning upon the warring factions in China; that the Japanese Government was determined to keep hostilities out of Manchuria.
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The vernacular papers reported yesterday that the Prime Minister, Baron Tanaka, stated that Japan was fully mindful of its obligations to act with the other foreign powers to protect foreign nationals residing in North China. He is reported to have added: “Japan is in a favorable geographical position to take the necessary measures and it will, therefore, endeavor in the event of danger to remove the causes of anxiety. If, however, Peking and Tientsin should become the scene of disturbances, the situation in Manchuria will become immediately affected; the economic position of several hundred thousand Japanese will be destroyed, and as a result of the uneasiness created among one million Koreans residing in Manchuria, peace and order in Chosen will be menaced. In the sense, therefore, that measures to guard against disturbances arising in Manchuria may be regarded as defensive measures, a warning was addressed to both the Northern and Southern Factions. Japan also expressed the hope, which is equally entertained by all the foreign powers, that these factions would compose their differences and thus give peace to the Chinese people. The declarations Japan has issued were, from the standpoint of our safety, unavoidable and necessary; but this distinction must be borne in mind: the giving by Japan of advice to the two factions to establish peace because Japan wished to see peace established, and the hope that peace might be established, are two absolutely different things.”
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I have [etc.]