711.672/555: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

5 [6?]. (1) It is the understanding of the Department from your No. 8, February 6, 2 p.m., No. 6, February 3, 11 p.m., and No. 5, January 30, noon, that the present status of the negotiations between yourself and Tewfik Rouschdy Bey is as follows:

(a)
The duration of the present modus vivendi is to be extended for an additional period of 6 months from February 20, 1927.
(b)
You have reached an agreement in principle providing for a resumption of diplomatic relations by an exchange of notes.
(c)
Having made substantial progress with regard to the above points, you are now negotiating with respect to the nature of the treaty relations between the two countries and as to how and when those relations will be entered into.

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(2) With regard to point (c) it is the understanding of the Department that the positions of the parties to the negotiations are now as follows:

(a)
It appears clear that Turkey prefers to negotiate a treaty of amity to be followed by a series of conventions. As yet, Turkey has not categorically rejected, by act or word, the treaty of August 6, although the Minister for Foreign Affairs has clearly indicated his opinion that the treaty of August 6 leaves something to be desired, and that if the Assembly should ratify it, there would be reservations and modifications, and that certain articles of it have less than two years to rim. See point (3) (f) of your telegram No. 5.
(b)
The view has been expressed by you that Turkey would like to get rid of the treaty of August 6 since Turkey is not now disposed in its latest treaties to give treatment as advantageous as was given to the United States in consular matters and also presumably in commercial rights. See point (5) of your telegram No. 3, Jan. 24, midnight. To assist you in opposing the desire of Turkey for a treaty of amity, you have stated that you would propose to Turkey the negotiation of a commercial convention instead of a treaty of amity, and you have recommended that the treaty of August 6 be immediately resubmitted to the United States Senate whether or not action can be taken before the adjournment of Congress on March 4.
(c)
The Department has proposed that Turkey’s desire for a treaty of amity be opposed by a proposal for an exchange of notes or a protocol as set forth in Department’s telegram No. 5, February 1, 7 p.m. From the Department’s point of view paragraph (b) of that telegram provided the ideal solution, that is, an undertaking in alternate form to resubmit the treaty of August 6 to the Senate or to negotiate a series of agreements on specified subjects.

(3) It will not be practicable for the Executive immediately to resubmit the treaty of August 6 to the Senate. Although there has been talk regarding the possibility that certain Senators who voted against the treaty could be persuaded in the future to change their positions, nevertheless, there is not the slightest proof that there has been any change. For the President, therefore, to resubmit the treaty to the Senate some three weeks after its failure to secure the necessary vote of two-thirds, without obvious explanation or pretext, might well arouse resentment in that body and lessen any chances the treaty might have at a future date. Should, however, an exchange of notes or a protocol following the line of Department’s telegram No. 5 actually be concluded between the two countries in time to permit such action prior to March 4, it might then be possible for the President to take into consideration the fact as to whether it would be appropriate to resubmit the treaty to the Senate in connection with informing that body of the results of your negotiations with Turkey. In other words, the conclusion of an exchange of notes or a protocol might possibly furnish the President with a suitable [Page 790]occasion for again ascertaining the Senate’s views with regard to our treaty relations with Turkey. This possibility may be used by you in your conversations with Tewfik Rouschdy Bey, but discreetly and only after it has been ascertained, first, that this possibility would really be an added inducement to the acceptance by Turkey of an exchange of notes or a protocol following the line of the Department’s telegram No. 5 and especially paragraph (b) thereof and, second, that without this added inducement Turkey will not accept the exchange of notes or the protocol.

(4) At present your main objective is to secure the assent of Tewfik Rouschdy Bey to an exchange of notes or protocol following the line of Department’s telegram No. 5 and particularly the essential paragraph (b) thereof.

(5) You should keep in mind that the position which Turkey has heretofore taken that diplomatic relations and treaty relations are interdependent is an unusual one in international practice. As the Department pointed out in paragraph (3) (a) of its telegram No. 4, February 1, 6 p.m., the practice of this country has been to consider diplomatic relations and treaty relations as not interdependent. Presumably, the reason for the Turkish practice is the desire to obviate the possibility of any attempt to revive the capitulations or the treaties under which the capitulatory rights were enjoyed. If this is the purpose of the Government of Turkey, Turkey is protected from this possibility, so far as this country is concerned, by a provision following the line of paragraph (b) of the Department’s telegram No. 5.

In your endeavors to persuade Tewfik Rouschdy Bey to agree to an exchange of notes or a protocol following the line of Department’s telegram No. 5, you should be very careful to correct any possible suspicion he may entertain that the views of the Government of the United States are affected in any way by ulterior and hidden motives. The Government of the United States is now looking at its relations with the Government of Turkey not in terms of months but in terms of years. It is animated only by an earnest desire to have friendly official contact with the Government of Turkey as quickly as possible and eventually to develop through such friendly contact comprehensive treaty relations between the United States and Turkey. A great deal has been accomplished in the last few months towards a better understanding of Turkey in the United States in spite of the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty of August 6. American public opinion is unquestionably being favorably impressed by the good sense apparently displayed by Turkey in the face of the Senate’s action. Should Turkey endanger the full fruition of this better understanding by an insistence that [Page 791]American-Turkish relations be handled according to a general rule which the Government of Turkey has found to be of advantage in dealing with certain other nations, it would be a matter of great regret.

Kellogg