893.00/8685
The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Howard)
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of April 14, 1927, in which you inform me that the British Government has received a communication, from its Minister at Peking indicating that there is danger lest a situation should arise at Peking similar to that which developed in 1900 and stating that the commandants of the foreign expeditionary forces at Tientsin who take an equally grave view of the situation have recommended that the international forces at Tientsin and Peking should be raised to a figure of 25,000.
You state that the British Government has undertaken the main burden of the defense of the settlement at Shanghai, that it is therefore not reasonable to expect it to assume an equal burden in North China and that it has instructed its Minister at Peking that, unless effective international cooperation can be secured, he is to make arrangements in case of necessity for the evacuation of both Peking and Tientsin. You state that the British Government realizes the serious consequence of such a decision for other nations as well as for Great Britain and that it is with the greatest reluctance that it has brought itself to contemplate evacuation as inevitable unless Japan and the United States are prepared to do their share in the defense of common interests against the danger which threatens all equally.
You say that you have been instructed, in view of the above, to invite an expression of the views of the United States Government with regard to the present situation at Peking and Tientsin and the measures which should be taken to meet it. You add that according, to the views of the British Government the figure of 25,000 estimated as sufficient by the commandants at Tientsin is an under-estimate, it being the view of the British Government that reenforcement of two divisions would be required to hold Tientsin and its lines of communications, and say that the British Government might possibly be able, as its contribution to such forces, to make available the one [Page 114] brigade at present under orders for China. In conclusion you state that this brigade cannot reach Peking before the middle of May and that its disposition on arrival will have to be governed by the circumstances obtaining at that time.
The Government of the United States is not unappreciative of the steps which have been taken by the British Government in the defense of the settlement at Shanghai. The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet has been at Shanghai for some time and has conferred frankly and freely with the naval representatives of the other Powers concerned on questions relating to the protection of their several groups of nationals at Shanghai, and, where the lives of foreigners have been imperiled in common, the naval forces of the United States under his command have cooperated with the defensive forces of the other Powers in the common task of making the settlement a safe refuge for foreigners at Shanghai. The Government of the United States believes that when the extent of the several foreign interests and the numbers contained in the several foreign groups at Shanghai are compared it will be found that the United States has not failed to bear its share of the burden of protecting not only its citizens but other nationals as well.
With reference to the present situation at Peking and Tientsin and the measures which should be taken, the Government of the United States maintains at Peking and Tientsin, and along the line of communications between Peking and the sea, a mixed force of marines and infantry amounting to some 1300 men. It expects shortly to have available within easy reach of Tientsin additional marines numbering some 3000 men, to be used in case of necessity for the protection of the American Legation at Peking and of American citizens and their property in North China against mob violence. In addition to this number of men there will be available in case of emergency for use in North China a regiment of infantry from the Philippines numbering approximately 2000 men. Like the British Government, the Government of the United States has been advised by its Minister at Peking that the commandants of the foreign expeditionary forces at Tientsin have estimated that reenforcements amounting to 25,000 men will be needed at Tientsin. The Government of the United States, however, finds itself in agreement with the British Government that 25,000 men would be inadequate for the purpose of rendering the foreign legations at Peking and the foreign communities at Tientsin and communications connecting Peking and Tientsin and the sea safe against a determined attack by the Chinese military forces. The War Department of the United States after a careful study of the problem has expressed the belief that, while a minimum force of 50,000 men would be required to prevent any serious harm by Chinese troops to officials [Page 115] and nationals of the foreign Powers in Tientsin and Peking, such a force would not be able to keep the railway or the Peiho River open, but would provide merely for local defense in the two places. To maintain communications between Peking and Tientsin and the sea, as well as communications with Chinwangtao and the Kaiping coal field, the latter in order that coal necessary for the use of the railways might be available, would require an even larger force. The Government of the United States is frankly of the opinion that, if there is any likelihood that the incidents of the summer of 1900 are to be repeated at Peking and Tientsin, it would be better to evacuate the American Legation and American citizens from Peking and, if necessary, from Tientsin rather than go to the great expense and the almost certain loss of life necessary to maintain our nationals and Legation by force at Peking and Tientsin. The Government of the United States has been considering the question of the evacuation of its Legation from Peking and has instructed its Minister at Peking to consider this question and to discuss it frankly with his colleagues.
Accept [etc.]