893.00/8641: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (MacMurray)
[Paraphrase]
Washington, April 12,
1927—6 p.m..
146. Your telegrams No. 359, April 6, 3 p.m. [10 a.m.], No. 388, April 8, 8 p.m., No. 398, April 10, 9 p.m.
- 1.
- Above messages were referred to War and Navy Departments.
- 2.
- If the recommendations in your No. 359, paragraph 1, were followed, Department considers they would be interpreted as indicating a desire by this Government to side in the present strife in China with Chang Tso-lin.
- 3.
- All your telegrams referred to above indicate your belief that the United States Government should maintain its Legation in Peking by armed force. In your 359 you stated that you were reporting on the question of advisability of withdrawing the Legation.
- 4.
- The belief of the War Department after carefully studying the problem is that it would require a minimum force of 50,000 men to prevent any serious harm to nationals and officials of foreign powers in Peking and Tientsin by Chinese troops. This force could provide for local defense in those two places but could not keep open the railroad or the Pei Ho. It would require sending a much larger force to keep open the communications between Peking and the sea not only at Tangku but as well at Chinwangtao which is necessary to control the supply of coal needed for the railway.
- 5.
- The Department is not convinced in view of the great cost in life as well as treasure which is involved that it is worth the effort to continue the Legation at Peking. The Department would prefer to have you make all preparations for removing the Legation to Tientsin rather than risk danger of having the Legation trapped with consequent necessity for repeating the events of 1900. Naturally the Department must leave to your discretion the question of the time for such removal.
- 6.
- It is not considered wise by the Government to dispatch to the Philippines at this time a large force of land troops. Therefore the Government is not prepared to dispatch immediately a division of troops to the Philippines, to be held there for use in China. This [Page 108] Government will be prepared to send more marines to protect the lives and property of Americans at Tientsin if the powers desire for the time being to hold Tientsin as a place of safety for the concentration of foreigners. This Government does not desire for obvious reasons to take the initiative in proposing to the interested powers that Tientsin be held. This Government has no information regarding the intention of the other powers in this matter. The latest information it has is that the British Government was carrying on negotiations which looked to a transfer of its Tientsin Concession to Chinese control. Naturally this Government has no wish to furnish an excuse for breaking off any such negotiations. You are further aware that in the spring of 1926 during Chinese military operations in the neighborhood of Tientsin and Peking the American force at Tientsin suffered more than a little embarrassment due to the isolated position it occupied outside of foreign concessions in Chinese territory. This Government is persuaded by these considerations that it should wait for the initiative of the other interested powers in regard to the question of having an international force occupy the city of Tientsin for the purpose of holding Tientsin in the interest of foreign residents. Therefore any plans made by you for the future of the Legation at Peking and of the Americans resident in Tientsin should contemplate a possible evacuation of Tientsin. It is desired by the Department that you should not take any initiative regarding the question of whether or not Tientsin should be held by the protocol powers.
Kellogg