893.00/8511: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Paraphrase]
Peking, March 31,
1927—11 p.m.
[Received April 1—3:15 p.m.]
[Received April 1—3:15 p.m.]
310. My No. 277, March 29, noon.
- 1.
- Situation here during last two days has taken on graver appearance very rapidly. Feeling of apprehension of an antiforeign crisis here is very general among Chinese with whom Legation is in touch directly and indirectly. Certain missionary groups have found that their Chinese associates are insisting that arrangements be made immediately to turn the control of institutions over to them during the period to follow the expected driving out of foreigners. The happenings at Nanking appear as yet not to have had a definite reaction among the student element who, practically without exception, are Nationalist in their sympathies, but several perversions of that incident are gaining currency—one in effect that Northern agents disguised as Nationalist troops looted the city, and the other that foreign war vessels without provocation, and wantonly, bombarded the city, thereby killing 2,000 Chinese, because of hostility to the Southerners. It is reported by those in touch with local labor that workmen are highly organized and anticipate a period of demonstration and idleness. Chinese authorities report unusual activity and meetings of Chinese and Russian committees in the Soviet Embassy and that considerable quantities of arms are in storage there. The Chinese authorities profess [Page 99] to have information of the arrival of many of the gunmen and agitators from Shanghai and Hankow in Peking and in Tientsin where already agitation among mill hands and rug weavers is being worked up. See my No. 309, March 31, 10 p.m.84
- 2.
- The general opinion held by foreigners, including among them missionaries of long standing who hitherto have been disposed to place confident reliance upon the good will of Chinese, is that very serious trouble will occur in the Peking and Tientsin area in the not distant future. However, there is entire uncertainty whether the trouble expected will occur within a comparatively few days or sometime between now and next autumn, although seemingly the probability favors an early date. Chang Tsung-ch’ang’s quite probable defection may cause Chang Tso-lin at any time to withdraw to Manchuria, leaving the Communist agents and gunmen to take over this region even before Nationalist armies could arrive. A particularly difficult problem as to evacuation of the American citizens in this area is created by the uncertain time element involved. The obvious dictate of prudence is to get out at least the women and children as early as possible, but there is danger that any overt, conspicuous action in that direction would create not only panic and needless hardship and difficulty but would antagonize Chang Tso-lin by demonstrating a lack of confidence in his control of the situation, thereby precipitating the eventuality that is feared. However, I am advising the local responsible heads of American institutions that they should take means to send American women and children out of China as quickly as it is possible to do so inconspicuously, without creating alarm.
- 3.
- This afternoon at a conference with Consul Berger85 and General Castner86 I concurred in the General’s recommendations that the transport Thomas, carrying reliefs for Tientsin and the Philippines, should be diverted by the War Department to Tientsin instead of Manila, and that she should if possible also bring [garbled groups] company and a motorized artillery battery from Hawaii.
- 4.
- I understand from military attaché that the dispatch of reenforced brigade from the Philippines to China, as recommended in my No. 277, March 29, noon, and the sending of 1,500 marines, as recently requested by Admiral Williams, constitute the first two measures in the “plan yellow” of the War Department for protection of Americans in China. In my judgment the situation which now has developed urgently requires that that plan be put into effect. In carrying it out I would suggest, however, that for the time being it should appear, at least ostensibly, that all forces sent to China are [Page 100] directed towards Shanghai rather than Tientsin in order to avoid needlessly antagonizing Chang Tso-lin, the only remaining bulwark against anarchy in China.
MacMurray