893.00/8491: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 30—9:53 a.m.]
277. 1. It seemed reasonable until quite recently to assume that Chang Tso-lin and the forces he controls would be able and willing to prevent any manifestation in the North against foreigners. Now, however, there is increasing doubt in my mind, and likewise in the minds of several of the best informed of our American executives of missionary and philanthropic institutions in Peking, as to whether [Page 95] he could or would genuinely exert himself to do that. I am apprehensive that if he and Chiang Kai-shek should effect an understanding and division of territory in opposition to the radical element in the Kuomintang, the Northerners would fall in to such an extent with the antiforeignism of the moderate element of the Kuomintang as to prevent them from continuing their control of Soviet agents and the Chinese Communist faction in the North, a control which is effective at present. If no such understanding should be effected, the likelihood seems to be that Chang would withdraw to Manchuria, leave the territory of North China militarily indefensible against occupation by Nationalists and politically disorganized, with attendant anarchy and a tyrannic reign of terror. Even if Chang should remain at Peking despite the insistent advice of Yang Yu-ting, his chief counselor, he may sustain a defeat from the Nationalists and leave the Northern territory equally exposed. Americans in North China would find themselves in any of these eventualities as insecure as in Nationalist territory. In all probability it would become necessary to withdraw them for protection and for possible evacuation to Peking or to Tientsin.
[2.] Last Thursday, before receiving information regarding the Nanking incident, I had concluded that in view both of the condition of affairs along the Yangtze River, centering in Shanghai, and the probable necessity to extend protection in the Northern area to a large number of Americans, it was highly advisable that additional American forces be sent to China. This opinion has been confirmed by the Nanking outrages. I recommend with all earnestness therefore that those American army forces which it is my understanding are most immediately available, a reinforced brigade in the Philippines, should at once be sent to Shanghai. They could take the place of the marines on duty there now, who thus would become a mobile force available for patrolling duties to Tientsin, while retained on board ship temporarily at Shanghai. It would seem politically inadvisable under present circumstances to bring either a marine force or the Philippine brigade to Tientsin. Dispatch of additional forces to Tientsin, however, might be made immediately imperative by Chang’s withdrawal to Manchuria or by a debacle of his army, which at any moment may occur. I am likewise considering that the starting of additional army forces to the Philippines, made ready for quick dispatch to China, is rendered expedient by the very serious condition of affairs obtaining at present, which is becoming increasingly dangerous to the lives of Americans in China.
3. To make possible more adequate means of giving our citizens protection in case of necessity in North China, I feel that calling in American army forces would have in itself a very sobering effect [Page 96] on Nationalist leaders, who thus far have not shown any adequate sense of responsibility in matters involving personal security of Americans, let alone their material interests and rights.
4. Also I am strongly convinced that the dispatch of American army forces to China in the manner described above would do more than anything else perhaps to bring the Government of Japan into line in regard to protection of foreigners in China and to show our acknowledgment of the present situation in China which causes me serious concern.
5. We confront an increasingly grave situation unshielded. We must act at once, decisively, and comprehensively in the manner recommended, if we are to prevent an appalling disaster and protect American lives in China adequately either through bringing about a stabilization of the situation which would allow Americans to remain here or by providing means of evacuation as soon as possible in case the state of affairs should make evacuation inevitable.