893.8007/31: Telegram
The Chargé in China ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 30—8 p.m.]
1045. The Department’s telegram numbered 386, November 23, 11 a.m.
1. Legation has received from commander in chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet the following, which appears to be responsive to the third paragraph of Department’s telegram mentioned above:
“November 25. With reference to Legation’s 1004 of November 17, 7 p.m. to the Department. In regard to piracy and banditry against foreign ships, it appears from past information on the subject and from other information I have been collecting that piracy in South China has been directed generally against Chinese and some British steamers. A Standard Oil Company motor lighter was pirated on September 11 near Shekpai and all the cargo was appropriated, the vessel being then released. Since this incident, the Navy has convoyed Standard Oil vessels. At a later time when gunboats are available this convoy can be prosecuted more effectively. On the Upper Yangtze banditry is flourishing but American steamers cannot be given any convoy or other assistance in these waters until the gunboats are ready. The Dollar Line manager at Shanghai has furnished me with details concerning a plot last May to pirate a President liner and concerning the safety precautions taken for preventing the plot from being carried out, such as requiring the identification of all Chinese passengers by the comprador or by a Shanghai travel bureau and ceasing for a time the carrying of any third-class Chinese passengers. As a result of the latter precaution competitors have profited, as they made no such restrictions, and the Dollar Line has had the restrictions removed for some time. The only precaution being taken now for protection against pirates is the opportunity afforded, while executing searches for opium smuggling, to discover smuggled arms. [Page 336] There is no apprehensiveness at this time on the part of the local manager in regard to such activities on President liners. Aside from the reporting of the proposed plot from Hong Kong all action was taken in Shanghai. It is possible that there is some connection between the boycott against the British in the Canton district and the piracy against British ships, in view of reliable reports that wealthy Chinese corporations direct these piracies and that even Hong Kong is being used as one of the bases of operation. The British Admiralty, I am directly informed, is not in sympathy with the bombardment of villages in Bias Bay as a measure to deter piracy. Only a limited number of Americans travel through Southern China waters aboard merchant vessels which may be pirated. Consequently, even though I appreciate the advisability of communicating to the China authorities representations in regard to piracy in these waters and the possibility that there may be greater force in joint representations and likewise that I am not freely informed in regard to the diplomatic situation generally, I would suggest that it is advisable for our Government to make representations by an identical note or even by a similar note particularly applicable to the situation as affecting American interests.
I would appreciate it if you would obtain from the naval attaché articles 721–724, both inclusive, of the Navy regulations, and let me have your comments based on the entire situation, including the proposed representations to the authorities and the facts set forth therein, so that I can send to the Secretary of the Navy an appropriate report.
At present, preliminary to a final decision, I am very much opposed to any joint international patrol for the purpose of suppressing banditry or piracy in Chinese waters. Our Government would be made responsible by any such action for the acts of other nations, but without the authority or power to control such acts.
It is my belief that foreign steamship companies should be held to a responsibility for increasing the present number of foreigners in their crews and for making structural alterations of a protective nature to lend greater security against the seizure of ships by pirates among the passengers. It is the general practice to have a total of six foreigners, including a captain, two mates, a chief and two assistant engineers.
Any representations that are made should be made and delivered to the de jure authorities of China, the de facto government and the military authorities at various places in China and should be followed up continually by representations of our diplomatic, consular, and naval representatives, such action being taken as may be necessary, with every insistence that banditry, piracy or other interference with American interests to their detriment be prevented.”
2. I informed my colleagues at a meeting on November 29 of the drafting committee of the substance of the Department’s telegram 386. After consultation with them I submit the following in reply.
3. Concerning paragraph 1 of Department’s telegram, although I am doubtful whether the desired result will be brought about by the mere dispatch of a joint identic note to the Chinese authorities, there is nevertheless a chance that it may do so, considering that the present [Page 337] proposal has the additional and favorable factor of joint participation by the powers concerned, whereas hitherto the British have acted entirely by themselves.
4. In regard to Department’s paragraph 2, the object of the proposed joint note would be to make the Kwangtung authorities understand clearly that the deplorable state of affairs will no longer be tolerated by the foreign nations concerned and. that the latter will take steps for protecting their nationals in case the Chinese fail in this regard to do their duty. It is hoped that the Chinese authorities, if they can be brought clearly to this understanding, may find it to their advantage to suppress piracy. As indicated in my 1004, November 17, 7 p.m., paragraph 5, the only feasible plan, we are all agreed, would be continuous international naval patrol on the waters of Bias Bay. There is no question involved as to the bombardment of towns and the landing of armed parties. Any action along this line would, we feel, be undesirable and impracticable. If the Chinese should wish our cooperation, warships should not resort to fire action, but should only stand by in support and patrol.
5. Referring to Department’s paragraph 4, it is understood by us that all efforts to guard ships against piracy by examining passengers and their luggage has proven ineffective. It seems that all such safeguards have been explored thoroughly and have been tried. There is no practical plan, so far as we are aware, other than a naval patrol continuously in the waters of Bias Bay.
6. It was stated by the British Minister that he had received from his Government instructions approving the draft note, leaving technical matters to the British naval authorities. No instructions had yet been received by the French Minister. It was stated by the Italian Minister that his Government had approved the draft note but had some doubt, owing to the very limited number of Italian vessels in Far Eastern waters, as to their ability to cooperate actively in a patrol. The belief was expressed by Monsieur Vare that his Government had some misapprehension concerning the distance to be covered by the patrol, this distance being relatively very small, and that the question of participation by an Italian war vessel will present no difficulty.
7. The Japanese Government, according to the Japanese Minister, approved the draft note but wished, considering the extent of piracy along the coast of China, to enlarge the scope of our plan to include the waters adjoining Haichow in Kiangsu, another stronghold of pirates north of Shanghai, and to this end it was desired that a similar note be addressed to the Peking as well as the Canton authorities.
8. Although appreciating the viewpoint of the Japanese Government (a number of Japanese steamers having lately been attacked by [Page 338] Haichow pirates) and although hoping for the elimination of piracy along the entire coast of China, the Italian, British, and French Ministers and myself felt that it would be far wiser not to complicate the present situation, but rather to start with Bias Bay and if successful there to follow a similar procedure in regard to other pirate strongholds such as Haichow. The further observations were made by me that it seems to me, from the general political aspect, unwise to undertake the patrol of more than one area at a time, that a false impression might thus be given to the Chinese to the effect that our plans while purporting to concern piracy alone in fact contemplated general international intervention in Chinese affairs, and that with this in mind I was not able to recommend that my Government participate in the plan as enlarged by the amendment which the Japanese suggested. The hope was expressed unanimously by my colleagues and myself that the Japanese Minister might persuade his Government to withdraw for the moment the Haichow project. A willingness was stated by us to recommend to our Governments that there be incorporated in the original plan a provision for informing the Peking authorities unofficially of the proposed action in regard to Bias Bay, stating that unless meanwhile there was a clearing up of the Haichow situation we would be inclined to take similar action in that connection after a suppression of piracy in the Bias Bay area.
9. It was stated by the Japanese Minister that he would notify his Government by telegraph in this sense.
10. My colleagues were informed by me that I would report the substance of our meeting and would request instructions.
11. A paraphrase has been repeated to the commander in chief.
12. It is suggested that the Department revert to the use of the … code if this does not compromise confidential codes. The Legation’s messages on this subject may then be sent … via wireless.