893.00 Nanking/98
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called today at my request to discuss the note of the British Government to me of April 14, 1927, in relation to sanctions and the British note of April 18, 1927, in relation to the subject of the five Powers presenting an identic note to Eugene Chen in reply to his answer to the five Power protest. I said that I had taken these two notes to the Cabinet Meeting intending to discuss them fully and was explaining the notes and my views (substantially as I afterwards explained to the British Ambassador) when I received [Page 205] the memorandum from Mr. Johnson stating that the British Ambassador had just received a telegram from his Government asking him to suspend action on the note of April 18, 1927; that I could not say that the Cabinet definitely passed on it but from all that was said, I judge there was a general agreement that my views were correct; that I did not know whether the British Government desired me now to answer the notes or not; that I had seen in the morning New York Times a statement from London reading as follows: “Domestic strife between the Cantonese is regarded by British official circles as more important at present than the question of presentation of another note by the five Powers”. The Ambassador said that he judged that to be true and he thought that accounted for it and, in view of that, he did not know that any further answer was necessary; that he had telegraphed, however, to his Government the substance of what I said yesterday. What I told the Ambassador yesterday was in the main what I reported to him today. I told him that it was now evident that there was a split in the Nationalist organization between the Radicals and the Moderates, Chiang Kai Shek apparently being the leader of the Moderates; that it seemed to me that to send a further demand at this time might tend to drive Chiang Kai Shek and the Moderates into the arms of the Radicals and would really do no good and might do a great deal of harm to foreigners in various parts of China; that it seemed to me best under the circumstances for the present to let Eugene Chen’s note remain unanswered and await developments. The Ambassador agreed with me and said he believed that the notice in the New York Times was a correct explanation.
I told him the same argument applied to sanctions. Against whom would we apply sanctions? If they could be applied against the really guilty parties, that might make a difference; if there was a Government controlling China and its military forces which could be punished by punitive expeditions, that might make a difference; but neither condition existed; that it was probably impossible to lay hands and punish the guilty parties and why apply sanctions to the people of China by destroying property that simply was temporarily in the hands of certain military authorities. He agreed with me and said that was exactly what he thought himself. He wanted to know if he could say to his Government that the Cabinet approved my views. I told him I did not press for a definite answer because I had received the memorandum but that I had made my statement to the Cabinet and, in the main, my judgment was that we were in general agreement. I told him, however, that that was confidential.