893.00 Nanking/83: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:55 p.m.]
440. 1. Consul General Lockhart has sent to you from Hankow by naval radio the text of Eugene Ch’en’s answer to Lockhart’s note of April 11 setting forth demands on the Nanking incident.
[Page 197]2. Aside from minor changes of wording Ch’en’s reply to the British note is in substance identical with the reply to our note except that there is included in it a suggestion that the proposed international commission also investigate the incidents at Shanghai and Shameen in 1925 and the affair at Wanhsien last fall.
Ch’en’s reply to the Italian note is very much like that to ours except that there is no occasion to refer to firing by warships or to the violation of consular privileges. As yet only half of the reply to the French note has been received. It seems to be practically the same as the reply to the Italian note. Only a résumé of the reply to the Japanese note has as yet been received by the Japanese Minister. From this summary it appears that the note has two paragraphs which are designed as “bait”, as the Minister expresses it, for Japan; one of these paragraphs assumes that Japan will settle the matter by diplomatic negotiations and the other expresses confidence that it is not the wish of Japan to obstruct the Chinese revolution.
3. The Ministers of the interested powers agreed today to telegraph to their respective Governments the following identic recommendations:60
“After careful examination of the notes to their respective consuls from the Nationalist authorities in reply to the identic demands of April 11th, the five interested diplomatic representatives find themselves in complete accord in the conviction that the replies are wholly unsatisfactory and unacceptable. They constitute a transparent maneuver designed to stultify the demands by producing delay or disunion among the five interested powers. The notes do not meet the demands but attempt to obscure by irrelevant matters the plain issue of amends for the Nanking outrages. The sole point in which they profess to accede to the demands, that is, in the assurance of proper respect for the lives and interests of foreign nationals, is based upon protestations of Nationalist policy; with regard to that policy experience has shown the danger of reliance upon the Nationalist authorities, dominated as they are by Communist influences whose activities are directed towards delaying indefinitely any such adjustment of difficulties as the powers have been honestly seeking and making impossible the continuance of normal friendly relations between China and the foreign powers. Within Nationalist territory, the American and British Governments have found it necessary to withdraw their nationals to places where they can be protected or evacuated under cover: and in somewhat less degree the same is true of the French, Italian and Japanese Governments. In Hankow itself, the capital of the Nationalist regime, practically all foreign business has been compelled to close and all foreigners forced to leave except a small number encouraged by protection of naval force to remain though under precarious conditions. And even in the notes themselves the assurance of protection for foreigners is qualified by the veiled threat contained in the irrelevant reference to the so-called [Page 198] unequal treaties as constituting still a danger to foreign lives and property in China. The five diplomatic representatives are absolutely clear in their own minds that any attempt to negotiate or argue on the basis of these notes would merely play into the hands of [Eugene Ch’en] … They therefore join in recommending to their respective Governments that they be authorized to present to Eugene Ch’en through their respective consuls identic notes of the following tenor:
‘On April 11th the representatives of the American, British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments presented in identic notes certain terms for the prompt settlement of the situation created by the outrages against their nationals committed by the Nationalist troops at Nanking on 24th March.
To these identic notes the Nationalist authorities have not returned an identic reply but have answered such [each?] representative separately and in varying terms calculated rather to serve propagandist ends than to terminate the incident which has arisen. Not one of the demands made has been accepted unequivocally by the Nationalist authorities. Reservations have been attached to the acceptance of each one.
The terms presented in the identic notes of 11 April were not proposals open to discussion but the basic demands which the powers concerned are determined shall be carried out. Only after the Nationalist authorities have signified with a plain and unqualified affirmative that they are prepared promptly and completely to comply with these terms can any discussion regarding details take place.
Unless, therefore, the Nationalist authorities state unequivocally and without delay that they intend to proceed to the integral fulfillment of the terms presented, the Governments concerned will be obliged to consider such measures as may be necessary to obtain compliance.’
We also recommend that simultaneously with the delivery of this note the several Governments should make, and that the Ministers be authorized jointly to make, public in China a statement based on the above.”
4. Each of us in agreeing to these recommendations did so with the understanding that they are without prejudice to the position of his own Government. In particular, I reserved freedom of action on the part of the Government of the United States in regard to the matter of sanctions.
- Quotation not paraphrased.↩