893.00/9119: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 18—7:23 p.m.]
659. Department’s No. 249, June 7; my No. 630, June 9.14
- 1.
- After conferring with Brigadier General Smedley Butler, U. S. M. C., and General Castner, U. S. A., I am sending by letter to Admiral Williams, commander in chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, my views on the mission of the marine force in North China with especial reference to the considerations set forth in your telegram No. 244 of June 3, 1927. In connection with the fulfilment of this mission I am recommending, in the letter above mentioned, the dispatch to Tientsin of the rest of the marines which Admiral Williams informed me are available for service in this area. (See in this connection the first paragraph of your telegram No. 188, April 28 [26], 1927.) The following is a summary of my communication to Admiral Williams above referred to:
- 2.
- As there was no immediate need on June 2, 1927, at Tientsin for the entire marine force which was available at Shanghai and [Page 135] Olongapo, it seemed preferable from the viewpoint of expediency not to have the forces dispatched to Tientsin simultaneously, although it was felt at the time that it most probably would be necessary to have the second contingent of marines follow the first. In view of the fact that the arrival of reinforcements in North China has been published and explained in the case of the first contingent, no further publicity or explanation will be necessary in case further reinforcements are sent.
General Butler and I are in entire agreement regarding the mission of the marine force in North China. We agree that while it had been obviously wise to take the position that the force was coming to North China as a reinforcement to the American troops which are maintained here in accordance with the provisions of the Boxer protocol, yet for purposes of administration and in dealing with questions of international cooperation, it is highly desirable to keep the marine force entirely separate from the Fifteenth Infantry, which represents our share of the international force whose primary mission is to keep open the communications from Peking to the sea. Both General Butler and I feel that the sole mission of the American marines who have been sent to China (as the President has repeatedly and clearly declared) is to protect American life and property against any aggressive action on the part of the Chinese but to take no aggressive steps against them beyond the necessities of that primary responsibility above mentioned. My understanding is that the discretion to determine how the marines shall be employed to that end has been entrusted to the commander in chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet in collaboration with the American Minister.
In case the situation at Tientsin should develop in a manner similar to that at Shanghai it might become desirable to have close coordination with the other powers at Tientsin; but, according to my judgment, such coordination would be incidental and subordinate to the accomplishment by the United States marine force in China of their mission to protect American life and property, which is a duty apart from any obligations incurred under the Boxer protocol. I assume that General Castner’s and General Butler’s commands would, of course, give each other all necessary support should the situation require it, but this readiness to be of mutual assistance should not, in my opinion, lead to any confusion regarding the separate and distinct missions of the two American forces at Tientsin.
In connection with the protection of Americans in the Peking-Tientsin area, I consider it desirable that our marine force, while avoiding any involvement beyond such incidental cooperation with other powers as may be necessary in the nature of the case, should not participate in any program (such as we have some reason to [Page 136] believe certain of our associates of other nationalities desire to put forward) looking toward the reassertion in their entirety of the foreign rights acquired under the Boxer protocol and certain other arrangements (identic notes of July 15, 190215) which would involve an attempt to exclude Chinese-armed forces entirely from the region of Tientsin and to maintain open communication between Tientsin and Peking regardless of the estimated inadequacy of the military forces now available for that purpose. General Butler concurred. (In my opinion this policy should likewise apply to General Castner’s command on the same set of facts.)
As I have stated in my recent telegrams to the Department, I am entirely of the opinion up to the present that the danger to be anticipated from continuing to maintain the Legation at Peking is extremely slight and that the withdrawal of the Legation would in the circumstances be most unfortunate, if not indeed disastrous, to American interests. I feel that at least under present circumstances the protection of American life and property in the neighborhood of Peking and Tientsin would be adequately provided for whether the Legation remains or is withdrawn if a base from Tientsin to the sea were to be assured as against any contingency reasonably to be anticipated.
General Butler recommends as the most practicable and dependable means to that end that the Pei Ho should be kept open between Tientsin and the sea, which he believes can be rendered entirely feasible by placing a strong marine force at Tangku and at Tientsin. Should the commander in chief approve this plan, which, being a military matter, is for him to pass upon, it is requested that the 1,300 marines which were recently brought to Shanghai from Olongapo, along with the aviation units, should be sent to Tientsin.
Since General Butler would doubtless station a part of this contingent at Tangku, this would permit us to have an increased force in this area ready for any emergency without any apprehension of its being an unfortunately conspicuous addition to the American forces at Tientsin. Furthermore, according to information which has recently been received, by the time of the arrival of this second regiment of American marines, the Japanese, French, and British forces at Tientsin would also have been correspondingly increased.
The full text of my communication to the commander in chief is being sent to the Department in the next pouch.16
- Neither printed.↩
- See despatch No. 1046, July 15, from Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 198.↩
- Not printed.↩