500.A15 a 1/384: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson)
30. Your No. 68, July 7, 11 p.m., and No. 69, July 7, midnight.
- 1.
- Department approves suggested conversation with the chief delegates with view of impressing on them in every reasonable way fact that disruption of Conference would be disastrous for all parties and would inevitably be the beginning of a competitive building program which would make any agreement in 1931 more difficult to reach.
- 2.
- If you finally come to point where agreement seems impossible, I think you should adjourn for a week at least and give Department results of your final conferences together with figures of limitation on which British insist, as the Department would wish to submit entire matter to the President. A week of adjournment might afford opportunity for mature consideration of existing proposals as well as for sober reflection on part of all the Governments concerned.
- 3.
- If Conference fails and public meeting is called for purpose of permitting each delegation to state its position, or, should no public meeting be called and each delegation is left to make its position public, the Department believes you should make full statement of position of this Government. General statement you propose is well enough as far as it goes, but the Department believes that you should emphasize point that the President called Conference for purpose of limitation of armament, not to lay foundation for worldwide naval expansion. It is all right to lay emphasis on fact that a favorable outcome of Conference would enhance good feeling among the three countries parties to it and would create favorable impression throughout world, but I do not think that this was fundamental purpose back of calling Conference, which [Page 83] was, rather, to obtain a reasonable limitation on naval construction and to prevent competition. If the only powers which have considerable navies are willing to make reasonable limitations, the United States is not able to understand why the British Government finds it necessary to create so large a sea force when the United States and Japan are the only countries against which there is any necessity for building large navies. Neither British safety, nor British trade routes, nor British foreign possessions could possibly be endangered by navy of any other power, and should any other power start a building program of proportions to constitute a danger, the treaty would contain clause protecting not only Great Britain but any other signatory power.
I suggest also that you consider wisdom of including in your statement mention that the British accepted Secretary Hughes’ proposition at Washington Conference in 1921 for limitation of 450,000 tons on both cruisers and destroyers (Proceedings of Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, pp. 86 and 100). The Department is utterly unable to understand why, five years later, there is any justification for a cruiser tonnage which alone exceeds this combined figure. If result of Conference cannot be fairly interpreted by world opinion as self-denying ordinance entered into freely by the great naval powers, it then possesses no value whatever and will do endless harm. If the three great naval powers are unwilling to make concessions in order to stop competitive construction in sea forces, what can be expected of the other countries? The example to the lesser powers would certainly be very unfortunate.
Great stress is being laid by British press on view that Great Britain has proposed great economies through reduction of size and extension of life of battleships; but no mention is made of fact that no economy can result from any agreement on that score before 1931. I offer suggestion that it might be well to state that the United States had been willing to discuss with the other two powers at this Conference a program of reduction in size and of extension of life of battleships in 1931, but that as all the parties to the Washington treaty are not present and as no country can build any new battleships until after 1931, it would be useless to hold Conference for that purpose at present. Certainly, the increased building program of cruisers and the cost of their maintenance would more than offset any possible economies in battleships. If regrettable position is reached that Conference must be abandoned, careful consideration should be given to any statement to be made and time allowed for its consideration at Department and by President.
The foregoing is to assist you in preparing a statement to be submitted here for approval.