500.A15 a 1/331: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:05 p.m.]
35. There are indications that British delegation is not wholly satisfied over reception accorded its proposals in regard to modification of the treaty of Washington, and our delegation feels that British might be helped to withdraw from untenable position if, before you leave Washington, you could reinforce our statements here in a frank talk with either Howard or Chilton. In such a conversation we feel that there are certain points which it would be particularly helpful if you could touch upon.
- 1.
- Revision of the treaty of Washington. Though the American position has been stated in full it would be well to reiterate our statements explaining that such a revision is not a subject of discussion; that, should the British delegation find some way of not insisting on its proposals, an agreement would be far more easily reached, as the American delegation is not working with any thought of a concession; that while no revision of the treaty will take place at the present Conference, and they may as well recognize that fact now, they may be assured that it is our desire to make a recession from their position as easy as possible.
- 2.
- Equality. It seems incomprehensible that any doubt should now exist in regard to our having full parity, for this point has been explained to the proper British authorities for some time past; it would expedite matters if the British delegation would accept the fact that the United States, under an agreement or without it, will insist on its right to parity with the British Empire; and parity reached through a just agreement will be clearly advantageous to them. Should you deem it appropriate you might refer to the fact that I had told you of my reply to Bridgeman’s doubts concerning the necessity for us of parity to the effect that, should I accept a position of inferiority I should be forced to reside abroad permanently, and that you wholly agreed therewith.
- 3.
- It is clear that the British delegation consider the 1927 congressional building program a play to the gallery to back up the [Page 60] President in summoning the Conference and doubt its genuineness. It might be well to impress upon Howard that with his knowledge of the situation in the United States, he could not entertain such an idea; only by suggesting the Conference could the President curtail a building program of considerable size. Should no conclusion be reached at Geneva, probably a greater building program will be considered in the next congressional session; failure in our present task would create competitive building in both countries which could but be most detrimental to our relations, whereas an amicable agreement at this time would not fail gradually to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of naval strength.
- 4.
- As you stated in your telegram No. 11 of June 24, 8 p.m., and as you may care to confirm to Howard, a just agreement should be possible, based upon acknowledgment of our naval requirements, which are relative.
This outline is not detailed and is merely intended to set forth certain views which we have endeavored to emphasize here. It is obvious that should these same views reach the British Government and their delegation here through you, our position will be appreciably strengthened.