500.A15 a 1/322: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 24—4:24 a.m.]
27. The British naval delegates and Bridgeman have expressed the view repeatedly that the best way in which to have work initiated on a sound basis is for the delegations of the United States, Japan, and England to make a frank and full public statement of the needs of their respective navies with an explanation justifying the figures claimed. Bridgeman seems anxious to have a plenary meeting called soon and we assume that it is for this very purpose. We think that he will discuss later the burdens, etc., resting on the English Navy because of England’s island position and her consequent vulnerability. At the same time he will, we expect, dwell upon England’s entire dependence upon food supplies from overseas; the necessity that England police individual scattered units of the British Empire and trade routes; the lengthy coast lines of the various dominions and numerous colonies, etc. This is in accord with the British idea to get away from a strict application of the ratio fixed by the Washington Conference and endeavors to prove the necessity for a preponderant British strength. It seems obvious that the demands of the British will be very high, judging from Jellicoe’s indication to Admiral Jones last evening that England would require 500,000 tons of cruisers and considering Bridgeman’s remarks to me this morning that the United States would not need as much in the line of cruisers as would Great Britain. The idea of such a public statement is apparently to lead the United States and the Japanese to make a statement of a similar character as to [Page 53] their respective needs which the British can then comment on and criticize so as to obscure the issue. I feel that if we were to follow tactics similar to those of the British we would be led into an inconclusive argument as a result of which the British could readily distort our statements and we would then never succeed in clarifying the issue. To me it appears that the only way clearly to maintain the simplicity and clarity of our proposals is for us strictly to adhere to the principles of a fundamental nature which were laid down in the Washington treaty. I think that by adhering closely to those principles there will not be any danger of their distortion and we shall also be on safe ground. Thus should the statement to be made by Bridgeman be of such a nature as we anticipate, I desire in the most simple terms to reiterate the proposition that naval requirements depend upon the vital strength of other powers and are thus purely relative; that the American proposals are clear and comprehensive and demonstrate our willingness to adapt our tonnage figures to the minimum amount as regards auxiliary craft which the other members of this Conference can accept; that our faith in the practicability of the theory of relative requirements is thus plainly evidenced and that our suggestions in regard thereto remain open; conversely, that if a figure higher than that proposed by us is felt to be necessary by the other powers for their needs, our own requirements would have to be increased proportionately and would be on an equality with the higher figure. This appears to us to bring out in bold relief our willingness not only for real limitation but for reduction as well, so that should the tonnage levels be scaled upwards, it is my understanding that the power contending for the greatest tonnage would bear the responsibility therefor. An objective and clear indication of this in our statement may be necessary.