500.A15 a 1/a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Herrick )3
25. Following is text of memorandum to be handed by you to the French government in accordance with Department’s telegraphic instructions, Nos. 24, 26 and 27: [Page 2]
The American Government has followed with close attention the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference,4 and, after the most careful deliberation, has concluded that it can helpfully make certain observations at this time which, it hopes, may contribute materially to the success of that Commission—a success earnestly desired by the Government and people of the United States.
The conviction that the competitive augmentation of national armaments has been one of the principal causes of international suspicion and ill-will, leading to war, is firmly held by the American Government and people. Hence, the American Government has neglected no opportunity to lend its sympathy and support to international efforts to reduce and limit armaments.
The success of the Washington Conference of 1921–22 demonstrated that other Powers were animated with a similar desire to do away with this dangerous source of international discord. The Washington Conference made a beginning, however, and it has been the continued hope of the American Government, since 1922, that the task, undertaken at Washington by the group of Naval Powers could be resumed and completed.
For this reason, the American Government was happy to observe that the efforts looking towards the holding of a general international conference for the limitation of armament, which had been in progress for several years under the auspices of the League of Nations, had reached, in December, 1925, a stage sufficiently advanced, in the opinion of the Council of the League of Nations, to warrant the establishment of the Preparatory Commission, to meet in 1926, to prepare the ground for an international conference at an early date. The American Government, pursuant to its policy of cooperation with all efforts calculated to bring about an actual limitation of armament, accepted the invitation of the Council to be represented on the Preparatory Commission. The American representatives on that Commission have endeavored to play a helpful part in its discussions, and they will continue to be guided by that policy.
The American Government believes that the discussions of the Commission have been most valuable in making clear the views of the various governments as to the problems presented, and in demonstrating the complexity and diversity of the obstacles to be overcome in the preparation and conclusion of a general agreement for the limitation of all armament.
At the same time, these very complexities and difficulties, as brought out in the Preparatory Commission, have clearly pointed out that a final solution for the problem of armament may not be immediately practicable. Indeed, at the latest meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, several distinguished statesmen, leaders in the movement for the limitation of armament, sounded a note of warning against too great optimism of immediate success.
The American Government is most anxious that concrete results in the limitation of armament may be achieved. The discussions of the Preparatory Commission have emphasized the fact that a number of governments consider that one of the chief present obstacles to [Page 3] the general reduction and limitation of armaments lies in the interdependence of land, sea, and air armaments, and in the consequent impossibility of reducing or limiting one of these categories without dealing simultaneously with the others. On the other hand, the discussions have demonstrated even more emphatically that, should all effort to bring about the reduction or limitation of armament be conditioned upon the acceptance by all the world of a comprehensive plan covering all classes and types of armament, there would be little, if any, prospect of actual progress towards arms limitation in the near future.
The above difficulties must be frankly recognized. The American Government believes that they can be overcome and that they must be overcome, since the consequences of a failure to overcome them, and to make some definite, if only partial, agreement for the limitation of armament, would constitute a setback to the cause of international peace too great to deserve serious contemplation as a possibility.
Admitting reluctantly that the existing political situations in certain parts of the world may render the problem of universal limitation incapable of immediate solution as a whole, the American Government believes that it is entirely practicable for the nations of the world to proceed at once to the isolation and separate solution of such problems as may appear susceptible of such treatment, meanwhile continuing to give sympathetic consideration and discussion to comprehensive proposals aimed at the simultaneous limitation of land, sea, and air armaments by a general agreement when such an agreement may be warranted by existing world conditions. The American Government believes that the adoption of such a course is the duty of the governments represented on the Preparatory Commission, and that by so doing, they will ensure the achievement by the Commission and by the general conference of concrete, even though perhaps only partial results, thus facilitating progress towards the final solution of the general problem.
The American Government, as its representatives on the Preparatory Commission have repeatedly stated, feels that land and air armaments constitute essentially regional problems to be solved primarily by regional agreements. The American army and air force are at minimum strength. Agreement for land and air limitation in other regions of the world would not be dependent upon the reduction or limitation of American land and air forces. Therefore, the American Government does not feel that it can appropriately offer definite suggestions to other powers in regard to the limitation of these categories of armament.
The problem of the limitation of naval armament, while not regional in character, can be dealt with as a practical matter by measures affecting the navies of a limited group of Powers. This has been clearly established by the success of the Washington Treaty Limiting Naval Armament.5 The United States, as the initiator of the Washington Conference, and as one of the principal Naval Powers, has a direct interest in this question, and, being both ready and willing to [Page 4] enter into an agreement further limiting naval armament, feels itself privileged to indicate a course of procedure which will, in its opinion, lead to such an agreement.
The discussions over a period of six months in Geneva have been most useful in the opportunity afforded for an exchange of views as to the general problem of naval limitation and on the basis of these discussions it is felt that there is a possibility of reconciling many of the divergent views which have been expressed, in such a manner as to meet the requirements of the Naval Powers and enable them to decide upon acceptable measures of limitation.
In order to advance definitely towards a limitation agreement, the Government of the United States takes this method of addressing an inquiry to the Governments Signatories of the Washington Treaty Limiting Naval Armament as to whether they are disposed to empower their representatives at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission to initiate negotiations looking towards an agreement providing for limitation in the classes of Naval vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty.
The American Government is not unmindful of the fact that the Preparatory Commission is not specifically charged with the duty of concluding international agreements, and that its task is primarily that of preparing the agenda for a conference to be called at a later date. Nevertheless, being sincerely desirous of the success of the Preparatory Commission, the American Government makes this suggestion in the firm belief that the conclusion at Geneva, as soon as possible, among the Powers Signatories of the Washington Treaty, of an agreement for further naval limitation, far from interfering with or detracting from the success of the Preparatory Commission’s aims, would constitute a valuable contribution to the sum of achievement attributable to that Commission and would facilitate the task of the final Conference in dealing with the particularly complex problems of land and air armament, perhaps capable of solution for the present only by regional limitation agreements.
It seems probable that, under any circumstances, the final Conference will not be able to meet during this calendar year. The coming into effect of agreements reached by it might be delayed for a considerable period, for a multitude of causes. Therefore, the American Government believes that those Powers which may be able to arrive at an agreement for further naval limitation at an earlier date would not be justified in consciously postponing that agreement, and thereby opening the way for a recrudescence of a spirit of competitive naval building—a development greatly to be deplored by all governments and peoples.
The American Government feels that the general principles of the Washington Treaty offer a suitable basis for further discussion among its signatories.
Although hesitating at this time to put forward rigid proposals as regards the ratios of naval strength to be maintained by the different Powers, the American Government, for its part, is disposed to accept, in regard to those classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty, an extension of the 5–5–3 ratio as regards the United States, Great Britain and Japan, and to leave to discussion at Geneva the [Page 5] ratios of France and Italy, taking into full account their special conditions and requirements in regard to the types of vessels in question. Ratios for capital ships and aircraft carriers were established by that Treaty which would not be affected in any way by an agreement covering other classes of ships.
The American representatives at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva will, of course, participate fully in the discussions looking to the preparation of an agenda for a final general conference for the limitation of armament. In addition, they will have full powers to negotiate definitely regarding measures for further naval limitation, and, if they are able to reach agreement with the representatives of the other signatories of the Washington Treaty, to conclude a convention embodying such agreement, in tentative or final form, as may be found practicable.
The American Government earnestly hopes that the institution of such negotiations at Geneva may be agreeable to the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and that comprehensive limitation of all types of naval armament may be brought into effect among the principal naval powers without delay.
Repeat text of memorandum only to London as Dept’s. No. 21, to Rome as No. 8.
- See last paragraph for instructions to repeat text of memorandum to Embassies in Great Britain (No. 21) and Italy (No. 8). The same telegram, mutatis mutandis, with exception of last paragraph, was sent to the Embassy in Japan (No. 12).↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1926, vol. i, pp. 40 ff.; also, post, pp. 159 ff.↩
- Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan for the limitation of naval armament, signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247.↩