500.A15 a 1/531: Telegram
The Secretary of State to President Coolidge
We received a telegram yesterday afternoon reading in part as follows:
[Here follows a paraphrase of paragraphs 4 and 5 of telegram No. 147, August 1, 11 p.m., from the chairman of the American delegation, printed on page 146.]
It was important to answer at once so after consultation with the Navy we wired as follows:97
“If the Japanese or British delegations should make a suggestion such as that contained in paragraph four of the foregoing telegram that the conference might end without any prolonged and detailed speeches but merely with a statement issued on the part of the conference and concurred in by all three of the delegations and put out by the Secretary General of the conference which should recommend that the whole question be considered in 1931 I think that such a proposition ought to be given your support. I agree also with the ideas you set forth on the subject contained in paragraph five.”
I received another message in which the delegation stated that:98
“If Japanese initiative is rejected by the British or fails for other reasons our delegates are prepared to go ahead with their speeches. However, our delegations recommended a substitute for Japanese proposal [Page 151] in paragraph four and five of this telegram, which the delegation feels would be approved by public opinion and leave an opportunity open for future negotiations. This would require an authorization to go to see the British delegation and that of Japan and show them that public discussion on the differences of opinion could only bring about ill feeling and make matters complicated in the future. Likewise that the course of broad-mindedness and common sense would be to issue a joint statement stating that we had come to an impasse on technical matters but that as all three countries are united in a desire to arrive at an agreement we are not willing that any mere interchange of points of view should be taken as final. That on this account we are agreed that the only possibility now open is to issue a joint public statement that we have been unable to reach agreement with respect to the question of cruisers. That on that account we agree to adjournment in an effort to give a chance for negotiations directly between governments in the hope that united efforts and common devotion to the cause of naval limitation will lead in the end to the type of reasonable understanding which could alone be considered worthy of three great nations on friendly terms.
We think that a statement of this nature read at the public meeting by the Chairman of the conference would be altogether dignified and would have the tendency to sound a more reasonable note between the governments and might bring about a calming down of the recriminations which at present or in the near future make the carrying on of negotiations extremely difficult if not impossible.
As there is only a very short time now before the plenary session we hope that you can give us a decision very shortly on this subject.”
In view of the shortness of the time I have sent the following telegram as they had to have the answer this morning. I consulted with the Secretary of the Navy and answered as follows:99
“Your 152, August 2, 4 p.m., has just arrived very late this afternoon with many portions considerably garbled. However I believe I fully understand your suggestions.
- 1.
- Should the Japanese proposal for a compromise be turned down by the delegation of the British Empire or should it fail for any other reason you have stated that you are ready to proceed with your public statement in accordance with my instructions. I approve of this course. Should, however, a public plenary session be held and the British state their views naturally we must follow the same course.
- 2.
- Your calling in the delegations of Great Britain and Japan to suggest to them a joint statement of the fact that you are unable to arrive at an agreement and that on that account you are in accord that an adjournment should be taken in order to give a chance for negotiation directly between the interested governments appears to us to be statesmanlike. Both the Secretary of the Navy and I give our approval to the idea.”
Neither one of these propositions contemplates an adjournment for a few months but practically an ending of the conference with a reference of their work to the 1931 conference, thus leaving it open [Page 152] for diplomatic negotiations if possible. We have, as you know, desired to avoid recriminations but, of course, if the British insist on making speeches we will do the same. To make a treaty recognizing a large building program on the part of Great Britain of course is inadvisable. I am in hopes that this may be avoided.
Just been notified by the British Ambassador that British Government insists on speeches being made. This probably ends any attempt.