500.A15 a 1/512: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
139. I received a call from Ishii this morning; he informed me that he had had an interview with Bridgeman last night in an endeavor to learn whether there was not some way to find a basis of discussion so that we might proceed with our conversations. He said it was quite apparent that Bridgeman did not believe the American delegation was serious in saying that it would accept no transgression of the principle of freedom of armament and that he was confident that at the last moment some radical concession would be granted by the United States. The views expressed by the American delegation, Ishii said, he was firmly convinced were those of the American Government and that he did not believe unless I knew them to be those of my Government that I would have been presumptuous enough to state definitely that the proposals made by the British, concerning cruisers large enough to mount 8-inch guns, were totally unacceptable to the United States. I paid Bridgeman a visit after Ishii’s call on me and told him that I considered that I should inform him that I was in receipt of a full confirmation from my Government of the opinion I had given him that the British proposals concerning the armament of cruisers were absolutely unacceptable to the United States. He was further informed by me that I considered it necessary to request a delay of the next plenary meeting, so that I might be fully informed as to the views of the American Government before a final session of the Conference, and I said most emphatically that should such a plenary session be held it must be looked upon as the end of the Conference at Geneva.
In reply Bridgeman said that on the contrary he considered that it would be favorable if a full statement of our opposite opinions was [Page 143] expressed, after which a final appeal to the public might be made by Cecil and that we could then have a private meeting at which a final endeavor could be made to reconcile the views of the different delegations. The American delegation, I said, was ready to accept any means of accomplishing an agreement and that it was only too willing to give all its efforts and ingenuity to this end, but if any real success was to come from such a private meeting the endeavor should be made before another plenary session was held; that it would be useless to begin negotiations all over again after we had stirred up public opinion by stating in a positive manner our divergent opinions.
The political clause proposed by us,89 Bridgeman said, was entirely unsuited to British needs as they were of the opinion that Governments would procrastinate in assuming the rights allowed them by such a clause. If the United States would consent not to construct more than a small number of cruisers capable of carrying 8-inch guns, say two or three, besides the 10,000-ton vessels to be specified, Bridgeman said he thought some solution might be found, or, if the United States should incorporate in the treaty a statement to the effect that it was not our intention at present to construct any cruisers capable of carrying 8-inch guns besides those 10,000-ton vessels to be decided upon, but that ample notice would be given should we decide later to construct these cruisers. In reply I stated that I thought such a statement, which could only be a conjecture, would be subject to serious opposition and really had no proper place in a treaty. I said I saw no objection concerning the provision for giving advance notice and that as far as that provision alone was concerned it seemed entirely proper. (The United States would doubtless notify the other parties to a treaty of any new construction undertaken by it. See Washington treaty, part 3, section 1 (b).90) The above was not deemed to be sufficient by Bridgeman.
The question was then raised by Admiral Jones whether the British intended, when discussing 10,000-ton cruisers, to include any craft of sufficient size to allow the mounting of effective 8-inch-gun batteries. In reply Bridgeman stated that such was his intention and that the maximum class could include even 8,000-ton vessels carrying 8-inch guns.
At this juncture, I stated that the whole question seemed to have very little relation to realities, as the only question seemed to be whether any construction we might undertake within the limits of tonnage allowed us would be of interest to the British Empire and that considering our present and past policy we were absolutely sure that this was not so. The reply made by Bridgeman, in a very dry [Page 144] manner, was that this was not the way the British look upon the matter.
I was then asked by Bridgeman if I would interview Cecil this morning and see if he had anything to suggest. Of course I consented to do so and paid Cecil a visit during which he proceeded to repeat just what Bridgeman had previously told me. I took the matter of the postponement of the plenary session up with Cecil, as I knew Bridgeman’s consent to this depended upon Cecil’s assent. His reply was he would have no objection to this provided I could give him some hope of agreement, but if we were asking for this delay so that we might prepare an aggressive and effective speech, he would certainly object. My reply to this was that the American delegation did not require any time for the latter purpose, as I was ready to make a full and definite statement concerning the American position should they desire the session to convene tomorrow, but that neither the Japanese nor American delegations considered this a wise course to pursue. He then stated that he could not oppose delaying the plenary session and in accordance with this an arrangement has been made to postpone it until Wednesday or Thursday. The British said that they might give preference to Thursday, in order to allow Lord Jellicoe to be present, he having been detained in London due to the death of his brother.
It was the Americans’ turn, Cecil then said, to put forth some suggestion as to how the present impasse could be overcome. My reply was that I considered that a maximum proposal had been made by the Americans when they suggested the clause relieving the British of the obligations of the treaty should they decide that the American construction program of cruisers capable of mounting 8-inch guns was too offensive, and that I did not see, when this had been put aside by the British as not offering ground for discussion, how any minor suggestion would meet the situation, but that if there was any reasonable way to smooth matters out I was quite willing, as I had been from the first, to consider it.
Absolutely on his own accord, Cecil then stated that he would offer the suggestion that the situation might be overcome by our consenting to give advance notice of our intention to construct cruisers capable of mounting 8-inch guns. My reply was that I had assented to this during a conversation which Bridgeman and I had previously had. The attention of both Cecil and Bridgeman was called to the fact that the appeal which Cecil proposed to make to public opinion would be addressed to the world at large and not to the delegations at Geneva; that the United States needed no such appeal to influence it to study what it considered fair proposals and that I would not deem it wise to acquaint the public with our divergent views before attempting to come to an agreement, as such public airing of our differences [Page 145] would only vex public opinion in the United States and England and make it still more difficult for us to reach an agreement. All his experience in public life, Cecil stated, however, had been that when things apparently became hopeless, the day was often saved by an appeal to public opinion. The British appear to be very averse to wrecking the Conference on this issue but they have shown no disposition to grant any concession up to this period. Cecil and Bridgeman both informed me that they were most positive concerning the restriction to a small number of maximum size cruisers capable of carrying 8-inch guns and that there could be no departure from their suggestion. Therefore, we are preparing the last American statement with the amendments suggested by you, as I cannot see how the American and British views can be reconciled.
- Telegram in four sections.↩
- See telegram No. 115, July 23, 2 p.m., from the chairman of the American delegation, p. 131.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 258.↩