500.A15 a 1/510: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 30—10:10 a.m.]
137. Your No. 69, July 29, 2 p.m.85 The delegation is in complete agreement with you on disastrous consequences of final break, with public statements made of the differing positions. Delegation feels very strongly, however, that it would be equally as disastrous were we to let it appear that after having reached a deadlock over a clear-cut question we had avoided issue with inference that we lacked confidence in our position. Any initiative on our part for an adjournment would inevitably leak out and would be interpreted as admission by us that there would be possibility of making concession to British on question where on one hand there is nothing but surrender of a principle and on the other its maintenance. We understand that our position has the almost unanimous backing of the American press. We question if this backing may not be jeoparded for first time if we take the initiative to adjourn.
If we were to accept a proposal for adjournment, clearly emanating from another government, however, this difficulty would be avoided; it would, in fact, be obvious that our acquiescence in such a proposal would be only reasonable. If you desire, suggestion can be made to Japanese delegation (not revealing our initiative) that they propose an adjournment to us and to the British. We believe the latter would be very glad to accept such proposal; we should have to make clear, however, that adjournment and plenary session are mutually exclusive. Once a public stand had been taken an adjournment would be of no purpose. On other hand, if adjournment be agreed on, it is obviously not desirable to prejudice further discussion by making definite public statements.
Please instruct without delay.