500.A15 a 1/446: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 19—5:03 a.m.]
106. A decision on certain specific matters will clearly be necessary if the memorandum cited in my telegram No. 105 of July 18 is to be outlined as a groundwork for further debate respecting surface vessels. These matters which we ask you to consider and upon which we would like to have instructions from you are: (1) The proportion allotted to Japan with relation to our own; (2) the question of guns of 8-inch caliber; (3) maximum unit tonnage of the suggested smaller cruiser type.
With regard to the first point, a proportion of 5–3.25 would result from the suggested figure of 500,000 tons of surface craft for the United States and Great Britain and 325,000 tons for the Japanese Empire. This ratio in the opinion of the naval advisers concedes too much and might gravely endanger the American western Pacific position. They believe that no departure from the 5–3 ratio should be permitted and draw your attention to the Navy General Board papers on the subject. A small advance over the 5–3 ratio might possibly be made if one or several smaller vessels were named or concession in destroyers were made but this is only proposed because the Japanese would be offended by our intransigence on the subject of ratio, which might frustrate further efforts to arrive at an agreement.
The proposed smaller category of cruiser and the nature of its armament is the really crucial point involved in the question of the 8-inch gun. Throughout the negotiations the British have been insistent that this category should be limited to guns of 6 inches, while our Naval advisers all agree that we must strictly maintain the right of placing 8-inch guns on the smaller class. This entails [Page 114] the necessity of a maximum unit tonnage of at least 8,300 tons. Since the Japanese would have no extra tonnage within which to build this type of cruiser until 1936 we can scarcely expect them to support our position to any great extent, although we believe them to be in agreement with us in principle and think that they would have no objection to the maximum displacement above-mentioned with respect to the smaller type of cruiser. We desire to be instructed regarding the maximum size of the lesser type of cruiser and as to the question of the 8-inch gun. There can be no advantage in discussing any remaining questions until a decision is reached on these two matters. It is, moreover, on these very questions that the British might try to break up the Conference should we be firm in standing on our position. While we interpret our instructions as directing us strictly to maintain, in respect to all future cruisers, our class of armament, your definite corroboration of this is desired.
With reference to the retention of obsolete vessels, the British suggestion is clearly a camouflaged means of bringing total limitation to 625,000 tons, which is, however, within a figure which can be discussed by us. Certain factors such as quantity are susceptible of being changed, in order to render the plan more agreeable to us until 1936, but until the points mentioned in the preceding paragraph are settled it is idle to go into these features of the situation and this also applies to the question of the number of 10,000-ton vessels which each country might have.
It is seriously within the bounds of possibility that the Conference might be wrecked on any one of these matters, and we accordingly seek your instructions thereupon. While, of course, we are ready firmly to hold our ground, we are of the opinion that the entire subject should be studied by you both in its technical and its political aspects before we take up our final position.