Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, Volume I

893.512/479: Telegram

The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Peking, December 22, 1926—4 p.m.
[Received December 22—2:55 p.m.]

632. Supplementing my 628, December 19, 3 p.m.

1. As my telegram 628, December 19, 3 p.m. will have made clear the British memorandum communicated to the diplomatic body on the 18th was not restricted to the matter of immediate unconditional grant of the Washington surtaxes as was to be inferred from the press report upon which was based your telegram number 301, December 20, 3 p.m. Memorandum goes so much farther that it relegates to subsequently incidental discussion previously clear out [-cut?] issue as to these surtaxes. I assume it also removes any occasion for such action on my part as your telegram suggested.

2. Larger proposal which the British Government has not [now?] referred to the powers appears to be the result of determination on the part of the British Foreign Office to abandon the policy of assailer [assailant] and take the initiative in formulating a definite and positive policy of conciliation towards China. It contains in essence only two new points—first, and most important, the ambiguously expressed willingness to accept immediately and unconditionally what is referred to as “tariff autonomy” and, second, the proposal that the powers adopt the policy of condoning all but graver contraventions of treaty rights on the part of the Chinese.

3. There is already in effect what purports to be a national tariff (see Conference summary number 2, October 27 [28], 1925⁹⁵); and unless, in offering to recognize China’s tariff autonomy “as soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national tariff,” the British Government intended to hedge its offer by a condition which implies indefinite postponement, it would appear that it contemplates recognizing any schedules of tariffs which may be put into force by the competent authorities in the various regions of China. The latter appears to be the more probable interpretation, especially since the settlement itself presupposes that there will be no competent central government of China in the near future. Whether or not this is the intention of the British Government, it will be construed by the Chinese as a profession of willingness to pay any import duties that may be assessed anywhere in China.

4. While it is justifiable and perhaps advisable for the powers in their relations with China to adopt a mighty querulous and petty attitude in the matter of protests against insignificant infractions of the treaties, broad formula now proposed by the British with regard to condoning disregard of their obligations by the Chinese in all matters which the powers may not unanimously consider vital, is, in effect, an invitation to the Chinese to carry the principle of repudiation to whatever may prove to be the limit of tolerance on the part of the powers.

5. It seems to me a matter of grave doubt whether these two fundamental points of the British program are well advised. With regard to obviously necessary modification of existing treaty rights there are in general three possible courses to pursue: First, renunciation by the powers with a view to placating China[’s] nationalistic feeling; second, acquiescence by the powers (whether willingly or grudgingly) in a policy of repudiation by the Chinese; third, orderly negotiation with a view to readjustment of unsatisfactory or illiberal treaty provisions by mutual consent, simultaneously with insistence upon full respect for existing obligations until thus modified. The last-named seems to me to offer the only possibility of making the necessary readjustments reasonably and with fairness to the interests of both parties. The British program appears to ignore that possibility and to be directed towards placating Chinese feeling by concessions which I fear will scarcely at all appease nationalistic aspirations but will on the other hand encourage them to force other issues which are not contemplated by the British—such as the integrity of the Maritime Customs organization, the existence of Shanghai International Settlement, and of the various concessions, extraterritorial, special privileges of missionaries with regard to residence and ownership of land in the interior, and (what may prove of particular importance to us) the question of restrictions upon Chinese immigration into foreign countries.

6. The fact remains however that once the British program is made public (as it seems likely it will be within a brief time) the mere fact that such radical concessions have been made by the nation which is still predominant in the trade of China will compel us whether we like it or not to offer the same concessions on our part. The British will have forced our hands in view of the impossibility of our maintaining consistently or with any hope of success an attitude ostensibly less liberal than theirs. And, if we are to be compelled to fall in with this policy, it seems to me advisable that we should do so with a good grace and in spirit of loyal cooperation towards making it a success in the interest of all foreign powers, recognizing that though not ideal it offers possibility of uniting the treaty powers in what the statement itself terms “a constructive policy in harmony with the spirit of the Washington Conference but developed and adopted to meet the altered circumstances of the present time.”

7. These are some, indications that the Japanese will vigorously oppose the British program. It would nevertheless seem that if the British force the issue the Japanese cannot any more than ourselves afford to be put in the wrong in the eyes of the Chinese, especially in view of the great sacrifices they have for the past two years been making in the interests of a “friendship policy.” It would seem that they must either join the British or attempt the dangerous expedient of trying to outbid them by the relinquishment, for example, of the rights of extraterritoriality. This latter desperate alternative would quickly prove fatal to foreign rights and interests. It seems to me that we may best contribute to averting this possibility by adopting for our part the British program as the least destructive of the courses now open to us even though it offers us no definite assurance of obtaining a satisfactory adjustment for such claims as we have against China.

MacMurray

95. Foreign Relations, 1925, vol. i, p. 867.