500.A4e/690: Telegram
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 3—10:30 a.m.]
595. Department’s 273, November 19, 4 p.m.32 With reference to London’s 283 [253], November 17th,32 it may be recalled that in the instructions of the British Government to the British delegation made public September 18th, 1925, there appeared the following:
“His Majesty’s Government recognize that consolidation of the unsecured debts is one of the tasks which will confront the Conference.”
The British, in association with the other delegations, were engaged on and off throughout the Conference in discussions relating to debt consolidation until May 3rd when Stewart of the British delegation announced that he was under instructions to discontinue all further discussions looking toward the negotiation of general agreement providing for interim tariff rates and the disposition of revenues accruing therefrom. Up to that time when the discussions were thus abruptly terminated, Stewart had been engaged with the Japanese and American technical advisers in the discussion of such a general agreement, and negotiations were proceeding with excellent prospects [Page 862] of reaching an amicable arrangement. From that date until July 3rd, when the work of the Conference was discontinued, negotiations among the foreign delegations were directed solely toward reaching an agreement for the implementing of the Washington surtaxes and did not embrace a discussion of debt consolidation; and the latter question was not under consideration by the foreign delegations on July 3rd when action was taken in effect discontinuing the work of the Conference. In this connection see delegation’s despatch of September 9th33 enclosing a record of the conference studies numbers 1 and 2, in particular page 17 of the latter. If debt consolidation was the fundamental cause of the unwillingness of the British delegation to proceed with the work of the Conference, then Wellesley’s statement that this question wrecked the Conference would appear to be explicable only on the theory that the British Government preferred to see the Conference wrecked rather than meet in a spirit of compromise the views of the other delegations, or that on or about May 3rd the British Government reversed itself as to its willingness to discuss any plan of debt consolidation whatsoever.
The text of the telegram shown by Wellesley to MacMurray in 1923 should be in the files of the Department as an enclosure to a personal note dated February 10, 1923, from Craigie to MacMurray.34 It will be noted the Department was in agreement with Wellesley upon the principle of policy “of [eliminating] if possible from Special Conference discussion of unsecured debts.” The understanding reached between Wellesley and MacMurray contemplated eliminating the discussion of debts from the Conference provided that this problem could be taken care of by the debts being secured upon other than customs revenues prior to the Conference and the contingent understanding reported by Wellesley in 1923 is by no means the equivalent of the categorical statement reported by the Embassy35 that “he and MacMurray were in accord that debt consolidation should not be discussed at the Tariff Conference.”36 Whatever degree of misunderstanding may have existed on this point in January 1923, however, was wholly dispelled by the Department’s number 67 to London, March 26, 1923;33 see conference 38, May 12, 5 p.m.
With reference to the advisability of granting the Washington surtaxes without reservations, see Legation’s 594, December 2, 5 p.m.37
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Neither printed. R. Leslie Craigie was Secretary of the British Embassy at Washington.↩
- i. e., the American Embassy at London.↩
- The statement was reported to the Department in telegram No. 253, Nov. 17, which was repeated to the Minister in China in telegram No. 273, Nov. 19.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Post, p. 902.↩