500.A4e/647
The Consul General at Canton (
Jenkins
) to the Minister in China (
MacMurray
)17
Canton
,
July 29,
1926
.
No. 495
Sir: I have the honor to report that your
telegram of July 24, 2:00 a.m., was received in this Consulate General
on the morning of July 26. It was immediately decoded and embodied in a
note which was delivered to Mr. Chen by special messenger about 4:00
o’clock that afternoon. As it was not convenient for me to call at the
same time, I sent a personal note to Mr. Chen to inform him that I would
call to see him the following morning in respect to your
communication.
When I saw Mr. Chen at 11:00 a.m. the next day, I endeavored to let him
understand as you instructed that his original note might serve a useful
purpose but that this value would probably be lost if he indulged in
further communications for propaganda purposes. Mr. Chen frankly said
that he would have to reply to the American Minister’s message because
“it furnished too good an opportunity to be missed”. Mr. Chen added,
however, that he would take the precaution to couch his views in more
restrained language than in the past, and he hoped the Consulate General
and the Legation would appreciate the attitude of the Nationalist
Government.
[Page 850]
Mr. Chen drew my attention to the fact that the Legation had evidently
given publicity to the Minister’s instructions to the Consulate General
on July 24, whereas he (Chen) had not received the Consulate General’s
note until the afternoon of July 26. I explained to Mr. Chen that this
was undoubtedly due to the Legation’s failure to realize how slow
telegraphic communication was in these times and that the Minister was
evidently under the impression that the message would reach me much
sooner than it actually did. In this connection, the Legation will
doubtless be interested to know that Reuter’s telegram conveying the
verbatim text of the Legation’s message was published in the Hongkong
Morning Post of July 26 (before the telegram
had been delivered to this Consulate General) and actually reached
Canton an hour or two earlier than the Consulate General could deliver
its note to the Canton Foreign Office.
The Consulate General is just this moment in receipt of Mr. Chen’s reply
dated July 28, which has doubtless been published in the Cantonese
newspapers this morning. Copy of Mr. Chen’s note is enclosed and the
Legation’s particular attention is invited to the final paragraph which
contains a threat against the United States and other Powers concerned
in the event of a resumption of the Tariff Conference and the perfection
of arrangements for a loan to the Peking régime based on customs
receipts.
There has been considerable talk in the local newspapers of late in
advocacy of a declaration of tariff autonomy by China. Mr. Chen has not
alluded specifically to this in his conversations so far as I can
ascertain, but he has intimated on more than one occasion, as he does in
this note, that the so-called Nationalist Government will take drastic
measures of some sort should the Powers arrange for a loan to the Wu
Pei-fu–Chang Tso-lin group.
As previously reported in despatches from this Consulate General, the
Cantonese regime seems to be confident of the success of its military
expedition against the North and Mr. Chen has assured the writer of this
despatch that not only would the Cantonese armies soon reach the Yangtze
River, but that there would be a real government in Peking in the near
future with which the United States and the other Powers could deal.
Political leaders down here seem to anticipate important changes in the
affiliations of military leaders in the Yangtze Valley although they
have mentioned no names and given out no details. It is felt, however,
that the situation is full of grave possibilities and that the Legation
should be prepared for far-reaching changes in the North in the near
future. The Southerners may possibly meet with an overwhelming defeat
but if they should be successful in attracting other powerful leaders to
their cause, the predictions of the Cantonese may materialize more
speedily than now seems possible.
[Page 851]
In conclusion may I express my hearty approval of the intimation
contained in the Minister’s telegram to the effect that further
discussion with Mr. Chen is not desired … I am still of the opinion,
however, that if our Government could permit the Legation to publish a
statement more clearly defining the attitude of the United States in
relation to China, the results might be beneficial.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure]
The Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
at Canton (
Chen
) to the American
Consul General (
Jenkins
)
Sir: I have the honour to acknowledge the
receipt of your letter, dated July 26, in reply to my note of
protest against the resumption of the Special Tariff Conference at
Peking. In no querulous sense do I draw your attention to the fact
that the text of your reply was handed to Reuter’s Agency in time
for publication in Peking and elsewhere on July 24—48 hours before
it was delivered at this Ministry. While I do not wish to stress
this lapse in procedure, you will, I do not doubt, agree that its
repetition should be avoided in the future.
I note that Mr. MacMurray views my Government’s strong opposition to
the resumption of the Conference as evidence of “a disheartening
lack of unanimity amongst the Chinese people in respect to the
efforts of the Government of the United States jointly with the
other friendly Powers concerned to carry out its purpose of bringing
into effect certain re-adjustments in its treaty relations with
China.” But what seems to Mr. MacMurray to be a “disheartening lack
of unanimity” in understanding and appreciating the policy of the
United States is, in truth, a convincing proof that that policy is
wrong at once in conception and in application.
The policy is wrong because it is an expression of American failure
to realise that the Chinese situation is fundamentally a
Revolutionary situation and that, therefore, a Revolutionary i. e. a
fundamental solution is necessary as opposed to a solution involving
a series of socalled “evolutionary” re-adjustments. And the
situation is Revolutionary because the principle of change implicit
in the Revolution of 1911–12 has not yet been worked out in the life
of the Nation, particularly in its politico-economic aspect, owing
to the constant interference and intervention, direct and indirect,
of certain Foreign Powers who (to cite some signal instances) first
supported Yuan Shih-kai in his attempt to destroy the Chinese
Republic and financed him with the Re-organisation Loan of 1913,
next supported Tuan Chijui in his Anfu days and financed him with
the Nishihara and other [Page 852]
loans, then supported Wu Pei-fu and financed him with Customs and
Salt surpluses, and are now contemplating the support of a composite
strong man in the diversified persons of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin
and the financing of this brace of militarists with the proceeds of
a loan to be secured on the promised Tariff surtaxes.
Persistence in such a policy makes not only for Chinese disorder and
what is called “chaos” in this country but for the intellectual
confusion and moral bankruptcy of the diplomacy of the Powers. And
naught but a “disheartening lack of unanimity” will manifest itself
whenever the Government of the United States is moved to apply its
“evolutionary” policy to the Revolutionary facts of the Chinese
situation.
Nationalist China insists on a fundamental solution of the group of
issues known as the Chinese question. Internally, this means that
the new military and political technique which has enabled the
Nationalist Government to unify the Liang-kuang militarily, fiscally
and politically must be applied on a national scale in order that
the Chinese people may work out their own salvation in the interests
of themselves as a whole and not to subordinate the same to such
alien interests as foreign high finance and foreign trade. And
externally, the dominating feature of a fundamental solution of the
Chinese question is that America should revise its present policy of
“bringing into effect certain re-adjustments of its treaty relations
with China” and, recognising the necessity of a General
Re-adjustment of such treaty relations instead of readjustments on
the instalment plan, satisfy the demand of Nationalist China for the
substitution of the unequal treaties by other treaties consistent
with the real independence and sovereignty of China. This is a
policy that has been definitely brought within the range of
practical politics and proved to be both practicable and expedient
by the bold statesmanship of Soviet Russia.
In view of the fact that “at the moment there exists no central
government supported by all sections of China and recognized by the
interested Powers with which to deal on a basis of mutuality of
responsibilities”, it would be proper and pertinent for Mr.
MacMurray to ask with whom is America, either alone or in
conjunction with other Powers, to negotiate regarding a general
re-adjustment of China’s treaty relations with Foreign Powers. The
Foreign Powers can only negotiate, in the interests of all
concerned, with a National Government of China whose authority and
power is a reality.
As there is not such a government at the moment, I have the honour to
repeat the warning that the Nationalist Government, whose authority
is now extending to Central China, will repudiate all and every loan
to be concluded with the agents of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin in
Peking, and to add that the resumption of the Special Tariff
Conference will be viewed by my Government as a deliberate attempt
on the [Page 853] part of the United
States and the other interested Powers to convert the Chinese
Maritime Customs from a politico-fiscal organ into an engine of
war-finance and foreign intervention in China’s civil or rather
Revolutionary wars. In this event the Nationalist Government will be
compelled to take certain defensive measures.
I have [etc.]
