893.00/7166: Telegram

The Minister in China ( MacMurray ) to the Secretary of State

119. My 115, March 8, noon.

1.
Consul general at Tientsin reports that he has been informed by the local authorities that a series of 10 electrically controlled mines has been placed in Taku Channel near Spit Point buoy about 1 mile from Taku Forts where the channel is only some 500 feet wide and that pilots have been notified shipping would not be allowed in or out. The port of Tientsin is thus completely closed.
2.
Gauss further reports that, while bombardment of Taku position by Fengtien cruiser is still going on intermittently, the main movement of Tsingtau naval expedition appears to have resolved itself into a disembarkation at Pehtang about 7 miles north of Tangku where a considerable force has already been landed which has cut Peking-Mukden Railway at that point and is there engaged in fighting the Kuominchun. In the circumstances communication between Peking and the sea is entirely interrupted, contrary to the letter and spirit of articles 8 and 9 of the protocol of 1901.9
3.
There is to be a meeting of the representatives of protocol powers tomorrow morning, March 10th, to consider what if any steps should be taken in this regard. As it may be necessary for me to assume a definite position then or at a subsequent meeting, I respectfully submit the following: While the situation at Takunhas been hitherto somewhat undefined and might have afforded ground for accusations of an unneutral attitude on the part of the powers if they had demanded cessation of obstructions to sea communications in and out of Tientsin, the acknowledgment of Kuominchun in placing mines to prevent such communications has clarified matter, so that I consider that a display of international naval force for the purpose of enforcing the protocol is practicable and necessary. I believe that such action is highly expedient not only for the immediate purpose of protecting American life and property against the disastrous possibilities of mine field and bombardment, international or otherwise, by the Fengtien naval forces and the Taku Forts, but also in order to maintain the American and foreign treaty position [Page 596] wherever feasible in the rear-guard action which the treaty powers are now being forced to conduct in China—a practicability which the more difficult land situation in respect to the recent international train incidents did not permit. If unable to refer to the Department for previous approval or instruction at the time when the question comes up for decision, I shall take the position that the interested powers should join in using their naval forces for the purpose of enforcing a demand that both sides in the present hostilities refrain from action dangerous to foreign life and property in connection with the port of Tientsin. Before agreeing to this I shall make every effort to explore with my colleagues the possibilities of less drastic action as regards Central Government’s ability to cope with the situation.
4.
I feel the more satisfied of the soundness of position indicated above in view of the Department’s telegram 214, September 8, 5 p.m., 192410 in connection with enforcement of neutrality of Whangpoo River at Shanghai. In the present instance there is the further dominant consideration of the protocol with its provisions concerning communication between Peking and the sea. Indeed in view of the interruption of rail communication on every line out of Peking except to Tientsin, Peking is completely cut off from all transportation facilities until the port of Tientsin is again open.
5.
Repeated to commander in chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.
MacMurray