Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, Volume I

723.2515/2339a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Collier)

[Paraphrase]

Washington, May 22, 1926—2 p.m.

84. Yesterday in late afternoon the First Secretary of Chilean Embassy, in absence of Chilean Ambassador, delivered to me the two messages, dated May 20, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Cruchaga, which follow:⁹³

“No. 89. First. The formula suggested by the Secretary of State is so undetermined that it would be tantamount to give a step into the void. We cannot infer from it what we would really be transferring neither what we would be keeping. A plan for the division must be concrete and defined in order to be considered. We do not overlook the fact that the acceptance in principle is the virtual abandonment of the operation of the Arbitral Award, and it cannot be ignored that such a result has been and is the aim of Peru. Let the Secretary of State suppose that there is an acceptance in principle and that when the moment comes of fixing the dividing line—which will be the way of really accomplishing the equitable division—an attempt is made to relegate Chile to the Vitor line, for instance, with the abandonment of Arica and of the Railroad. The division would then be equitable for every one else but Chile. The division, let me repeat it again, must be defined as a fundamental starting point. Details of any other character, directed to insure future peace and tranquillity, can be agreed upon once that fundamental point has been established, without the determination of which we could not give our consent to the plan suggested.

Second. As I advanced to you in previous telegrams, precisely with the purpose of avoiding misunderstandings at the outset of the good offices, our sacrifices could not go beyond the cession of the Department of Tacna, Chile to keep the Department of Arica with the entire route of the Railroad. To abandon it to Peru, or to Bolivia, as a whole or in part, is beyond any possible concession from our part, because the Department of Arica is Chilean in its population and in its interests of every type, and its transfer to a different sovereignty would be an unjustice to our nationals and a source of difficulties for the acquirer, and a sure and permanent cause of conflicts between these countries. It does not seem judicious to give origin to such a state of affairs when what we are really looking for is the strengthening of peace and good relations.

Third. You must insist in the disadvantages of having Bolivia made a Party to this transaction, as we have been pointing out with entire sincerity and in a desire to avoid the complications which will surely arise. This is a question between Chile and Peru and its solution, by means of a compromise, would be simple on the proposed basis of the division of the territory. I think it is possible for me to anticipate the impression that the definitive ratification of the agreement would find no obstacle and could, therefor, be rapidly attained, thus bringing to an almost immediate close this longstanding and dangerous controversy.

Neither one of the two countries has any question pending with Bolivia. This nation has resuscitated now an aspiration or an interest which was freely abandoned on her own initiative, in the Treaty of 1904.⁹⁴ She wishes us to satisfy it and far from opposing her desires by quoting that comparatively recent Treaty, we would be ready to meet them taking into consideration our own interests, among which the paramount one is that of good and cordial neighbourly relations. Once we have settled with Peru, on terms which will insure us peace, it is well understood that for a country like ours it is an elemental international policy not to leave outstanding a situation that, however it may be, we could remedy, so much more if we consider the strong bonds of interests created by the Treaty of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia.

We wish to be understood and that some trust be placed on us or, at least, that we be credited with the ability to judge, by ourselves, our own interests, which are not directed to create sources of conflict, but, to the contrary, as we demonstrated when, without avoiding sacrifices, we successfully settled other neighbourly controversies.

In brief. We would accept the basis of the division in the general terms just pointed out, with the hope of securing the approval of the proper constitutional bodies.”

“No. 90. In order to further concrete the ideas set forth in my telegram No. 89 I wish to add:

a) We accept the division of the territory following the present inter-departmental boundaries, Chile thus remaining in possession of the Railroad’s route.

b) If it were insisted upon, we would give Bolivia a corridor with the aforementioned boundary line as an axis.

c) In order to avoid the possibility of the corridor covering the route of the Railroad, its width would be restricted or else it would be completed by Peru, the latter being compensated by Chile in other sections along the length of the same corridor.”

True significance of this maneuver can be appreciated by referring to following facts:

1. Total area of the disputed territory is approximately 10,000 square miles. At date of Treaty of Ancon, Province of Tacna comprised approximately half the total area. Since then Chile has twice readjusted the boundaries of the departments, formerly Peruvian provinces, until at present time Tacna comprises less than one-third total area.

2. From outset of the present negotiations, Chile has formally and informally contended for a division of Tacna-Arica as possible basis of settlement without intimating exactly what her idea of equitable division was.

3. On April 6 I suggested to the Peruvian and Chilean Plenipotentiaries that they accept in principle an equitable division in general terms.

4. On the same day Peru declined to accept this basis, referring to her consistent refusals of similar proposals in the past. At the same meeting Chile assented to proposal for division, but stated that formula would have to be more concrete before she could regard it as sufficient basis to warrant suspension of plebiscitary proceedings.

5. On April 15 I made my alternative suggestion for neutralization or transfer of the territory to a third power. Neutralization was promptly accepted by Peru. Chile has made no reply to either alternative of my proposal.

6. During this time there have been informal discussions which have brought into foreground idea of a Bolivian corridor; I have proposed, informally, to both Chile and Peru a modification of my proposal of April 15, as outlined in my No. 80, May 16, 2 p.m. Peru has agreed to accept this modification. The two Chilean telegrams, Nos. 89 and 90, quoted above, constitute Chile’s response. They throw much needed light upon Chilean position.

7. It appears now that Chilean Government’s conception of a division of territory is nothing more or less than allocation of the departments with their present boundaries; Peru to have Tacna; Chile to retain Arica. The corridor idea receives only specious recognition, for it is obvious that a corridor located north of and including neither the Arica-La Paz railroad nor the port of Arica would be mere strip of land which could not serve Bolivia in any true sense as an outlet to the sea. Such a corridor would run to no port or to any place at which a port could be built, and it is unthinkable that any of the interested parties would consider construction of railway parallel to existing railroad in order to make this ribbon of land serve purpose of corridor for Bolivia’s traffic; we may, therefore, dismiss the corridor as purely illusory. Reduced to lowest terms, this latest Chilean proposal, after five weeks’ delay, is a reiteration of her earlier demand, thinly disguised, for the entire Department of Arica with its present boundaries. …

8. … Chile insists that she have at least two-thirds of territory in dispute and that she make her own terms with Bolivia on latter’s access to sea. As long as Chile maintains this attitude, I shall be powerless to effect any settlement.

9. I called Ambassador Cruchaga in to see me this morning and discussed matter fully with him. Cruchaga asserts that he recommended strongly to Chilean Government the basis I laid down in my No. 80, but that both his efforts and those of Minister for Foreign Affairs have failed. He also stated that at next meeting of the Plenipotentiaries he will be bound, under his present instructions, to submit proposal embodied in telegrams Nos. 89 and 90, quoted above, from Chilean Foreign Office, and that if it is rejected, he intends to maintain silence, in this way refusing to take responsibility for breaking off negotiations. Meeting of Plenipotentiaries will probably be held Monday afternoon, May 24. If it is Chile’s last word that we have now, the record will be made accordingly. If you have any suggestions to make, your telegram should reach me not later than morning of the 24th.

Kellogg

93. Texts of messages not paraphrased.
94. Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 104.