723.2515/2168: Telegram
The Ambassador in Chile (Collier) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 21—10:25 a.m.]
87. I saw Mathieu late Tuesday night. He showed himself more willing to accept your plan in some form, but stated correctly that the sentiment of Congress and of the masses still strongly demands the plebiscite. He thinks it may change in a few days. I believe that my published notes and the letter of the President of Bolivia to President Coolidge announcing suspension of direct negotiations with Chile will have a powerful influence.
I informed Mathieu that Peru had not refused to accept cession plan. I gave him no inkling that Peru had suggested combination of the two plans. …
We must hold tenaciously to your proposition of April 15 and in no event allow it to be entirely rejected. Do not invite or permit other countries to enter into the matter except Bolivia, and then only if both Peru and Chile are willing.
What is absolutely essential here is to break down opposition to good offices, which is based upon confidence that plebiscite will not be annulled. I strongly urge the memorandum referred to in my No. 80, yesterday. Not until false idea of strength of their legal position is destroyed can you get the Cabinet or Congress to forego the plebiscite or even to suspend proceedings. Only way to change sentiment of the infatuated populace is to have some press associate spread news of Chile’s plebiscitary expenditures in such startling way that it will have to be published here. If it could also be sent out from London, Rio de Janeiro, or Buenos Aires, that would be still better. Influential businessmen would also be influenced by it and if American banks and business firms which have branches in Chile would immediately cable their correspondents inquiring about heavy expenditures and expressing fear over financial conditions, it would finally break into papers and have an effect. American papers should treat editorially of alarming condition, and press associations should cable their comments here. …