723.2515/2045: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Collier)
25. Your No. 40, March 22, 3 p.m.
(1) Since my No. 26 of March 20, 6 p.m., to you, I have received from Ambassador Cruchaga the communication you mention and a [Page 347] further memorandum from President Leguía in which the latter indicates that Peru’s position is still unaltered in respect to offer of good offices. After exchange of messages with Lassiter, I sent him last night following suggested program which I believe will be effected when Plebiscitary Commission reconvenes tomorrow:
[Here follows text of program set forth in paragraph 3 of telegram of March 22, 6 p.m., supra.]
Should Peru withdraw from plebiscite as result of these measures, I have requested General Lassiter to take briefest possible adjournment for purpose of submitting that fact to Arbitrator and receiving his instructions. Should Peru not withdraw, it is my understanding that registration will proceed at once and judgment upon question of fairness of plebiscite will be reserved until vote has been taken. I have also made the suggestion to Lassiter that, in view of Chile’s inquiry about what further guarantees or conditions are deemed necessary for the holding of a fair plebiscite, he seize this opportunity to make specific demands upon the Chilean Commissioner looking toward improvement of any conditions he thinks necessary. I have transmitted to Lassiter the communication from Mathieu on this subject, handed me yesterday by Ambassador Cruchaga.
(2) The program I telegraphed Lassiter yesterday has following advantages: (a) It provides for logical continuation of plebiscitary process, providing Peru does not withdraw, and defers decision on question of fairness until plebiscitary vote has been taken; (b) it keeps door open for negotiations for settlement, for on one hand it avoids any premature finding on conditions which might render it difficult, if not impossible, for Chile to entertain mediation, and on other hand it furnishes Peru with maximum inducement to consider settlement without a plebiscite.
In regard to Chile I am sure the risks of present situation are fully appreciated. Views of General Lassiter and of his advisers at Arica on unsatisfactoriness of existing conditions appear to be thoroughly understood. If plebiscite goes on and conditions are not improved, possibility that Lassiter may feel obliged to declare plebiscitary vote void and certify that decision to the Arbitrator must be considered. In these circumstances it seems that Chile should make strongest possible effort to improve conditions in the plebiscitary territory and, at same time, to continue receptive to diplomatic settlement of question.
(3) In regard to plebiscitary conditions, Chile’s fundamental point of view has been constantly at variance with that of the president of the Plebiscitary Commission. From time to time Chile has emphasized idea that her position as administrator of the provinces in dispute gives her advantages over the contending party which she [Page 348] is entitled, as a matter of right, to insist upon and which she is entitled to maintain; the impression has been created that Chile has tendency to give too little weight to high responsibility, necessarily imposed upon her by her position as administrator, to see that conditions are absolutely fair to both sides.
The feeling can not be avoided that if at this juncture Chile would take vigorous measures on her own initiative to guarantee public order and to punish offenses against the regulations, matters would be helped considerably. I can not, of course, at this distance make specific suggestions. I do not desire Mathieu to feel that I am putting any pressure upon him to agree to an enlargement without limitation of Arbitrator’s powers, as such a step is something outside the protocol of submission. This suggestion did not originate with me but came from Santiago. I have not consulted the Arbitrator on question whether he would accept unlimited powers, and anyway he could not accept them unless Peru were willing.
You might understand my telegram No. 26 of March 20, 6 p.m., as an invitation to bring pressure to bear on Chile. It was not so intended. I have taken every appropriate step to afford Peru opportunity to accept our good offices, or mediation, but to present she has declined.