723.2515/2045: Telegram
The Ambassador in Chile (Collier) to the Secretary of State
40. Your No. 26, March 20, 6 p.m. I have had a long talk with Mathieu. He is not able to reach decision immediately, as President Figueroa will not return to Santiago until noon tomorrow and also because Mathieu has had an engagement for some time to address the Senate in Executive session on Tacna-Arica question; he dare not recommend that Chile submit matter to Arbitrator without limitation on latter’s powers until he ascertains sentiments of Chilean Congress. He said that he was unable thus to repudiate protocol of Washington [Page 341] without congressional approval. In answer to a question from me he said he thought he could accept good offices or mediation.
Although Mathieu insists on continuing with plebiscite without interruption, I think that if there is possibility that Commission will pass resolution terminating plebiscite it would be better to postpone again for some 10 or 15 days. The purpose of the postponement, however, would be defeated if put upon ground that conditions did not yet permit holding of fair plebiscite, or if impression were given that postponement had been granted to open way for some method of solution besides plebiscite. There should be some reason given that will not add to belief of Peruvians that Commission is sympathetic to their views.
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Mathieu said that even if there had been some irregularities before he returned here, he felt that, in general, order had been good since then and that presence of 600 Peruvians peacefully camped at Arica was proof of that fact. It was impossible for him to see how Arbitrator could say that present conditions prevented fair plebiscite; Chile would regret keenly decision by Arbitrator’s representative that fraud and violence rendered the plebiscite impracticable; the Chilean Congress realized injury that such a decision would cause, but was disposed, nevertheless, to appeal to judgment of the world. He astonished me by adding that Chile would not abandon the province if plebiscite were held impracticable. In that event, he said, let the Peruvians come and try to evict the Chileans. If plebiscite be held, Chile will accept result in good faith, whatever it may be.
He read me closing paragraph of telegram he had sent to Chilean Ambassador at Washington on March 18,28a in which he instructed Ambassador Cruchaga to ascertain specifically from you what further guarantees or conditions consistent with award the Arbitrator would consider necessary to hold an honest plebiscite. He declared that he had accepted post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to cooperate with you in carrying out award; and he said that he was completely discouraged, for, although he had complied with every demand Arbitrator had made and had offered to do everything else consistent with the award, there was on General Lassiter’s part an ill-concealed intention never to permit the plebiscite.
Mathieu showed me a telegram he had sent a few days ago to Ambassador Cruchaga stating that he thought his own 7 years of work in Washington endeavoring to bring Chile and the United States into close friendly relations were now being undone and that his age and failing vigor were not sufficient to cope with the task he was facing; he felt a break with the United States would soon come and that he would resign first. He repeated this statement during the conversation [Page 342] and said that he might resign after addressing Congress on Thursday.
I told him that now was the time to stick to his post and to render his country a real service. He asked what, placed in his position, I should do. I said that I had no authority to speak for the Secretary of State but that it was my personal belief that I should offer to leave entire matter to Arbitrator without limitations.
Mathieu repeated his doubts about congressional approval; and he said that Peru would interpret this step as a sign of weakness and that the United States had shown no willingness to try to get Peru to accept such an arrangement, although virtually trying to coerce Chile to accept it. I asked what he meant by “coercing”. He said by such statements as General Lassiter had made to Claro at last meeting of Commission; these statements were that Commission would have to vote impracticability of plebiscite and put blame on Chile unless conditions changed. Mathieu characterized these statements as a threat. I said that they were neither a threat nor pressure, but were a friendly allusion to conditions which were thought bad, in hope that Chile might find way to correct them. I said that my own inference was that trouble arose from fact that though many guarantees had been given by Chilean Government, they were not carried out by officials.
We talked about two hours. Mathieu referred again and again to difficulty of getting Chilean Congress to approve an unlimited enlargement of Arbitrator’s faculties; but he said that if Chile could be assured she would receive Arica, the Congress would promptly give authorization. He again expressed wish that it were possible to have separate plebiscites, one for Tacna, the other for Arica.
Toward the end he made the only practicable suggestion, worthy possibly of serious consideration. He said in effect: The Chilean Government has accepted mediation; it could do this as acceptance was advisory rather than obligatory, and for that reason Chilean Congress did not have to be consulted in advance. Let the Arbitrator bring pressure on Peru to induce her to accept mediation. He can compel both nations to consent to mediation and then to accept whatever he recommends. He can use same measure toward Chile that his representative is using now, namely, to have Commission vote passage of a resolution that plebiscite cannot be held because of the alleged frauds and violence. He can coerce Peru by letting her know that procrastination, evasion, vague generalization and much agitation, and unsupported accusations must cease and that plebiscite will be held at once. At the present moment the United States will not allow the plebiscite to be held and Peru will not allow any other solution to be tried. If mediation is accepted, let the plebiscite be kept alive by adjournment so that its coercive power will not lapse.