723.2515/1952: Telegram
The Ambassador in Chile (Collier) to the Secretary of State
23. After the Minister for Foreign Affairs had handed me his memorandum last night, he entered into conversation and made several statements which, he said, were not at all to be thought as limiting, or qualifying, or even as interpreting his formal memorandum accepting our good offices. He said that as I had given him some idea of feeling of American Government on serious situation growing out of difficulties placed in way of honest plebiscite, he felt he ought to give me views of Chilean Government, as well as his own, especially some idea of what he thought to be limit of concession which the Government could get Chilean Congress to approve.
The Minister said that the tender of good offices came at time when plebiscitary situation was thought by all Chileans who had exact knowledge of it to be most favorable to Chile; that Chile had given the irrevocable guarantees that had been demanded and had reduced her military and police force in the province to comply with wishes of the Commission, and was at present time maintaining as reasonable degree of order as it was possible to expect in human affairs; that Chile’s demand for adoption of electoral law had at last been complied with; that qualifications for voters had been determined; and that Chile would win by majority of not less than one or two thousand. He thought that when the American Government exercises its good offices, it should take these facts into consideration.
I believe sincerity of Minister’s statement about Chilean confidence. When Mathieu was in Washington he doubted that Chile would be [Page 307] successful, but since his visit to Arica he is convinced Chile will win. This confidence is general but not universal. …
Mr. Mathieu also said that treaty of 1904 between Bolivia and Chile8 created certain obligations for Chile towards Bolivia as well as rights with reference to port of Arica and Arica-La Paz railroad; and that inasmuch as large majority of population and practically all business and industry of Arica were Chilean, the Government believed that Chilean Congress would not consent to surrendering Department of Arica at this time, but would be willing to give entire Department of Tacna to Peru. He said that the Government believed that the most important thing for Chile, however, was to obtain Bolivian friendship; and that at once after acquiring definite title to Arica, it would negotiate with Bolivia to give that country a port, but that compensation would be expected for it, and intimated that commercial concessions would be satisfactory.
I explained to Mathieu that I had no instructions from you to ask him any questions and that he must not infer from any I asked either that you wished the information or that it indicated any idea or plan you were entertaining; then I inquired if he thought that it would be wise to attempt to adjust the entire Pacific question now, including Bolivian aspirations. Mathieu replied that that would complicate matters. He said that your tender of our good offices spoke only of the difficulties between Peru and Chile, and he thought that limiting the matter in this way would be better, leaving Bolivian question for subsequent negotiations between that country and Chile.
I inquired if Chile were willing to give Bolivia a strip 5 kilometers wide both sides the railway, Peru in turn to do the same. Mathieu said he thought it might be arranged that way, but he did not appear to have given the question very careful study. He said more than once in his conversation that Chile would accept almost any arrangement which did not take the Department of Arica away from her.
It is my impression that Chile wants to use Arica for trading purposes, and earnestly wishes an arrangement with Bolivia; but that she will be apt to exact a heavy price for it or impose conditions Bolivia will not be disposed to accept. If question is postponed and is left to direct negotiations, these will be protracted and may possibly not terminate successfully, an outcome that would be disturbing to South American harmony and that would create a new delicate situation. If Peru and Chile can nevertheless be induced to agree to a partition of the territory, as Mathieu suggested, this arrangement will be in accord with racial majorities in each of the two departments, and may save each nation from mortification of complete defeat. That outcome would be great step forward and we [Page 308] could then afford to leave Bolivian question to the future, especially if great difficulty be met in getting Chile entirely agreeable with Bolivia as well as Peru at present time.
I assume that Chile will yield more than Mathieu set forth in his conversation yesterday with me. It is even possible that Chile might be persuaded to settle Bolivian question now or even to consent to independence and neutralization of entire territory as Edwards has suggested. It is reported that ex-President Alessandri would support this way of solution if plebiscite cannot be held; but Mathieu foresees certain difficulties and much opposition in Congress.
If Chile really believes that Plebiscitary Commission is going to declare plebiscite impracticable, placing responsibility for this result on Chile, she will naturally yield a great deal, but care must be taken that no formal or written statement be made to Chile to the effect that Commission is likely to take action of this sort, if we wish Chile to accept any other proposition that we may want to make at the time; for it would be interpreted as a threat and, no matter what the peril Chile would run, the Government probably would reject any new proposition and would defiantly challenge indictment Commission would make.
When I presented your memorandum to Mathieu I spoke to him personally in strong manner about the conditions in the province. He was much impressed and I believe that my statements influenced Government’s decision to accept our good offices, but last night he told me that he would not have dared tell the Government that I had made any such statement formally, as effect would have been to arouse anger and to cause rejection of your offer.
Mathieu also yesterday made some reference to the economic interdependence of Tacna and Arica; he also referred to Chile’s having erected some public works which served needs of the respective departments, possibly, in some instances, both departments. He was of opinion that Chile’s expenditures for these purposes ought to be given consideration by the President when he exercises his good offices; he also hinted that Chile might invite consideration of old loans made to Peruvian governments, and to certain debts, all of them dating, it seems to me, from period of the War of the Pacific or to efforts made by Chileans to maintain Peruvian governments in power after Chilean occupation of Lima.
Mathieu did not, however, lay much stress on points in last paragraph. He again told me yesterday that he was continually meeting with stiff opposition from within the Cabinet.
- Telegram in four sections.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 104.↩